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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I challenge the validity of a pervasive conception of political 
action and decision-making that grounds both on the so-called “public use of 
reason”. The latter, underpinned by a notion of “pure” reason inherited from the 
Enlightenment and largely sustained by liberal theory, not only promotes a 
reductionist view of human rationality, but also implicitly leads us to disregard a 
critical aspect in contemporary politics: the political role of the emotions. 
 The opportunity to exploit the emotions in order to pervert the democratic 
process follows from that disregard. Reading it in light of Schmitt and Agamben’s 
ideas on the state of exception, I examine the pervasiveness of emotional dynamics 
in contemporary western politics, illuminating phenomena such as democratic 
propaganda, the ongoing “war on terror”, and the persistent threat of global 
economic collapse. I subsequently posit that the rationalistic hubris of the politics of 
(limited) rationality opens the door for irrational politics, ultimately enabling the 
creation of a permanent state of exception through the manipulation of misguided 
emotional inclinations. 
In order to address this problem, I argue for an abandonment of the sterile 
reason-emotion dichotomy implicitly preserved by the current debate on the 
cognitive status of emotions. Instead, I propose an expanded model of human 
rationality, which incorporates emotion into processes such as decision-making, 
motivation, and action – thus arriving at the notion of emotional rationality. This 
enables me to consider the commonly overlooked possibility to educate emotions, 
and advance a conception of emotional education that relates them with the 
Aristotelian notion of phronesis. I conclude by arguing that a heightened political 
awareness of emotions and a conscious effort to educate them are necessary steps 
towards avoiding the undesirable political fate entailed by our present situation. 
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Introduction 
 
“For when appetites overstep their bounds and, galloping away, so to speak, whether 
in desire or aversion, are not well held in hand by reason, they clearly overleap all 
bound and measure; for they throw obedience off and leave it behind and refuse to 
obey the reins of reason, to which they are subject by Nature's laws” (Marcus Tulius 
Cicero, De Officiis) 
 
The metaphor of human emotion as a rampant horse, demanding steadfast 
reining in by the horseman of reason is one that – knowingly or otherwise – has been 
a significant part of western thought. It is pervasive in common-sense knowledge – 
the familiar notion that one must keep emotions in check in order to make sound 
decisions or behave appropriately – but almost just as so in philosophical reflexion. 
Within the latter, the perils of ungoverned emotions and their potentially destructive 
consequences have been a recurring theme, underpinned by a simple rationale: since 
“raw” emotionality brings us closer to the base instinctiveness of animals than to 
luminous wisdom, human beings should not be, by nature and definition, emotional 
creatures. Emotion has thus often been regarded as an accident that threatens to sully 
the human soul’s potential for virtue, a somewhat fateful circumstance of life whose 
influence on the latter fortunately can – and indeed should – be subdued and 
minimized via the influence of reason. Those are, in fact, as Cicero puts it, “Nature’s 
laws”, and any other relation between reason and emotion would thus not only be 
disadvantageous, but unnatural. 
Sometimes regarded as an unfit or unimportant topic for philosophical 
inquiry, the emotions have nevertheless recently been the subject of a disciplinarily 
broad wave of research interest, animated by the conviction that human existence 
cannot be genuinely understood – or experienced – without regarding it in its 
wholeness. The idea of a purely rational human being, which was never more than a 
useful fiction, has increasingly come to lose even its status as aspiration, following a 
revaluation of the legitimate role of emotion in various dimensions of human 
existence. Damásio’s famous Descartes’ Error is perhaps one of the most significant 
contemporary works in that regard, having managed to convey the instrumentality of 
emotion towards a fulfilling existence to an audience well outside the usual academic 
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circles. Popular works such as Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow (2011) and 
Haidt’s The Righteous Mind (2012) have both followed and revitalized that trend, 
having contributed to foster a generalized rethinking of the processes of reasoning, 
moral judgement, and general decision-making to include something other than 
purely rational mechanisms.  
Following this renewed interest in the emotions, some studies have surfaced 
proposing to examine their role in one of the most critical dimensions of human 
existence: the political (Ahmed, 2004; Moïsi, 2009; Nussbaum, 2013). They have, 
however, proved unable to significantly alter the paradigm of political thought 
regarding the matter. Within contemporary democratic states, charges and counter-
charges of appeals to voters’ emotions remain commonplace in the verbal jousting of 
political actors, with such appeals frequently denounced as illegitimate attempts at 
base manipulation. Even if emotions are surreptitiously regarded by the political 
strategist as useful political instruments, in public discourse there is a relative 
consensus regarding the unacceptable possibility of emotions infiltrating the 
deliberative exercise – for emotions impair judgement, and sound, reasonable 
judgment is the sine qua non condition of the democratic process1. 
A philosophical examination of the role of emotion in politics is, at this point, 
a necessity. The prevailing current approaches, stemming from fields like political 
science and political economy, lack the comprehensiveness to truly progress beyond 
the circumstantial, and thus reach the deeper existential layer of the problem. 
Generally speaking, little thought is spent on the possibility that emotions are 
necessarily and legitimately involved in the political process. On the contrary, the 
fact that they have been proved to influence voters’ behaviour usually leads back to 
the conclusion that political actors must strive to keep emotions in check. But what if 
emotions are inextricably involved in the political process? Would not our ignorance 
of that fact be substantially more dangerous?  In light of this possibility, statistical 
studies on the effectiveness of campaign ads focussing on either “positive” or 
“negative” emotions, while instrumentally useful, cannot constitute the full scope of 
our concerns; the reason why emotions play a role, the extent to which they do, how 
                                                           
1
 It is interesting to note how this sort of argument resembles those employed to oppose women’s 
suffrage. It seems the concession made afterwards was not that there was nothing fundamentally 
wrong with being an intrinsically emotional being, but rather that women were capable of being just 
as unemotional as men. 
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their presence comes to shape our political reality, and how this should direct both 
our political education and action, are more worthwhile questions.  
In order to answer such questions, however, we must overcome a significant 
gap in the contemporary study of emotion, whose expression is essentially threefold. 
It begins, in western political thought, with an almost endemic aversion towards any 
serious attempt to include emotion in the political process as something other than an 
avoidable and disruptive influence. That aversion, as we shall realize, is the result of 
a widespread rationalistic conception of politics, that regards emotion as essentially 
a- or even anti-political. Although the existence of this political rationalism is 
reasonably evident, its origin and philosophical foundations remain largely 
unexplored – and must thus be identified and examined before anything else. 
Secondly, while the traditional hierarchy of the relationship between reason 
and emotion is often questioned and even inverted in current literature, a critical 
rethinking of the nature of that relationship, truly challenging its assumed dichotomy, 
is still sorely lacking. If anything, that dichotomy has extended itself to the framing 
of the debate, opposing cognitivist perspectives – that ultimately attempt to subsume 
emotions into reason, likening them to rational judgements or appraisals – to non-
cognitivist ones, which either adopt a quasi-Humean stance, or regard emotions as 
purely somatic phenomena which are rationally contextualized ex post facto. To 
resolve this unfruitful disagreement, a new conception of human rationality is 
required, one within which reason and emotion are not either’s slaves, but different 
expressions of the same phenomenon of consciousness. 
Thirdly, even though the influence of emotions in general decision-making 
and political deliberation is sometimes acknowledged, it is systematically done from 
a standpoint that preserves the aforementioned dichotomy. A good example is 
provided by the debate surrounding rational choice and game theories, which 
opposes proponents of so-called “rational” and “irrational” sources of political 
behaviour, in a battle to assert the effectiveness of descriptive and predictive models 
– but without fully considering the implications of the anthropological conception 
they are implicitly advancing. In terms of political theory, this entails that most 
accounts of emotional influence fail to apprehend the pervasiveness of the latter, and 
how it has come to shape the very political landscape that it is presumed to affect 
solely by accident. In terms of knowledge of the human mind, on the other hand, it 
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further promotes an inauthentic, virtually bicephalous conception that must be 
abandoned.  
 Unless these aspects are addressed, our understanding of the complex relation 
between reason, emotion, and politics will remain fundamentally flawed, neither a 
credit to philosophical knowledge nor a worthy guide for our political action. If and 
when they are, however, we will still be left with the present consequences of our 
long-standing disregard for emotion’s place in the political sphere. Chief among 
them, our permeability to certain instruments of political manipulation – such as 
propaganda and the abuse of the state of exception – that have decisively marked our 
recent political history, and threaten to continue to do so if the problem of emotion is 
left fundamentally ignored. Here too our contribution can add something new to the 
discussion. A critical look at our political reality, informed by our philosophical 
inquiry into emotion’s political role, will unveil the nature of such threats. It will 
allow us to relate significant politico-philosophical conceptions such as Schmitt’s 
and Agamben’s to our work on emotion, and consequently apply that relation to shed 
light on some of the most significant – and democratically dangerous – political 
challenges of our time. And it may even enable us to point out possible routes to 
address them.  
 Informed and animated by these concerns, the core thesis posited here can be 
thus summarized: there is an overly rationalistic understanding of human rationality 
in western politics, which allows for the exploitation of certain political expedients – 
such as propaganda and the state of exception – in order to manipulate citizens, and 
therefore entails a serious risk towards the sustainability to the democratic system. 
That risk, I argue, can only be coherent and efficiently addressed by taking the 
education of emotions as a serious concern within political education.  
 With this brief outline of the argument in mind, the first chapter will consist 
of an examination of the rationalistic bias of contemporary western politics, its 
politico-philosophical roots, and whether the usual arguments of its critics are not 
actually allowing the most significant problem at stake – the political role of 
emotions – to go unnoticed. 
 The second chapter will progress deeper into the philosophical roots of the 
problem by considering the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion, in an 
attempt to expose and overcome its reductionist effect – particularly in the political 
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sphere. In order to achive this, I propose a model of human rationality which 
transcends the dichotomy imposed by the Enlightenment’s notion of “pure reason” 
and moves towards a more holistic understanding of reason and emotion: an 
emotional rationality. 
 In the third chapter, I build upon the conclusions of these efforts and reflect 
on the difference between individual psychology and group dynamics in what 
pertains to political deliberation and decision-making, focussing especially on the 
phenomena of contemporary mediatised rhetoric, expert systems, our cognitive 
insufficiency regarding political matters, and an eventual democratic need for 
propaganda. 
 Drawing on preceeding chapters, as well as on the work of thinkers like Carl 
Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, the fourth chapter considers contemporary events 
such as the 9/11 attacks in New York, the ensuing (and ongoing) “war on terror”, the 
seemingly cyclical WHO pandemic alerts, and the threat of worldwide economic 
collapse, employing them to examine how the hubris of reason in politics can enable 
the creation of a permanent state of exception and plant the seeds of despotism 
within a democratic polity.  
 The pressing twofold question raised by this realization – namely, how that 
risk comes about and what can be done to circumvent it – provides the motif for the 
final two chapters. Starting from the premise that any significant political vices 
within contemporary democratic states (as well as the possibility for their solution) 
decisively depend on the [political] education of citizens, chapter five seeks to 
examine the ideological and pedagogic foundations of what we might generally term 
the western system of formal schooling, and how they might be contributing for the 
problem rather than for its solution.  
 Chapter six builds upon this critical examination and considers the question 
of how an alternate model of education – one that regards emotion as an integral part 
of political virtue – might be achieved, thus dispelling the danger posed by a political 
existence led under what we might dub the “rationalistic illusion” of contemporary 
politics. I will conclude by examing whether there are valid alternatives to the 
customary (and reductionist) appeal towards a suppression of emotion in the political 
sphere, casting a critical glance at popular theories presenting themselves as such – 
like Daniel Goleman’s model of Emotional Intelligence.   
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 Ultimately, the political essence of the problem at hand can be synthesised in 
a simple question: is it preferable to accept a comfortable but dangerous fiction, or be 
forced to address an uncomfortable and taxing reality? Such is a question which, in 
Philosophy, can only have one answer. 
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Chapter I – Political Rationalism 
 
 Contemporary western politics have come to be widely dominated by the 
assumptions and expectations of liberalism. That influence is felt both in the political 
sphere – where liberal ideals purportedly animate much of the policy-making and the 
political justification in western polities – and in the realm of economics – where 
economic liberalism (or “neo-liberalism”, as it is sometimes termed) increasingly 
determines the nature of interactions. The existence of a worldwide market economy, 
sustained and enforced by international agencies such as the IMF or the ECB, 
ensures that the rule of the game for polities around the globe is increasingly evident: 
embrace and agree to be shaped by that neoliberal agenda, or suffer under the 
unrelenting pressure of the markets.  
That there are significant political and economical consequences to this 
should be immediately clear; what interests us are its less obvious philosophical 
implications, which are liable to affect not only the nature of our interactions in the 
public sphere, but also the very nature of human experience. In what follows, we will 
attempt to demonstrate that liberalism – both as political theory and practice – is the 
main source of a rationalistic bias that characterizes contemporary western politics, 
and ultimately presents a significant danger to the sustainability of democratic 
politics.  
Regarding this, an important caveat must be made: in light of the relation we 
will seek to establish between liberalism and political rationalism, one might 
hurriedly assume that our criticism ultimately aims to target the former through (or 
even rather than) the latter. That, however, is simply not the case. The target of our 
critique is, unequivocally, political rationalism – more specifically, a particular form 
of the latter that is exhibited and promoted by liberalism. Liberalism, however, is 
obviously far from being the sole source of a rationalistic bias in contemporary 
politics; both communism and socialism, for instance, could be perceived as 
encompassing an appeal to the rationalization of politics at least as great as 
liberalism’s, and thus warrant the same kind of criticism in that regard.  
The question that concerns us here, however, is neither what all the possible 
sources of political rationalism might be, nor which one of those three ideological 
currents – i.e., liberalism, communism, or socialism – is the most “rationalistic” in 
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itself. The truly relevant question, in light of our concerns, is simultaneously more 
pragmatic and ideologically neutral: what is, considering the current political reality 
of the West, the most likely and pervasive source of a pernicious kind of political 
rationalism? Given the particular circumstances of that reality, liberalism – through 
its collaboration with other ideological constructs that we will mention further down 
– presents itself as the clearest answer. That, and no other reason, is what motivates 
the following examination of the nature of liberalism's central tenets and the manner 
in which it finds itself interconnected with other dimensions of contemporary 
political existence that further amplify its influence. 
 
 
1. Liberalism and Rationality 
 
What is “liberalism”? As Ryan puts it, one is “immediately faced with an 
embarrassing question: are we dealing with liberalism or with liberalisms? It is easy 
to list famous liberals; it is harder to say what they have in common” (2012, p. 21). 
In light of the changing character of liberalism across history (and distinct 
representatives), it may indeed appear more reasonable to seek an understanding of 
“liberalisms” rather than of its singular form. Or perhaps, as Wall suggests, 
liberalism should be understood as a single political tradition, but one that is not very 
unified, encompassing a variety of rival strands of thought” (2015, p. 1). For one, the 
rivalry between so-called “classical” and “modern” liberalism – the former being 
“limited in its aims, cautious about its metaphysical basis, and political in its 
orientation”, while the latter is “unlimited, incautious, global in its aims, and a threat 
to the achievements of ‘classical liberalism’” (Ryan, 2012, pp. 24-5).  
A related issue is the divergence between liberalism and libertarianism, which 
exhibits a similar “tendency for the partisans of one side or the other to claim that 
their version of liberalism is true liberalism and the alternative something else 
entirely” (Idem, p. 26). The distinction between the two, however, cannot be so 
easily drawn – in essence, “[b]oth are committed to the promotion of individual 
liberty; both rest most happily on a theory of human rights according to which 
individuals enter the world with a right to the free disposal of themselves and their 
resources” (Idem, p. 27). When they differ, it is almost exclusively on the status and 
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necessity of government, as well as the fact that libertarians tend to regard “rights as 
a form of private property” (Idem). 
 Given the complexity of liberalism as both political theory and practice, it 
might seem impossible to define it with total accuracy. But perhaps an absolutely 
closed definition is unnecessary for our present purposes. If, instead, we focus on 
unveiling the foundations of the idea presiding over its various manifestations, it 
should still be possible to find crucial points of contact. Now, those foundations are – 
roughly speaking – typically provided via either “natural rights, social contract, [or] 
consequentialist approaches” (Swan, 2015, p. 9). The points of contact between 
them, on the other hand, consist in the key liberal values shared by all – autonomy, 
liberty, and, most crucially, rationality. Retrospectively, natural rights “were taken to 
provide the rational grounding for a political order that preserved individual 
liberties”; social contract theories assumed the possession of rationality on the part of 
contractees as sine qua non of its legitimacy; and consequentialist approaches such 
as Mill’s have consistently appealed to “the fundamental idea of utilitarian ethics – 
its commitment to rationality” (Ryan, 2012, p. 259). The latter can even be regarded 
as the guarantor of the other cited key values of liberalism – inasmuch as true 
autonomy and liberty cannot be said to exist without the ability to know and to 
pursue further knowledge.  
One of the core beliefs of liberalism lies in the conviction that it is possible to 
comprehend (and therefore organize) the world around us through the use of reason. 
It is, as Waldron notes, a conviction that mirrors the Enlightenment’s “burgeoning 
confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its irregularities 
and fundamental principles, to predict its future, and to manipulate its powers for the 
benefit of mankind” (1987, p. 134). This is held to be true both in what pertains to 
the material world – by means of scientific and technological advancement – and to 
the more intangible circumstances of human existence – via a rationalization of the 
fields of morals, economy, and politics.  
 The claim that reason is the most important of all human faculties is 
simultaneously the logical antecedent and consequence of such a belief. Thus, the 
anthropological conception of liberalism becomes self-evident: human beings are 
essentially rational beings; the greater the purity of that rationality, the higher the 
degree of human perfection. In all realms of human existence, rational behaviour 
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becomes the standard and the aspiration of the liberal thinker. Morality should be 
regarded as either a rational calculus of utility or a matter of obeying a universal law 
derived from reason. Economic relationships ought to be grounded upon a rational 
understanding of market logic in order to maximize profits and reduce the risk of 
loss. Social life must be regarded as a matter of accurately identifying the best means 
to pursue the rationally acknowledged greatest common good. The appeal to 
rationality in all these different spheres of human existence ultimately comes 
together in the sphere that encompasses them all: the political. If individuals can 
“grasp the rational order of the world as the Enlightenment promised, […] each 
individual, as a rational agent is in a position to demand that the [political] 
restrictions on his freedom be justified to him” (Wall, 2015, p. 4). To liberalism, 
politics (and political actors) are ruled by – and should hence be understood on the 
basis of – rational principles. Thus politics become rationalized, to the extent that 
rationality itself becomes politicised. 
 This realization – that politics have become increasingly rationalized – is 
neither unprecedented nor wholly original. Oakeshott’s Rationalism in Politics 
([1962] 1991) notably posits that this rationalization of politics is found across all 
political persuasions, moulding the intellectual matrix of the West to the extent that 
either “by conviction, by its supposed inevitability, by its alleged success, or even 
quite unreflectively, almost all politics today have become Rationalist or near-
Rationalist” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 5). According to him, in no other field of human 
activity has rationalism become so pervasive and influential as in politics, fuelled by 
the post-Enlightenment conviction that if reason should be the guide of our conduct 
of life, it should also guide us regarding public affairs. Consequently, the prevalent 
political type has gradually become that of the “political rationalist”, who 
 
stands for independence of mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any 
authority save the authority of ‘reason’. […] Moreover, he is fortified by a belief in a 
‘reason’ common to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration […]. But 
besides this, which gives the Rationalist a touch of intellectual equalitarianism, he is 
something also of an individualist, finding it difficult to believe that anyone who can 
think honestly and clearly will think differently than himself (Idem, pp. 5-6) 
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 The question of the origin of this rationalism is one that Oakeshott briefly 
addresses, by linking it to a conception of technical (as opposed to practical) 
knowledge largely deduced from Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode and Bacon’s 
Novum Organum2. Although we broadly agree with that assessment, it fails to fully 
account for the complexity of the question. Crucially, and while Oakeshott did not 
explicitly state it, the above characterization of the political rationalist patently 
incorporates some of the key tenets of liberalism – autonomy, critical reason, and 
equalitarianism – along with one of its most common critiques: individualism. As 
such, I would contend, there is good reason to expand the search for the source of 
any contemporary political rationalism to the roots it might share with liberalism.   
The clearest testament to the origin of the rationalistic spirit of liberalism – 
and of the politicisation of rationality – can be found in Kant’s An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?, where he postulates the “public use of one’s 
reason” as the essential demanded by the Enlightenment. Human reason applied to 
public [political] life was for him the culmination of the laudable motion towards 
rationality that the Enlightenment inaugurated. And it is this idea of the public use of 
reason advanced by him that still animates the work of those who were principally 
responsible in shaping and establishing what is known as modern liberal political 
theory. Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1984), for instance, argues for 
a rehabilitation of the Enlightenment’s ideal of rationality against Max Weber’s 
critical account of the process of rationalization of politics, thus facilitating the birth 
of what he perceived to be a much needed communicative rationality. In a similar 
manner, Rawls’ Political Liberalism (1996) famously postulates the idea of a public 
reason, the exercise of which is sine qua non of a liberal democratic polity and the 
kind of overlapping consensus that the latter’s endurance requires. 
 Interestingly, it is mostly the relative prevalence of Rawls’ work in this field 
that has muddled our perception of the origin and significance of the idea of public 
reason within contemporary liberalism. Many “believe that if there is such a creature 
as ‘public reason liberalism’ it is a Rawlsian creation”; the truth, however, is that  the 
“social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant are all based on the 
conviction that the main aim of political philosophy is to identify an agreed-upon 
public judgement or public reason” (Gaus, 2015, p. 112). From very early on, 
                                                           
2
 See Oakeshott, 1991, pp. 17-25. 
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liberalism and public reason converged as “interrelated responses to the modern 
problem of creating a stable social order in societies deeply divided by religious and 
moral disagreements” (Idem, pp 112-3). As such, and despite some critics of Rawls’ 
specific approach arguing to the contrary, this so-called public reason liberalism 
relies on a conception of public reason which aims to cope with cultural diversity, by 
allowing “the different reasons (and reasoning) of citizens [to] converge on liberal 
principles, rules, and institutions” (Idem, p. 113). In the pursuit of this intent, 
liberalism has necessarily interfaced (and integrated) with other compatible – albeit 
conceptually independent – politico-philosophical constructs, which have served not 
only to legitimize the rationalistic nature of former, but also to deepen and intensify 
its effect.  
 
1.1. Liberal Rationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
 
Liberalism is often associated with cosmopolitanism, to the point that many 
liberal theorists seem to acknowledge the existence of an almost umbilical 
relationship between the two (Nussbaum, 1996, 1997, 2000; Moellendorf, 2002; 
Kok-Chor, 2002). Considering the nature of both concepts, that relationship is 
logically consequent: after all, what has constituted the foundation of 
cosmopolitanism since Diogenes the Cynic first uttered the words “I am a citizen of 
the world” is the same universalistic account of human reason espoused by 
ideologies such as liberalism – or socialism. 
A brief caveat: admittedly, it may appear strange to throw liberalism and 
socialism together in this fashion, without making any sort of fundamental 
distinction between them. But despite their obvious differences in approach to a 
number of socio-economic issues, there is something concerning which they are very 
much in agreement: a profound faith in the power of human rationality and the 
consequences the latter necessarily entails for the political realm. Indeed, one could 
even argue that “as a doctrine socialism is not so much a call to reject the principles 
of liberalism as a claim that it alone can fulfil them” (Gamble, 1990, p. 100). And in 
sharing the aforementioned faith in rationality, liberalism and socialism can also be 
said to share a “final great bond” which “lay in the cosmopolitan and universal 
principles they both embraced” (Idem, p. 108). Regardless of whether one is looking 
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at the United States of America Declaration of Independence or at The Communist 
Manifesto, both cosmopolitan rationality and designs are there to be found. 
The argument that cosmopolitanism is implied whenever one embraces the 
same kind of perspective on rationality adopted by liberalism is far from intellectual 
novelty. If we once again return to Kantian philosophy, we may unambiguously 
realize it. Both Perpetual Peace and Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose clearly point towards the morally necessary transition 
between acknowledging the kind of universal[izable] rationality that Kant regarded 
as intrinsically human, and drawing from it significant political consequences – 
namely, the responsibility to lead humanity away from the limited political 
conception of nation-states, and towards a truly cosmopolitan existence. Thus, if 
liberalism adopted a universal reason, it could not do without – at least to some 
degree – embracing cosmopolitanism as well.  
In socio-political terms, “the cosmopolitan idea was to follow logically from 
the avowed universalism of liberalism”, and it was a view espoused by many that 
even a “liberal theory of justice is a reductio ad absurdum if it cannot be 
universalised to support a theory of cosmopolitan justice” (Kok-Chor, 2002, pp. 431-
2). While the notion of a necessary political affiliation between liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism has recently been subjected to substantial criticism – namely, on 
the part of proponents of an alternative “liberal nationalism” such as Tamir (1995) 
and Callan (1997) – there still seems to be an inherent mutual attraction that causes 
liberal theorists to gravitate towards cosmopolitanism. That attraction is caused 
precisely by the shared conception of rationality that Kant had already 
acknowledged. 
The connection between cosmopolitanism and liberalism thus persists today, 
albeit often in a much more complex and nuanced manner. Martha Nussbaum, for 
instance, famously argues for a civic education on the grounds of a liberal education 
imbued with cosmopolitan concerns – an idea which she advances most explicitly in 
For Love of Country (1996) and Cultivating Humanity (1997), and which has 
probably been one of the key catalysts for the contemporary discussion around 
cosmopolitanism in both politics and philosophy. Liberal and cosmopolitan 
principals are, in Nussbaum’s conception, tightly interwoven. Both are instrumental 
in combating the pernicious temptation to construct citizenship simply by “finding in 
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an idealized image of nation or leader a surrogate parent to do our thinking for us”; 
against the latter, it is the task of educators “to show our students the beauty and 
interest of a life that is open to the whole world”, and that there is “more genuine 
love and friendship in a life of questioning and self-government than in submission 
to authority” (1997, p 84). Ultimately, the key liberal goals of “equality and justice” 
are not only in line with, but indeed “better served by […] the very old ideal of the 
cosmopolitan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human 
beings” (1996, p. 4).  
Recent work on the subject has taken matters beyond the concerns expressed 
by Nussbaum, to include discussion around the phenomena surrounding 
globalization and how they affect the possibility of forming genuinely cosmopolitan 
political arrangements (Audi, 2009; Maak, 2009; Went, 2004). We have even 
witnessed the rise of a sort of economic cosmopolitanism – stemming from Hayek’s 
defence of a liberal global market order that ought to supersede individual States – 
which has complicated matters by creating a conceptual rift between it and 
“philosophical” cosmopolitanism. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the nuances that separate the different 
contemporary approaches to cosmopolitanism, all of them have something in 
common: the assumption of the universality of human reason, which – as we have 
argued – they share with liberalism. There is, in fact, a sort of rational continuum 
between these two ideologies, which pervades the spheres of morality, economy and 
sociology. The result is a rationalistic liberal-cosmopolitan world view which 
legitimizes – and is in turn sustained by – politico-economic realities such as 
international organizations oriented by purportedly universalistic goals – of which 
the U.N. and the E.U. are good examples – multinational business corporations, or 
even something as the existence of a universal declaration of human rights. In sum, 
where cosmopolitanism and liberalism go, their particular conception of rationality 
follows; and given the fact that contemporary western polities are determined by 
ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity to a degree that seems to demand the adoption 
of liberal and cosmopolitan principles, the “where” is virtually everywhere.  
 
1.2. Liberalism and Economic Theory 
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The relationship between liberalism and economics is a complex one. The 
existence of something commonly dubbed “economic liberalism” does not 
necessarily entail that the latter is an true economic correlate of political liberalism – 
or even that such a correlate exists. That being said, it is possible to perceive a degree 
of conceptual interplay between political and economic concerns within some of the 
subdivisions of liberalism that we identified above. Regarding classical liberalism, if 
one, for instance, examines Locke’s account of natural proprietorship, it is already 
possible to perceive that the rational ability that enables individuals to be politically 
autonomous and free, can also manifest itself in different ways. According to this 
perspective, “[r]ationaliy is evinced by the ability to acquire goods and to go on 
acquiring them up to the limits set by the law of nature” (which is valid for 
immaterial goods, such as knowledge, but also for material ones); a “rational man is 
one who obeys the law of reason, and the law of reason is in turn the law of nature, 
and this is the will of God” (Ryan, 2012, p. 524).  
We are thus faced with an argument reminiscent of Weber’s account of the 
development of the “spirit” of capitalism, expressed in what he terms the Protestant 
ethic. The latter, a form of religious asceticism within secular occupations, called for 
the “methodological rationalization of life” (Weber, 2002, p. 87) in the name of god 
– and, “like any ‘rational’ asceticism”, worked “to enable man to demonstrate and 
assert his ‘constant motives’ against the ‘emotions’” (Idem, p. 81). It is the 
rationalism of Protestantism that promotes the transition from the social and the 
moral to the economic: when a “restraint on consumption is combined with the 
freedom to strive for profit, the result produced will inevitably be the creation of 
capital” – along with the establishment of an “economically rational conduct of life” 
(Idem, pp. 116-7). Inasmuch as it arguably too represents a form of secular rational 
asceticism, classical liberalism mirrors the rationalization of life operated by Weber’s 
Protestant ethic, pouring political concerns into the realm of economics. As such, 
liberalism comes to regard the political and economic liberation of individuals not 
only as parallel and co-dependent processes, but also as being founded upon and 
legitimized by the same conception of human rationality – something which is patent 
in the works of Locke as much as in Adam Smith’s. 
This original connection between liberalism and economic concerns was 
further deepened by the subsequent evolution of neo-liberalism – or economic 
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liberalism – on the back of thinkers like Hayek and von Mises. Neo-liberalism relies 
on the idea of rationally self-regulating markets, while arguing for the advantages of 
a market economy based upon private initiative and limited government. Regardless 
of the economic nature of the theory, however, the latter was ostensibly justified with 
recourse to arguments derived from political liberalism. The benefits could be 
presented as essentially threefold: “it was best placed to cope with conditions of 
imperfect knowledge; it allowed for experimental evolution; and it provided 
protection against the abuse of [political or economical] power by a selfish minority” 
(Jennings, 2015, p. 56). The alternative, as Hayek inferred, was the “road to 
serfdom” – a return to illiberal conditions, in both economic and political terms. 
Whether it is regarded as legitimate or not, this attempt to explicitly translate 
the bases and implications of liberalism into economic terms is the likely cause of yet 
another dimension of the bond between liberal rationalism and economic theory. 
Contrary to what happened in the past, the study of politics is today increasingly 
determined not by disciplines like philosophy or political science, but by economy. 
In accordance with what is perhaps the spirit of our times, to paint an explanatory 
picture of politics is now an affair largely dominated either by economists or those at 
least inspired by economic theory. In what pertains to what interests us more 
specifically – political behaviour and decision-making – Anthony Downs’ An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) paved the way for a variety of attempts to 
account for the way in which voters, politicians and states interact with each other, 
via an application of principles stemming from economic theory. Despite the 
considerable criticism that Downs’ work has since garnered, more recent theoretical 
constructs, such as rational choice theory or public choice theory, have continued – 
and further disseminated – the trend inaugurated by him. 
Now, the particular merit of each of these theories is not to be presently 
subject to an in-depth examination – neither time nor opportunity allows it. What 
does need to be examined about them, however, is the nature of the explanatory (and 
often predictive) models they employ in the analysis of political behaviour, and the 
sort of principles inherent to them.  
Rational choice theory, along with public choice theory (which expands on its 
ideas but essentially shares its foundations), does not fall short of the promise 
entailed by its denomination; simply put, it postulates that “all action is 
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fundamentally ‘rational’ in character and that people calculate the likely costs and 
benefits of any action before deciding what to do” (Scott, 2000, p. 126). Just from 
this quick enunciation, it is evident that, much like in the case of liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism, there is an undeniably rationalistic anthropological perspective 
implicit in this conception – even if the kind of rationality at stake here is not the 
pure, all-encompassing kind proposed by Kant and his intellectual heirs, but a merely 
instrumental rationality. According to these theories, there is an ultimately rational 
logic presiding over what we, via an analogy with familiar economical notions, 
might call political markets (Wittman, 1997). And whether we assume that political 
agents are indeed well informed and thus – as Wittman puts it –  [politically] efficient 
– or that their actions are, to the contrary, determined by a rational ignorance 
(Downs, 1957) which prevents them from being so, the fact remains that rationality 
is still perceived here to be the source of action in general, and political action in 
particular. 
Despite the introduction of some interesting qualifications of the concept of 
rationality3, with its insistence on maintaining a rationalistic bias in approaching the 
problem, economic theory has not only failed to contribute towards a broader 
understanding of political behaviour, but it has in fact perhaps made it even 
narrower. It lent its scientific creedence to the already deeply entrenched reductionist 
perspective of political action, which causes contemporary politics – along with the 
behaviour of political agents – to be systematically understood and explained on the 
grounds of a highly questionable rationalistic assumption.  
   
 
2. Criticisms 
 
We have just focussed our analysis on three key aspects which – I would 
argue – are among the principal causes of the pervasiveness of a rationalistic 
approach to the understanding of political action: liberalism, cosmopolitanism and 
the political application of economic theory. All of these aspects, however, have 
certainly not gone unchallenged and indeed continue to spark lively debates in the 
                                                           
3
 Such as the notions of bounded rationality (stemming from the works of Herbert Simon and Daniel 
Kahneman) and rationally irrationality (advanced by Brian Caplan in his 2008 work The Myth of the 
Rational Voter), which we will subsequently examine. 
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area of political science and philosophy. Each of them has its own habitual 
interlocutor within that debate: liberalism is systematically challenged by 
conservatism; cosmopolitanism by nationalism or patriotism; and rational choice 
theory finds some of its fiercest critics inside the field of economics itself. We will 
now briefly examine the nature of each of those debates, to assess whether the 
correct questions are being asked. 
Let us start with the contemporary challenge to liberal theory. Historically, 
the political – and ultimately anthropological – liberal thesis we have presented 
above has had to contend with many conflicting political ideologies, but none of 
which being more diametrically opposed, one could argue, than conservatism. The 
debate between liberalism and conservatism is surely one whose duration we would 
be hard-pressed to predict. Despite a somewhat pervasive sentiment (generated in the 
wake of WWII and heightened by the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union) that 
political ideologies in general have withered to the point of losing any sway and 
relevance in the minds of contemporary voters, it seems to be a case of the news of 
their demise having been greatly exaggerated.  Even concerning a country such as 
the USA, for instance – assuredly one of the bastions of liberal (and neoliberal) faith 
– there is mounting evidence to the existence of a lively and deeply felt ongoing 
debate between liberalism and conservatism (Jost, 2006; Abramowitz & Saunders, 
2008; Carney et al, 2008).  
The contemporary vigour of the debate notwithstanding, the fundamental 
reasons for conservatives’ disagreement with the rationalist view advanced by 
liberalism can be, almost in their entirety, traced back to the origins of the discussion. 
Conservatives reject liberalism’s ethical individualism, its belief that all human 
beings are equally capable of self-governance, and, primarily, its “doctrine of liberty 
of thought and discussion based on belief in the unrestricted autonomy of reason – 
that is, the rational capacities of individual people – as the sole and sufficient canon 
of objective truth” (Skorupski, 2015, p. 403). What conservatives find most 
objectionable about liberalism is indeed the sort of unlimited structuring and creative 
power the latter seem to afford individual (or even “universal” or “public”) reason.  
Much of the criticism coming from conservatives regarding liberal theory can 
then be subsumed in an attempt to refute its political rationalism “which attempts to 
reconstruct society from abstract principles or a general blueprint, without reference 
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to tradition” (Hamilton, 2015). This has been the case since Burke’s critical 
perspective on the liberalism of his time, and is also much the case with 
contemporary arguments against the liberal theory. The task that liberalism’s 
political rationality seems to demand would require each citizen to become a sort of 
philosopher-democrat (Vaughan, 2005), something which conservatives perceive to 
be not only highly implausible, but also ultimately not necessarily desirable. For the 
latter, human reason – especially in what pertains to political and social existence – 
can never operate in a sort of vacuum. To create a global virtuous political and social 
order, or even to conceive of the best direction for one’s individual political action, is 
not something we can create ex nihilo, simply in virtue of the power of human 
reason; it is, to the contrary, something that can only occur in the presence and with 
the aid of a certain intellectual and cultural tradition, as well as with the invaluable 
contribution of the social and political institutions that are responsible for 
maintaining and actualizing such tradition. Things like family, nationality, religious 
wisdom and intellectual tradition should not – and cannot – be wiped clean to make 
way for “pure universal reason”, for they are the guarantee that the in fact limited 
human reason is not misguided, but working in the benefit of the continuity of the 
nation.  
The conservative counterpoint to the rationalistic approach of liberalism is, 
hence, the key notion of tradition, which is grounded in social institutions such as 
family, community, church, nationality, and so on. Oakeshott, for instance, 
ostensibly contrasts tradition and habit – the wealth of communally-shared past 
experience, that should ground our [political] education4 – with the intellectual near-
arrogance of the rationalist who “never doubts the power of his ‘reason’” and for 
whom “the past is significant […] only as an encumbrance” (1991, p. 6). Tradition, 
on the other hand, does not (or should not) reject individual reason, but keep it in 
check, by offering a point of reference – provided by the accumulated knowledge of 
our predecessors – and a much needed orientation to its activity. To the conservative, 
this does not mean that polities should be absolutely crystallized and immutable; as 
Burke famously argued, “a state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation” (1998, p. 72). The question is thus not to abolish change 
                                                           
4
 An education consisting of “an initiation into the moral and intellectual habits of his society, an entry 
into the partnership between present and past, a sharing of concrete knowledge” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 
38). 
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and progress, but to have a collective and traditionally-rooted wisdom decide upon it, 
instead of permitting an abstract, unbridled – ultimately dangerous – individual 
reason do so. 
Changing the focus of our analysis to cosmopolitanism, we will see that there 
is a certain overlapping of themes between the debate among the latter and 
nationalism with the liberalism-conservatism divide we have just discussed. That 
should come as no surprise, however, since “the natural tendency of liberalism is 
towards cosmopolitanism” (Skorupski, 2015, p. 410), and considering the fact that 
nationalism – its interlocutor – essentially draws from many of the essential aspects 
of conservatism. The criticisms made of cosmopolitanism by proponents of 
nationalism – or, indeed, even by those who, not necessarily adhering to the latter, 
still find serious faults within the former – have fundamentally to do with the 
universalistic reason that cosmopolitans place at the centre of all human relations.  
As rational human beings, cosmopolitans argue, our main political allegiance 
should be to a universal community of human reason and not to accidental aspects 
such as being born a citizen of a given nation or belonging to a given ethnicity, 
religion, and so on. To cosmopolitans, the intrinsically and decisively rational nature 
of human beings should necessarily dictate that the “interests of humanity come first 
in any conflict between them and national interests” (Audi, 2009, p. 372), and not be 
clouded by the moral narrowness that almost always ensues from understanding 
oneself as, for instance, a “patriot”. According to some of its more passionate 
proponents, cosmopolitanism thus comprehended would in fact facilitate the solution 
of many of the most significant current socio-political issues, such as racial tensions, 
ethnic conflicts, human rights issues and even ecological ones (Nussbaum, 1996). 
Apart from often considering this to be an overly optimistic, borderline 
utopian perspective, its critics have significant objections concerning its rationalistic 
foundation for political existence. Any kind of active and involved citizenship, they 
argue, decisively relies upon the ability to create some sort of indelible affective bond 
between citizen and State (Williams, 2007) – and, by doing so, to insure a political 
and social cohesion grounded upon the values of participation, abnegation and 
solidarity. But the content of that affective bond can only be provided by the 
emotional allegiance to one’s family, community and country. If we fail to 
understand this and merely try to create the kind of “citizens of the world” that 
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cosmopolitanism proposes, we will ultimately be left with citizens “of an 
abstraction” which “has never been the locus of citizenship” (McConnell, 1996) – 
and who, due to their lack of emotional attachment for their country, will not be 
compelled by the urge to act on its behalf. 
Lastly, we shall consider the criticisms made of rational and public choice 
theories, of which some of the most significant – as we already pointed out – often 
arise from within the field of economics itself. That is certainly the case with the 
work of Brian Caplan, who, in a number of journal articles (2000; 2001a; 2001b), as 
well as in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad 
Policies (2008), advanced the notion of rational irrationality in order to account for 
the common decision-making processes of political agents living in democratic 
polities. By doing so, Caplan attempted to refute the dominant belief in the canonical 
economic approach to politics: that “the thesis of global human rationality is 
internally consistent” (2008, p. 114). The assumption that the behaviour of political 
agents is essentially rational is thus put under scrutiny, one that Caplan argues it 
cannot withstand. Against it, and to occupy its place, he proposes the assumption that 
political behaviour is determined by a rational irrationality. What does this mean? 
The average voter, Caplan argues, is rationally aware of how little his or her vote 
actually maters in determining the outcome of an election or a referendum on a given 
policy; by proceeding via a rational calculus, he or she realizes that the actual cost of 
supporting an ultimately inept politician or a detrimental policy (multiplying the 
actual cost of the policy by the probability of the voter having a decisive role in 
determining its approval) is very low. Now, there is often a psychological wellbeing 
associated with supporting candidates or policies which feel good but are in fact 
detrimental, which greatly surpasses the negligible foreseeable cost of voting for 
them. Therefore, Caplan states, voters often behave irrationally – voting for 
politicians or policies which they rationally acknowledge to be potentially harmful – 
for instrumentally rational motives – maximizing their psychological welfare. 
 
 
3. Reframing the Critique 
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 After considering the main arguments and counter-arguments employed in the 
debates we have just considered, it is now time to explain why I feel that those 
debates have been inadequately approaching the problem, which needs to be 
reframed in order to be truly understood. There is, as we have often stated and 
verified, a prevalent rationalistic assumption in the contemporary understanding of 
political action and decision-making. This assumption, I have argued, is 
fundamentally due to the pervasiveness of three aspects: liberalism, cosmopolitanism 
and economic political theory. Even though the critics of each of the latter – as we 
have also seen – explicitly target the rationalistic nature of their understanding of 
political behaviour, do so from within the very same rationalistic paradigm, which 
they ultimately – and mistakenly – leave unchallenged. Ironically, the manner in 
which different the criticisms we have seen are conceived causes all of them all to 
brush upon the issue which should really be at stake, but without ever 
acknowledging its existence.  
Conservatives tend to use tradition as the counterpoint of liberalism’s 
absolute human reason; but their criticism falls short of the mark by failing to 
explicitly account for exactly how the sources of tradition they quote can have a 
significant and undeniable effect on political action. In that respect, the same can be 
said for nationalism’s critique of cosmopolitanism, even if the former manages to 
clarify the influence of the aspect we are looking for in a much more obvious 
manner. Both conservatism and nationalism stress the importance of notions such as 
family, community (understood here in the sense of Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft) and 
country to ensure that the political action of individuals is not only grounded in 
something tangible, but simultaneously motivated and encouraged by it. But what is 
it that makes these aspects of human life, upon which both tradition and national 
allegiances rely, so relevant in the lives of individuals that they actually manage to 
produce an effect in the way he acts and decides politically? The answer is decisive: 
they draw upon not on the rational – in the reductionist sense the word has been used 
so far – but on the emotional nature of human beings. 
 In Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott makes use of Pascal as a critical 
counterpoint to Descartes’ artificially technical account of the human mind, 
attributing to him the realization that “the significance of rationalism is not its 
recognition of technical knowledge, but its failure to recognize any other” (1991, p. 
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25). Pascal’s most famous contribution for common-sense knowledge, however, 
could equally be used to challenge an aspect of the problem which is just as 
significant, if not more: le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas. What the 
debates we have examined so far should not have neglected – for, in fact, the very 
idea of it is implied in their ongoing discussion – is what role do emotions play in the 
political behaviour of individuals. And I do not mean by this to consider emotions in 
the same way that Caplan did with the introduction of his notion of rational 
irrationality. What we have there is nothing more than a critique of the ideal 
rationalism inherent to economic theory by saying that sometimes disturbing 
irrational factors inhibit standard rational processing. Even though Caplan implies 
that there is something rational about this irrationality, this is still a fundamentally 
dualistic conception of reason versus emotion that does little to actually challenge the 
concept of ideal rationality proposed by economists.  
The explanation for (political) action that ensues from this reductionist 
rationalism hinges on what Popper dubbed the “rationality principle” – which, albeit 
a “good approximation to the truth”, useful as a theoretical tool, “is actually false” 
(Popper, 1997, p. 177). The unreserved assumption of its veracity, widely espoused 
in place of Popper’s conscious methodological concession, leads to a crucial 
misunderstanding of some of the most decisive aspects of human existence, as well 
as of its essence. As Ryan puts it, considering the human proneness to error, the 
rationality principle provides a poor empirical generalization regarding moral or 
political behaviour. Furthermore, if it is interpreted in the more narrow sense adopted 
by many who “claim that rational behavior is common in economic matters but not 
so in social life generally”, it becomes something much closer to “Max Weber’s 
account of Zweckrationalität or […] Vilfredo Pareto’s account of logical action” than 
a true reflection of the essence of human rationality (Ryan, 2012, p. 576).  
As such, and in light of our considerations so far, what we should be asking is 
this: since there seems to be a number of occasions in which emotionally charged 
concepts have a decisive effect on political behaviour, would not it be possible that 
emotions actually play a decisive role in the political process? Indeed we would do 
well to go beyond that, for this formulation still leaves room for the dismissal of that 
role as merely disturbing, misguiding and irrational. What we propose to do is to 
reframe the discussion around rationalism in politics not simply to include emotions 
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in politics – that would be of little consequence – but to include them in political 
rationality itself. We will argue that the conception of rationality forced upon us by a 
certain intellectual theory is reductionist and manifestly insufficient to account for 
the processes of motivation, action and decision-making intrinsic to human life in 
general, and our political existence in particular. A new notion of rationality is 
needed in order to do so. A rationality which is neither ideal, nor instrumental, 
because the human reason we know is genuinely none of those things. This new 
conception of reason has to be able to encompass the multiple dimensions of human 
experience and the way in which they shape the very way in the former operates. 
Only then will we be able to truly understand political behaviour. 
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Chapter II – Rationality and Emotion 
 
As we have just argued, there is a widespread form of political rationalism in 
contemporary western politics that imposes a reductionist – because essentially 
artificial and instrumental – notion of rationality on our understanding of political 
behaviour. Furthermore, we have posited that what makes such a notion of rationality 
at once philosophically illegitimate and politically dangerous is the fact that it 
artificially excises emotions from mental and social phenomena inherently connected 
to the political sphere. Since the roots of this malaise of contemporary political 
thought can be traced back to a very specific conception in philosophy of the mind, is 
seems both warranted and necessary at this point to suspend our consideration of the 
specifically political problem at stake, and first present our own conception of how 
the relation between human reason and emotion can be understood in a much more 
holistic – and therefore genuine – manner. That is precisely what we propose to 
accomplish in this chapter. 
With that intent in mind, and in order to later successfully redirect the 
discussion towards its political dimension – ultimately establishing the key argument 
that emotions play a legitimate role in our political lives – we must begin by 
developing a concept of “emotion” which is not inherently incompatible with the 
demands of democratic political life, but that may actually prove to be political in 
itself. Thus, an examination of the nature of emotions as universal phenomena of 
human life should provide a valuable stepping stone towards understanding the 
particular relationship between emotions and politics – and lay down the foundations 
upon which we may ground a coherent conception of a political existence that 
necessarily involves emotions. Current accounts of emotion and its relation to reason, 
usually polarized into cognitivist or non-cognitivist, rationalist or anti-rationalist, are 
largely unable to provide an accurate picture of a problem whose complexity 
invalidates such polarization. I reject both cognitivist and non-cognitivist approaches 
on the grounds of their excessive narrowness, and propose to find a more 
comprehensive alternative.  
To accomplish this, some key aspects must be explored: firstly, the 
connection between emotion and cognition, and the possibility to contradict the 
commonsense view on emotions as unruly passions that, by definition, are passively 
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experienced by the subject – thus diminishing accountability; secondly, the role 
played by emotions on deliberation and general decision-making – which, unless the 
role in question is a disruptive one, still strikes most as a bizarre notion; thirdly, the 
relation between emotion and action, focussing on the phenomena of motivation and 
weakness of will (akrasia). By the end of the present chapter I thus expect to have 
established that emotions not only inevitably play a significant (and not necessarily 
disruptive) role in mechanisms of general decision-making, motivation, and action, 
but also the legitimacy of that role.  
 
 
1. Emotion and Cognition 
 
 The “most notorious point of contention in the philosophy of emotion” – 
which markedly separates “cognitivists and non-cognitivists” – lies in the possible 
cognitive nature of emotion (Debes, 2008, p. 2). The conception of emotions as being 
(in some measure) intrinsically cognitive is an idea that has been consistently 
advanced by a number of contemporary thinkers – thus motivating the establishment 
of a cognitivist theory of emotion as a prevalent counterpoint to the inherent bias of 
the customary reason-emotion dichotomy. Robert Solomon, for instance, flirting with 
and being seduced by what he calls the “strong cognitivist thesis” on emotions, 
essentially conceives them as being akin to judgements (2003, p. 78). Nussbaum’s 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2003) also largely subscribes to 
the view of emotions as “appraisals or value judgements”, which she derives from 
the Stoics – while dismissing the canonical Stoic thesis that “the evaluations 
involved in emotions are all false” (2003, p. 4). Concurrently, the so-called 
“appraisal theory of emotions” postulates that emotions are essentially evaluative 
mechanisms that enable us to rapidly assess a given situation and respond to it, by 
providing us with “(partly) preformulated solutions” to the problem at hand 
(Parkinson, 2004, p. 108).  
Its prevalence in contemporary literature on emotions notwithstanding, this 
cognitive theory of emotions entails a significant problem: in pursuing the 
worthwhile goal to rehabilitate emotion from rationalistic prejudice, it often 
succumbs to the temptation of merely exchanging one extreme – that emotions are 
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utterly irrational – for another – that they are a sort of pseudo-rationality. Assenting 
to this over-intellectualization of emotion, as Goldie (2000) calls it, thus traps us 
within the very dichotomy that we should be trying to overcome; indeed, it implies 
that the only way to rescue the value of emotion as a legitimate aspect of human 
existence is to surreptitiously portray it as a sort of mock-rationality – thus 
succumbing to the same mistaken prejudice all over again. Conversely, our purpose 
should not be to merely find a way to fit emotion into any ideal notion of “pure” 
rationality, but to question the latter and thus rethink human rationality in a broader 
manner – one that that organically relates it with emotions. There is, undoubtedly, a 
relation between emotion and cognition. But as much as they are not mutually 
exclusive, neither is there a mere identification between the two. Emotions are not 
cognitions; they can, however, have cognitive elements.  
In order to fully support this view I will start by focussing on Aristotle’s work 
on emotions (primarily found in both the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics) and 
the considerations that such work subsequently elicited. Despite all the more recent 
work on the subject, Aristotelian theory of emotion, I would argue, provides the 
germ of a more coherent and holistic view on emotions and their cognitive element. 
As Kristjánsson notes, recent interest and research on the moral and politically 
relevant effect of emotion in everyday life has been “propelled by the powerful 
resurgence of an Aristotle-inspired cognitive view of the emotions”, and many of the 
ideas being currently discussed “would have sound outlandish prior to this 
Aristotelian renaissance” (2007, p. 1). His perspective offers a unique possibility to 
understand the relationship between emotion and action in a way that rescues the 
former from being construed as a merely misguiding influence on the latter – and 
thus blatantly hindering genuine comprehension of our emotional dimension. 
Concerning the topic of emotion and cognition in Aristotle, a relative 
consensus exists among Ancient Philosophy scholars that the path followed by him 
was laid down by Platonic tradition. Fortenbaugh, for instance, argues that the 
inquiry into the relation between knowledge and pleasure in the Philebus “certainly 
makes clear that Plato saw an intimate relationship between emotion and cognition” 
– even though he ultimately “fails to make [the nature of] this relationship clear” 
(2006, p. 25). The aporetic conclusion to this dialogue must have caused the echoes 
of the discussion to endure within the Academy, something which was not seemingly 
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met with indifference by Aristotle. Making use of the logical resources comprised in 
what was later – and meaningfully – dubbed his Organon, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
presents what was then a rather unique approach to the study of emotions. First 
referring to emotions in general – but employing anger as a paradigmatic case, he 
tells us that in order to fully understand an emotion such as anger, the latter must 
necessarily be analysed following three particular headings: “what is their state of 
mind when people are angry, against whom are they usually angry and for what sort 
of reasons” (1378a27-30). To this prescription on the proper way to proceed in the 
analysis and deconstruction of a given emotion, Aristotle then adds a particular 
definition of anger, which is to be construed as a “desire, accompanied by pain, for 
manifest retaliation because of a manifest slight that was directed, without 
justification, against oneself or those near to one” (1378a36-9).  
For Aristotle, cognition is necessarily involved in emotions: if emotions are to 
have an object (whom) and involve reasons, they inevitably imply some sort of 
cognitive activity on the part of the subject. Concurrently, if acknowledging the 
(manifest) existence of both a slight directed against us or our own and the 
evaluation of that slight as being unjustified are essential components of anger, one 
could not properly experience such an emotion without the involvement of cognition. 
In this regard, the same could be said of fear, which is defined by Aristotle as “a sort 
of pain or distress derived from the appearance of a future destructive or painful evil” 
(1382a28-9). A cognitive assessment that a threatening danger looms is required, on 
the part of the fearful, for the emotion of fear to be experienced.  
But what role does cognition actually play in Aristotle’s analysis of emotional 
phenomena? Upon first inspection, it appears to be twofold, concerning two 
important aspects of the human experience of emotion: justification and causation. 
Regarding the first, and looking back to Aristotle’s definition of both fear and anger, 
cognition seems to play a definite part in answering the question “why are you 
angry/afraid?” To Aristotle, the answer could never reasonably be “I am angry on 
account of a desire for revenge, accompanied by pain”, or “I am afraid because I feel 
a sort of pain or distress” – even though William James would certainly argue 
otherwise. But to the Stagirite, such would be simply pointing out the psychosomatic 
effect of the emotion, not justifying it. According to the Aristotelian analysis, the 
answer to those questions would be “I am angry because I think person A has 
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unjustifiably slighted me in doing Y” or “I am afraid because I think I face imminent 
harm by the presence of object X or situation Z”. Under these circumstances, and to 
borrow Aristotelian terminology, the presence of cognition in emotion cannot be 
discounted as merely accidental; it is, in fact, essential. As Fortenbaugh puts it, “for 
Aristotle the thought of outrage and the thought of danger are not merely 
characteristic of anger and fear respectively. They are necessary and properly 
mentioned in the essential definitions of anger and fear.” (1975, p. 12) 
The involvement of a cognitive aspect in the essence of emotions thus 
provides us with the possibility for a justificatory account of the latter. But what 
about causality? Might we infer that the cause of a given emotion, of something we 
have grown accustomed to perceive as irrational – or arational, in the very least – 
could be caused by a cognitive assessment of the situation at hand? According to 
Aristotle, the answer is yes. Again making use of his organa by discerning between 
different kinds of causes and seeking a syllogistic explanation of emotional 
phenomena, it is not only possible but also reasonable to assign the efficient cause of 
emotions such as anger and fear to their cognitive element. Syllogistically, the 
middle term is the efficient cause, and, in the case of anger, it is the “apparent insult” 
that constitutes the middle term5.  
So, we become angry because we think someone has unfairly slighted us, in 
the same way that we become fearful because we think that harm may ensue from the 
situation we find ourselves in. It is our cognitive acknowledgement of an apparent 
unjustified insult or an apparent impending pain that can be said to be the efficient 
cause of the emotions there in play.  
As one could have expected from the onset, there is a noticeable overlapping 
between causation and justification. This provides one of the chief arguments in 
support of the enduring validity of Aristotle’s conception of emotions and their 
connection to cognition: it is the very fact that there is a cognitive element involved 
in the causation of emotions that allows for their justification. One of the major 
problems of the opposing view on emotions – that they are fundamentally irrational 
and nearly irresistible pulls in a given direction – is the fact that it implicitly denies 
us the possibility of retaining the notions of responsibility and accountability for 
“patients” of emotion other that in a very weak sense – in the sense of being the mere 
                                                           
5
 See Fortenbaugh, 1975, pp. 13-4. 
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material cause of their actions, for instance, but not their efficient one. Aristotle, on 
the other hand, believes that when “a man responds emotionally, he is not the victim 
of some automatic reflex”, but is rather “acting according to his judgement” 
(Fortenbaugh, 2006, p. 29). By endowing emotions with a certain degree of 
cognition, his view allows for emotional action (action “out of emotion”) to be not 
only intelligible – it can be justified – but also intelligent – it can be grounded on 
rational grounds. 
Obviously, many objections can be raised to the view, and that even within 
the latter there are a number of nuances that we may be accused of overlooking. 
Even though most of them shall be addressed in due time, there are some which I 
would like to address immediately, in order to avoid misunderstandings. First of all, 
a caveat: the fact that we have just claimed that emotions can be both intelligible and 
intelligent should not be misconstrued as meaning that we have dismissed our own 
words of caution and adhered to a cognitive theory of emotion. There are degrees to 
be observed, and to say that emotions – in light of their cognitive element – can be 
intelligent is not to say that they are always and necessarily so. This is not an attempt 
to portray emotion as pseudo-rationality. Even though there are cognitive processes 
involved in emotions, the workings of the latter do not mirror those of “pure reason” 
– or would not, if such a thing ever existed. Paradoxically, as far as the traditional 
perspective on emotions is concerned, this does not, however, rob emotions of their 
validity or importance – it may actually even add to it, as we shall see later. 
Secondly, I feel that some objections to the view I proposed can come from 
the non-cognitivist side of the argument on the nature of emotion, presenting 
themselves in the form of Jamesian arguments or – following the contemporary 
revival of James’ theory in fields such as neurobiology – those we might dub as neo-
Jamesian. Concerning the first kind – which operates under a strong somatic theory 
of emotion – it would seem that the incommensurability between conflicting 
perspectives provides little room for fruitful philosophical debate. Given current 
scientific knowledge, no one seriously still believes that James’ original thesis retains 
full legitimacy without any sort of adaptation. Yet, if we were to read it in light of 
what has just been proposed, one might suggest that he overlooked the fundamental 
Aristotelian distinction among types of causes – thus mistaking material and efficient 
causes.  
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Undoubtedly, emotions are accompanied by physiological alterations to our 
body-state – Aristotle himself acknowledges this in his De Anima, when he 
picturesquely points to the boiling of blood around the heart as the material cause of 
anger. But even though its existence is required to grant the emotional experience its 
psychosomatic nature, material cause alone is not enough to fully produce the 
emotion in question; an efficient cause is needed here, and the latter is to be found in 
cognition rather than visceral sensations. If we failed to acknowledge the actual 
threat posed by James’ bear and experienced only the physiological effects usually 
associated with flight-inducing situations devoid of cognitive contextualization, 
would we really be afraid? Not only is that highly implausible, but even if we did, it 
would more likely be due to the cognitive realization that we were experiencing an 
unexplained (and unpleasant) visceral uproar rather than on account of the bear itself.  
 That being said, I see no reason for the Aristotelian approach to emotions to 
be fundamentally incompatible with the contemporary rethinking of James’ theory. I 
see them, on the contrary, as being closely related: the former, as we just established, 
is flexible enough to accommodate the diversity of elements that complexly 
intertwine themselves to cause emotions, while the latter’s contribution to the 
understanding of what those elements might be and how they associate is surely a 
worthwhile one towards the clarification of that very complexity. 
 Some of the more recent developments in theory of emotions have suggested 
that our emotions can never be fully understood if we try to study them as 
individualized phenomena, without taking into account the multiplicity of factors – 
psychological, physiological, and even environmental – that the experience of a 
given emotion entails. Ben Ze’ev, for instance, tells us that “looking simply at the 
‘objective’ nature of the situation” is insufficient to predict the generation of 
emotions, since any prediction of the sort “is much more complex and should refer to 
other personal and contextual factors” (2001, p. 4). This seems correct. Overly 
simplistic accounts of emotions that rely on unidimensional cause-effect relations as 
the source of explanation for the emotional phenomenon can never come close to 
grasping the full scope of the latter, and do little more than further deepen the chasm 
of our misunderstanding on such matters6. Once again borrowing the words of Ben 
                                                           
6
 This temptation to regard emotional experience as a sort of stimulus-response process was, it would 
seem, further heightened by the advent of the computerized model of rationality – which likens it to a 
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Ze’ev, “classic definitions in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions are not 
very useful in the study of emotions” (Idem, p. 3). 
The Aristotelian approach that we have discussed eludes this criticism 
through a proper understanding of what an efficient cause really meant for Aristotle. 
Speaking of an emotion such as anger we could refer to a material cause (the 
physiological changes), an efficient cause (the perception of an unjustified slight) 
and a final cause (the desire for retribution). Indeed, following what Ronald de Sousa 
(1987) says about paradigm scenarios, we might even speak of a formal cause of 
anger7. As we have seen previously, it is the efficient cause that can be defined as the 
moving force behind the change. But that does not mean that whenever the efficient 
cause is present it must necessarily be actualized. The change it is liable to produce 
may thus exist potentially, but its coming into actual existence does not automatically 
follow. We could say that even though the efficient cause is necessary for the 
production of emotions, it is not sufficient; and we could even add to that: of the 
different causes implicated in the generation of emotion, neither of them – taken 
independently – may be construed as sufficient. Hence, there is a flexibility to 
Aristotle’s perspective that enables it to escape reductionist cause-effect paradigms 
and explanations, while providing room for an explicatory effort that accounts for all 
the different personal and contextual factors that Ben Ze’ev refers to. 
 The actualization of the potential for change entailed by the efficient cause 
may depend precisely upon those factors: if I am sitting in a comedy club, I may not 
experience anger due to the unjustified insult directed at me by the stranger standing 
on stage; but if that same person were to similarly insult me in a different context, 
my emotional reaction might be altogether different. Conversely, even if I am sitting 
in the comedy club but there is something in my personal history that has caused me 
to be especially susceptible to that particular kind of insults – let us say it is a pun 
regarding my balding head, and that I have been (sadistically) brought up to believe 
that bald-headed men are sexually diminished – that personal factor may be enough 
to override other contextual factors and ultimately lead to the experience of anger. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mere input-output relation, where the input represents a given object or situation and the output our 
emotional (and automatic) reaction to it. 
7
 De Sousa argues that the way in which emotions are culturally portrayed – in literature, for instance 
– actually supplies us with paradigmatic examples of how to experience those emotions, granting us 
paradigm scenarios that ultimately shape our perception of the proper way to both experience and 
express them. 
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There is such a complexity in emotional experience that even when we speak of the 
cognitive element as being the efficient cause of emotions we cannot assume that we 
are referring to a simple cause-effect relation; and if we truly understand the 
subtleties of Aristotle’s multidimensional treatment of causality, we certainly should 
not. 
 
 
2. Emotion and Decision-making 
 
 The realization that, throughout a significant part of our history, the tightly 
knit notions of deliberation and decision-making have been conceived as essentially 
rational affairs should constitute no surprise. Common-sense knowledge – as we 
have already mentioned – has always informed us that the “heart” is a poor advisor, a 
notion widely corroborated by the rationalism of the Enlightenment. This 
rationalistic claim, however, has since been systematically challenged by a 
perspective that argues for the insufficiency of reason – of logic, if you will – to fully 
account for the process of decision-making. Zajonc, who remains one of the most oft 
quoted authorities in the study of emotion, cognition, and decision-making, famously 
argued that “[q]uite often, ‘I decided in favour of X’ is no more than ‘I liked X’. […] 
We buy the cars we ‘like’, choose the jobs and houses we find ‘attractive’, and then 
justify those choices by various reasons” (1980, p. 155). As further studies 
demonstrate, this process of justification entails a search for information in support 
of the individual’s initial emotional response, in order to be able to internally (and 
thus externally) portray the latter as a rationally well-founded decision (Pham et al, 
2001; Pham, 2007; Yeung and Wyer, 2004). As such, emotional impressions 
arguably “have a powerful impact on reactions to, decisions about, and cognitive 
processing of people and objects in our environment” (Herr et al, 2012, p. 833). 
That is not to say that reason should here be simply replaced by emotion; as 
we previously stated, shifting to the “emotionalist” extreme would be as erroneous as 
stubbornly persisting in its rationalistic counterpart. Instead, what we should strive to 
find is the middle-ground between both, and seriously consider the hypothesis that 
while “misguided emotion can be a major source of irrational behaviour”, a forced 
40 
 
“reduction in emotion may constitute an equally important source” of the latter 
(Damásio, 1996, pp. 52-3).  
 Damásio’s work in the field of neurobiology – alongside the philosophical 
propensity of his reflection upon the former – could arguably be credited with 
securing widespread attention towards the possibility that emotions play a critical 
role in the processes of deliberation and decision-making. In Descartes’ Error 
(1996), Damásio presents the case of one of his patients (referred to as Elliot) as a 
paradigmatic example on how our rational and logical ability alone is not enough to 
enable us to make proper decisions – ironically, what we commonly dub “rational 
decisions”. Following the removal of a brain tumour which caused a particular kind 
of injury to his prefrontal cortex, to put it simply, Elliot suddenly became a case-
study for neurobiology. Up until then a successful man in both business and family 
life, Elliot’s social existence gradually starts collapsing under the blows struck by 
poor – sometimes seemingly absurd – decisions. Understandably, the assumption that 
Elliot’s cognitive abilities have been impaired by the brain surgery begins to surface. 
But after being subject to a wide array of intelligence, memory and personality tests 
it eventually becomes clear that his ability for logical reasoning remains fully intact8. 
Even after his injury, he could be said to possess a “superior intellect” (Idem, p. 41).  
All the more puzzling then, when such an intelligent man suddenly finds 
himself unable to make even the most trivial of decisions with any measure of good 
sense, as we would call it. Nonetheless, the fact that Elliot was a seemingly normal 
man “who was unable to decide properly, especially when the decision involved 
personal or social matters” (Idem, p. 43) still remained, and had to be accounted for. 
To do so, Damásio was forced to turn away from the traditional notion of a purely 
rational decision-making mechanism and broaden the scope of his analysis to 
consider the impact of other factors in the way we commonly make our decisions – 
namely, emotions. 
This shift did not happen by chance; during the course of the time spent 
analysing and interviewing Elliot, Damásio began to notice that he always conveyed 
his experiences – even the more dramatic ones – with a sort of cool detachment. Not 
once did he seem struck by the tragedy of his situation, nor in the least distressed by 
any of the unpleasant consequences it often entailed. Following a 
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 See Damásio, 1996, pp. 39-43 for a detailed account of such tests and their results. 
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psychophysiological experiment he was subject to, Elliot himself acknowledged that 
even “topics that had once evoked a strong emotion no longer caused any reaction, 
positive or negative” (Idem, p. 45). Could his inability to properly make decisions in 
his everyday life be connected with this emotional impairment he seemed to be 
suffering from?  
To answer that question, Damásio and his colleagues decided to put Elliot 
through another battery of tests, this time focussing not on purely cognitive abilities, 
but on the ability to correctly evaluate (and respond to) social situations that entail 
both social conventions and moral values. But even here Elliot responded admirably, 
scoring highly on the tests and presenting multiple possible response scenarios when 
thus elicited, seemingly in stark contrast to his performance in similar real-life 
situations. After the surgery, Elliot had lost his job, divorced his wife, rashly married 
someone else, divorced the latter shortly thereafter and gotten involved with (and 
been taken advantage of by) some rather unscrupulous characters. All these failings 
were due to his inability to properly decide when presented with the same sort of 
social situations he was now responding to exemplarily in the tests. How then to 
account for this utter dissonance between laboratory and real-life performance?  
The key difference, as Damásio points out, has to do with the fact that our 
practical rationality – which, in philosophical terms, is what is truly at stake here – 
does not simply proceed by means of a rational analysis of possibilities and divergent 
hypothetic scenarios; responding to tests in a controlled environment fundamentally 
differs from real life in the sense that, in the latter, decisions have consequences, 
situations appear within a context that constrains our choices, and we are often 
pressured into deciding by various circumstances. The very diversity of stimuli we 
are subject to in real-life situations is beyond what laboratory experiments are able to 
emulate: tests are merely verbal, whereas life is not. Hence, in terms of actual 
decision-making, even though someone like Elliot (whose cognitive abilities were 
proven to be essentially intact – and even above average, in some respects) seems to 
maintain the necessary faculties to ascertain the situation and envisage most of the 
available avenues, the process of reaching a sound decision is ultimately 
compromised. As Damásio puts it, the tragedy of his condition is that, despite being 
“neither stupid nor ignorant”, “he acted often as if he were” (Idem, p. 38).  
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Concerning this impediment to sound decision-making processes, however, 
perhaps the most astonishing thing about patients such as Elliot is that not only their 
ability to decide properly is hindered by their pathologically induced apathetic state, 
but also the ability to decide at all. Speaking of another one of his patients, Damásio 
tells us the story of how he, when confronted with the need to decide between two 
different dates for his next doctor’s appointment, spent something like half an hour 
enumerating “reasons for and against each of the two dates: previous engagements, 
proximity to other engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually 
anything that one could reasonably think about concerning a simple date” (Idem, p. 
195). Finally, Damásio and his colleagues decided to stop him and just suggest one 
of the dates, admittedly not knowing how long his deliberation would have lasted if 
they did not. 
These extreme cases from the realm of neurobiology can thus help us to better 
understand exactly how emotions might be involved in the processes leading up to 
our decisions. The patients referred by Damásio display two chief characteristics that 
interest us here: i) their calculating cognitive abilities remain intact, and ii) their 
ability to “normally” experience emotions is barred from them. Two significant 
consequences follow them, being – I would argue – causally related to each 
respectively: a) the patients are still able to produce detailed rational cost-benefit 
analyses between alternative possibilities, and b) they are unable to narrow the scope 
of those analyses to focus on the more relevant aspects towards the decision they 
have to make. Upon serious consideration of all previous points, we may begin to 
realize that the role of emotions in decision-making is deeply connected with the so-
called frame problem, at the core of which we find the realization than a merely 
rational cost-benefit analysis may have to consider a virtually infinite number of 
variables in any given situation. Let us imagine the case of a relatively trivial 
decision – deciding, for instance, what to cook for dinner: we can begin by taking 
into account the ingredients available in our pantry, proceed by calculating the 
number of possible combinations between those ingredients, consider the nutritional 
pros and cons of each of those combinations, ascertain the caloric intake required by 
our body as dictated by our level of physical activity during the day and factor that 
into the equation, analyse the monetary cost of each alternative and ponder it under 
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the light of the monthly budget, as well as the overall trend of the economy, etc. – 
thus proceeding nearly ad infinitum.  
Now, it is fairly obvious that this is not only an impractical way of deciding, 
but most likely even an impossible one. Human brains are not computerized super-
processors able to consider all the variables entailed by a single decision – in fact, 
not even actual computerized super-processors are able to do so; even the most 
complex probabilistic models of prediction inevitably hit a wall beyond which 
further calculations are impossible. Hence, and especially if we consider the human 
brain’s comparatively limited processing ability, it becomes clear that our decisions 
cannot rest on reason alone9. The solution to the frame problem – the problem of 
how we are able to narrow the field of possibilities entailed by a given situation and 
focus on the aspects deemed most relevant – must then lie partially within man’s 
emotional ability. Note that the usage of the term “partially” here is intentional: 
although I would not argue that the frame problem is entirely solved by the presence 
of emotions in decision-making, I would still contend that emotions – in conjunction 
with other unique aspects of human experience (such as personal history and 
contextual semantic perception 10 ) – ultimately allow us to limit the amount of 
possibilities perceived as viable in any given decision-making scenario. 
But exactly how is this supposed to happen? According to a prevailing view 
in the study of emotions' effect on decisions, the former essentially control the 
salience attributed by the deciding subject to the different aspects of the possibilities 
entailed by the situation at hand. In doing so, emotions necessarily grant different 
weights to those often diverging possibilities and focus the subject’s attention on the 
more relevant – or viable – ones, thus enabling him to narrow the scope of his 
deliberation11. By framing the problem within a manageable amount of alternatives, 
emotions – insofar they relate to both our past experiences and interpretation of our 
present context – are actually indispensable elements of our decisions. As Mameli 
                                                           
9
 For an increasingly comprehensive effect, we could also consider here Ronald de Sousa’s argument 
on how a purely rational creature would be utterly unable to decide between alternatives perceived to 
be equally advantageous, since no purely rational criterion would be able to incline it towards one or 
the other. (1987, pp. 14-5) 
10
 A clear understanding of his notion of contextual semantic perception may benefit from an 
illustrative example, like the one of a nude model who suddenly feels ashamed of her nudity when she 
realizes that the artist painting her has begun to think of her not as a mere model, but as a woman 
(Ben-Ze’ev, 1998) 
11
 “Emotion can endow one sat of supporting considerations with more salience than the other. We 
need emotion [...] to break the tie when reason is stuck.” (Idem, p. 16) 
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argues, “in no case does unemotional cost-benefit analysis determine action –
choice”; rather, emotions are involved “not only in the preselection phase of 
decision-making, but all the rounds, including the final one” (2004, p. 171).   
In order to explain this phenomenon, and deeming what he calls the “high-
reason” view of decision-making too complex to be practical in most scenarios, 
Damásio posits the existence of a psychosomatic mechanism that enables us to 
quickly qualify alternatives as leading to either positive or negative outcomes –  
granting higher salience to the former, and swiftly dismissing the latter. That 
mechanism is constituted by what he calls “somatic-markers” – emotional feelings 
that act upon our body proper and that rely on past experiences to inform present 
decisions. The theory, understood in this fashion, is in agreement with much of the 
recent philosophical research on the same subject. Evans, while discussing emotion’s 
effect on memory, concludes that “[a]ny event that produces a strong emotion in us, 
whether negative or positive, is recalled more easily and more accurately than an 
emotionally neutral event” (2001, p. 112). Damásio’s work in neuroscience, on the 
other hand, is able to take this philosophical perspective further through the analysis 
of somatic-markers and their mode of functioning. Succinctly put, whenever “a 
negative somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination 
functions as an alarm bell”; but when “a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed 
instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive” (1996, p. 174).  
Now, while one might be inclined to hastily dismiss this account of decision-
making as one which relegates the latter to a sort of automated process based on 
whim or mere “gut-feelings”, that is not the case here – nor does it amount to a 
Humean enslavement of reason by emotion. The somatic-marker hypothesis does not 
aim to replace reasoned deliberation, but simply to help understand what role the 
emotions play in it – for they undoubtedly do. In this sense, we could say that 
“somatic-markers do not deliberate for us”, but merely “assist the deliberation by 
highlighting some options (either dangerous or favourable)” (Idem, p. 174). There is 
always room for logical reasoning beyond the occurrence of emotions, but that is not 
to say that the latter are unable to influence the direction in which the former 
proceeds – be it overtly or covertly, advantageously or detrimentally. As I said 
earlier, my intention here is not to paint emotions under a flattering light, while 
casually overlooking all signals to the contrary. The fact that emotions necessarily 
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play a role in our decisions does not imply that such a role is always a positive one; 
indeed, if our emotions can do so both consciously and unconsciously, we ought to 
be careful about the sort of emotions we cultivate. 
In order to fully grasp the significance of that latter sentence, we must 
consider the origin of somatic-markers. Damásio posits that most somatic-markers 
involved in decision-making were probably “created in our brains during the process 
of education and socialization, by connecting specific classes of stimuli with specific 
classes of somatic states” (Idem, p. 177). They are thus acquired from experience, 
generated in the interaction between our “innate regulatory dispositions” and 
external circumstances that include “punishment and reward in social interactions 
from an early age” (Idem, p. 179). The philosophical significance of these claims will 
not be lost on those familiar with Aristotle’s educational theory – which thoroughly 
emphasises the importance of habit and role-modelling in the education of young 
children towards (political) virtue. The argument is well known: since man’s alogical 
(alogon) dimension precedes his logical (logon) one (Politics, 1334b21-3), the 
education of children should be based on habit rather than on logical reason (Idem, 
1338b3-5). Hence, at this stage of his life, man’s education should essentially be an 
education of emotions, than enables him to acquire the sort of dispositions – or 
somatic-markers – that would later lead his decisions in a virtuous direction. Simply 
put, “young people are at first habituated to love and hate correctly, so that later 
when they have acquired the ability to deliberate and reflect there will be a 
symphony between habituated preferences and what reasoning shows to be good” 
(Fortenbaugh, 1975, p. 49). 
More should be said regarding this Aristotelian perspective on the education 
of virtues at a later point. For now, it would seem that the reason-emotion dichotomy 
is somewhat preserved, simply having its hierarchical order reversed in terms of 
temporal generation. That is, however, simply not the case. As pointed out earlier, 
Aristotle’s moral psychology is much more complex than what we sometimes give 
him credit for. In his Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, he describes man’s rational 
part as divided in two: one part being rational since it is obedient to reason, the other 
possessing reason and being deliberative (1098a4-5). The first is what we previously 
dubbed man’s alogical dimension, while the latter is the logical one. Being two 
halves of the rational part of the soul, both these subdivisions could thus be 
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considered intelligent, insofar each partakes of human reason – albeit in a different 
manner. While the alogical half “is primarily the capacity for emotional response”, 
the logical half “is primarily the capacity for reasoned deliberation” – what makes 
both acts “intelligent, so that both capacities are cognitive” (Fortenbaugh, 2006, p. 
54).  
At this point, one should not succumb to the seemingly ubiquitous temptation 
to adjust human rationality to a preconceived ideal rationality. Instead, one should 
realize that the very notion of “human rationality” must simultaneously be broadened 
and individualized: broadened in the sense that it must actually be understood as 
integrating both reason and emotion; individualized inasmuch it must not be 
mistaken or constrained by the thought of an ideal rationality – a sort of pure, 
omnipotent rational potentate that is, in itself, essentially inhuman. The philosophical 
reading of the somatic-marker hypothesis enables us to do just that, and abandon the 
fiction that we are purely rational creatures. In fact, in light of Damásio’s research 
and all other considerations I have just presented, the very notion of a “purely 
rational” being – that is, one completely devoid of emotion and desire – is 
paradoxical if translated into concrete terms. Individuals who – like Damásio’s 
patients – were brought closer to such a state have actually proven to behave less 
“rationally” – not more. And the reason for it should by now be clear: emotions are a 
key aspect in the way we make our decisions. To our previous argument that 
emotions are cognitively grounded, we may now add that they are so because they 
constitute an intrinsic part of human rationality. 
In what way, then, can emotions be incorporated into our concept of 
rationality? How are they able to skew our decision-making landscape towards one 
end or the other? While the notion of somatic-markers itself already provides us with 
something of an answer to these questions, further clarification is warranted. 
Through a combination of innate neurophysiologic mechanisms and the “emotional 
memory” constructed from our previous interactions with the world, somatic-
markers may endow us with seemingly intuitive – albeit actually learned – response 
tendencies when faced with the need to decide. As such, our emotions narrow the 
field of response possibilities according to our past world interactions and learning 
experiences. Nevertheless, when presented in this manner, one might assume that 
emotions only come into play whenever a decision-prompting situation arises, and 
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hence we should not really speak of a requalification of human rationality, but 
perhaps only of a collaboration between it and emotion when circumstances dictate. 
This perspective is, however, still too narrow-minded. The reason why emotions 
come into play within the field of rationality whenever the need for a decision 
presents itself is due to the fact that they never were outside of said field to begin 
with. What I am urging here is not a merely convenient and sporadic association 
between human rationality and emotion, but a true rethinking of the former, thus 
reaching a concept of rationality that includes emotion not only when we make a 
decision, but that does so because it incorporates emotion in the very way that we 
rationally experience our in-der-welt-sein. 
The notion of an emotional rationality is particularly fecund in this regard. De 
Sousa (1987) advances precisely such a notion, and does so in a way that is very 
much consistent with what we have argued up to this point. Emotions are not to be 
construed as mere epiphenomena of subjectivity: they are actually key factors in our 
experience of the world. Emotions, De Sousa claims, “apprehend the axiological 
level of reality” (1987, p. 303); they work on the grounds of a subjectively-based 
perception of the value of world objects. When it comes to the way in which we 
relate to the world, they control salience and attention, and in doing so they are able 
to essentially filter and reinterpret that very world. As De Sousa puts it, “logic leaves 
gaps” (Idem, p. 197). We can only reason about what we are made conscious of, and 
it is our emotions which determine what that is.  
According to this perspective, human beings cannot experience a “rational 
existence” and an “emotional existence” separately: the two actually overlap. The 
relationship between rationality and emotion is hence much more tightly knit than 
what the traditional dichotomy might lead us to believe. Logical reasoning generally 
operates over a canvas painted by our axiological perception of the world and its 
events, which in turn depends on configuration of our emotional substrate. In a sense, 
then, if “language is the house of Being” (Heidegger, 1975, p. 5) – since the logos 
sets the boundaries of our existence as in-der-welt-sein – in akin fashion can be said 
that “emotion frames our possibility of experience” (De Sousa, 1987, p. 332). Our 
emotional repertoire works in conjunction with our logos to shape the way in which 
we perceive the world and our existence in it. And much like our emotions “provide 
a framework for our beliefs, bringing some into the spotlight and relegating others to 
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the shade” (Idem, p. 243), so too can our beliefs (and judgements) drastically affect 
the cognitive aspect of our emotions – ultimately determining whether we even come 
to experience some of them. 
The mutual pervasiveness between logical reasoning and emotion within this 
novel notion of rationality is of crucial importance. If human reason and emotion 
find themselves so intertwined to form what we have referred to as an emotional 
rationality, what follows is that we surely will not only find the influence of emotion 
limited to the processes of deliberation and decision-making, but actually extending 
into the realm of what broadly constitutes the actualization of the two: action. 
 
 
3. Emotion and Action 
 
 Before delving into the relationship between emotion and action, we must 
reflect on the nature of the concept of “emotion” we have been – and will continue to 
be – working with. We have thus far deliberately refrained from presenting a clear-
cut definition of “emotion”. The reason for this is simple: to do so, at the onset of a 
reflection on such a complexly nuanced subject, is an invitation to reductionism. Nor 
is it necessary, for our present purpose, to dwell tirelessly on the question of what 
emotions are, and subsequently attempt to posit a sort of “ready-made” idea of 
human emotion.  Instead, we will approach the problem in terms of how they operate 
in our lives, and allow their nature to become gradually and deductively clear. 
 Emotion makes for a dauntingly broad topic of inquiry for any research 
endeavour – let alone for one that is not solely devoted to it. Under the umbrella 
concept of “emotion”, and depending upon nearly personal differences, one might 
find emotions with clearly defined conceptual borders – like anger, fear, hate or envy 
– alongside phenomena that are dubbed “emotional” almost solely for lack of a more 
accurate categorization – melancholia or grief being good examples. As such, the 
expectation to account for all of them in detail within this chapter would be quite 
unreasonable. Our purpose will hence not be to exhaust all that could be said on the 
subject, but to circumscribe it to what specifically concerns man’s political existence. 
Instead of attempting to comprehensively cover the subject of “emotion”, we will 
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focus our attention on the kind of emotions that have a greater sway in the processes 
that are conducive to action: practical emotions. 
 Although the terminology is borrowed from Fortenbaugh (1975, 2006), the 
notion of practical emotion is rather intuitive. An emotion is “practical” not because 
of its usefulness, but in the sense that it disposes to action – it is connected with 
praxis. A practical emotion is therefore an emotion whose experience somehow 
depends on or urges to action. A paradigmatic example of the latter is fear. Fear, 
Aristotle tells us, “makes men deliberate” (Rhetoric, 1383a5), and urges to action as 
to escape or avoid the perceived danger. Although some instances of extreme fear 
can seem to have the opposite effect – to thwart the ability to act (“I was frozen by 
fear”)12 – the common experience of fear does indeed seem to have a action-inducing 
quality to it; if we perceive something as being potentially threatening, and thus 
begin to fear it, the natural tendency would be not to wait for it to make good on the 
threat, but to act in order to avoid it.  
 Another practical emotion worth mentioning is anger. The experience of 
anger is always accompanied by a desire for retribution, to such an extent that it can 
be said that “a kind of pleasure follows all experience of anger from the hope of 
future retaliation” (Aristotle, Idem, 1378b2-3). It is precisely from this desire to 
restore the balance of justice previously disrupted by the unjustified slight that 
anger’s practical nature stems. Contained in its very definition is the quality of an 
emotion that compels to action, thus making such quality inseparable from its normal 
experience. 
 The exemplary cases of fear and anger should serve to illustrate the fact that 
some emotions are inherently connected to action. And while some other relevant 
examples of practical emotions remain to be explored, I will suspend said exploration 
until it proves to be pertinent, and return to my previous point: to ascertain exactly 
how emotions can be said to influence action. For from the fact that some emotions 
are more easily construed as inherently practical does not follow that none of those 
which are not are unable to affect the course of our actions. Quite on the contrary, I 
would argue: they do, and significantly.  Any action, in order to qualify so be so 
named – and thus meet the requirements of agential awareness and intentionality – is 
                                                           
12
 Perhaps even in these extreme cases Aristotle may provide us with an explanation; for “no one 
deliberates about things that are hopeless” (Rhetoric, 1383a5-6), nor about things perceived to be so. 
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necessarily preceded by and founded upon the processes of deliberation and 
deciding. It is therefore unsurprising that something which significantly impacts 
upon the latter – as I have argued emotions do – should have an equally noteworthy 
implicit control over any actions those processes eventually lead up to. What I will 
be addressing here, however, is not merely the indirect influence of emotions on the 
way we act, but their actual presence in virtually every step of the mechanism of 
action – including the final one.  
 This mechanism of action, much like what happens with the processes of 
decision-making, tends to be traditionally thought of and described in excessively 
rationalistic terms. The anecdote is familiar: faced with a variety of alternatives, the 
agent rationally considers the situation, conducts a logical cost-benefit analysis of 
each possibility and thus concludes which is the more advantageous one, enabling 
him to then act upon that rationally informed judgement. Now, even if one chose to 
overlook all that has been previously argued regarding the role of emotions in these 
processes, one must still concede that this description, however neat and appealing it 
may sound, does not stand the test of empirical verification in a crucial way: it 
contradicts the experience of akrasia, or “weakness of the will”.  
 
3.1. Akrasia, motivation, and emotion 
 
Akrasia is important because it evidences aspects of the mechanism of action 
which we might otherwise come to conveniently disregard. Regardless of its 
philosophical roots, the everyday experience of akrasia was probably best captured 
not by a philosopher, but by a poet, Ovid: “video meliora, proboque, deteriora 
sequor”13 he tell us, thus reflecting something which most of us have, one time or the 
other, been forced to retrospectively concede. This poetic description may, following 
Goldie’s characterization, be subsequently divided into the two main forms of the 
phenomenon: last-ditch akrasia – in “cases where, having deliberated, we decide to 
do something, and then either fail to do that thing or do something else instead” – 
and impetuous akrasia – in “cases where, without having deliberated, we rush into 
doing something which, if we had deliberated, we would not have done” (Goldie, 
2000, p. 111). In both instances, however – be it prospectively or retrospectively – 
                                                           
13
 “I see the what is better, and approve, but follow what is worse” (Metamorphoses, VII, 20) 
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there seems to be a gap between whatever rational assessment we make of the 
situation before us and the course of action we ultimately select. Even 
(hypothetically) conceding that the processes of deliberation and decision-making 
involved were completely rational (in the purely logical sense of the word), logic 
cannot be the one to bridge that gap – akrasia would not exist otherwise. Therefore, 
it is towards emotion – or rather, towards an emotional rationality – that we must 
look to find the answer to what happens between the time when we weigh the pros 
and cons of the available alternatives and the moment we actually follow through 
with one of the latter. 
 When it comes to the mechanism of action, that final stage we have been 
alluding to – the gap left to bridge after deliberation takes place – is intimately 
connected with motivation. That our actions are motivated is fairly obvious, and what 
they are motivated by is an essential component of their intelligibility – inasmuch our 
motives can be used to ascertain whether those actions were justified or otherwise. 
But in accepting the commonplace that all our actions must have reasons we seem to 
have mistaken the meaning of the sentence: although the term “reasons” here stands 
for “motives”, the wording has perhaps misled us into commonly assuming that they 
can only be purely rational ones. In truth, our reasons are not always rational – nor 
are they even guaranteed to be reasonable. 
 To understand what I mean by this, let us consider the notions of belief and 
desire. Both are usually perceived as key factors at the heart of intentionality, and are 
consequently considered to play a significant motivating role in our actions. A simple 
illustration of this would read as follows: faced with a situation X, I act in a manner 
A because my assessment of X has led me to believe that A is the more advantageous 
option and I thus desire to attain the benefits implicitly promised by A – or, to put it 
negatively, avoid the harm entailed by the remaining alternatives of B, C and D. This 
perspective on motivated action remains, however, not only reductionist but also 
somewhat naive.  In order to fully capture the essence of intentionality and 
motivation, “feelingless beliefs and desires are not enough” (Goldie, 2000, p. 19); 
granted, beliefs and desires are normally involved in the mechanism of action, but 
not in such an exceedingly logical fashion. Even though their workings thus 
described may provide us with a rough outline of the structure of action, they also 
paint an inaccurate picture of motivated action. Successful motivation – not 
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necessarily reasonable or morally proper, but effective – I will argue, cannot occur in 
the absence of emotions14. 
 In order to justify this claim, let us retrieve the problem of akrasia, in the way 
it is ordinarily experienced. It would seem, on the grounds I have just expounded, 
that it is our misguided conviction that rational beliefs are sufficient motivating 
factors of action that grants the experience of akrasia its frustrating nature. When 
faced with a dilemma, and although we may indeed acknowledge option A as the 
logically preferable one, that rational acknowledgement can prove insufficient to 
make us ultimately choose option A – instead choosing option B, for instance, which 
we had just concluded to be less advantageous than A. The systematic verification of 
this kind of behaviour in our everyday lives is precisely what justifies the 
characterization of akrasia as a weakness of the will, in the sense that – in keeping 
with Ovid’s formulation – even though we may rationally acknowledge what is 
“best”, and thus will to do it, we end up doing what is worse. All things considered, it 
does indeed appear that our will is to blame here, for not making us to necessarily 
adhere to our rational assessment and otherwise allowing some sort of whim to lead 
us astray.  
Regardless of appearances, however, there is an illegitimate logical leap 
inherent in this sort of reasoning: the fact that we rationally acknowledge something 
to be “what is best” – that we believe it to be so – does not necessarily entail that the 
latter shall be the object of our will15. Paraphrasing Kant, should human will be 
perfect, we would have no need for something like a categorical imperative founded 
upon pure reason; our will would simply be in perfect consonance with what is 
rationally best. But that is not the case. Our will is imperfect, essentially because it is, 
in part, cognitively impenetrable. Even though we can rationally determine what we 
should [ideally] will, we cannot likewise absolutely determine what we actually do. 
And if that is the case, then perhaps weakness of the will is not the most accurate 
description of the phenomenon, as opposed to a misdirection of the will – the 
                                                           
14
 As Mameli states, beliefs about what is rationally appropriate “do not exert any motivational force 
on decision-making unless they can trigger emotional feelings that motivate one to choose according 
to the content of these beliefs” (2004, p. 171) 
15
 The issue at play here can arguably be subsumed into the debate between internalism and 
externalism concerning the motivation for action. Bernard Williams’ perspective on the necessity of 
internally motivating factors for action – and the insufficiency of external (or objective) factors such 
beliefs or judgements – would constitute the correlate of our perspective within said debate. For a 
more in-depth discussion, see Williams, 1995, pp. 35-45, and Williams, 1981, pp. 101-13. 
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grounds for which can never be fully understood without first coming to terms with 
the nature of emotions and their pervasiveness within the mechanism of action.  
Emotions, as previously argued, come into play not only in the decision-
making process (controlling both attention and salience) but also – and significantly 
– in the space between our logical cost-benefit analysis of the problem and the very 
concrete action we are ultimately agents of. This space, as I also previously pointed 
out, is the locus of motivation, and hence the assertion that when time comes to take 
action, the role of emotions is an inherently motivating one. Recent studies on the 
relation between emotion and motivation have acknowledged the “special status of 
emotions as drivers of behaviour”, arguing that emotions motivate behaviour in the 
short and long terms, and that although cognitive appraisals are necessary to the 
process, “alone they are insufficient” – inasmuch emotions “have impact over and 
above the cold cognitions that accompany them” (Passyn & Sujan, 2006, p. 588). But 
what kind of insight does this – in conjunction with our brief analysis of the problem 
of akrasia – provide us regarding the nature of emotion’s relationship with action? 
Succinctly put: how exactly do emotions motivate our action? 
Naturally, any attempt at an answer would be disingenuous unless it 
consequently followed what our previously exploration of the somatic-marker 
hypothesis. What the latter posits, basically, is that emotions – along with the bodily 
felling of emotions – may cooperate with our memory of past life and learning 
experiences in order to prompt feelings of “comfort or discomfort toward evaluative 
prepositions” (Greenspan, 1993, p. 14). This projective experience of either comfort 
or discomfort – in the sense that the actual feeling operates as a symbol of potential 
future pain or pleasure associated with the imagined actualization of the evaluative 
propositions in question – often operates at a subliminal level, be it because the 
experience of those feelings eludes full conscious awareness on the part of the agent 
or because the underlying and retrospective reasons for those feelings to be 
associated with that particular situation are also found at a subconscious level – or 
even both. 
Emotions can hence be said to operate as motivating reasons for action, 
seeing as they may implicitly “serve as rewards or punishments for their agents [...] 
by ‘registering’ evaluations in positive or negative affect” (Idem, p. 80). Naturally, 
that is not to say that emotions fully replace beliefs and judgements within the 
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mechanism of action, but simply that any judgement or belief is made much more 
motivationally significant through its association with emotion. This association can 
then work in both a positive manner – connecting comfort with one alternative and 
thus endowing it with greater subliminal desirability – and a negative one – linking 
discomfort with another, therefore making it less prone to ultimately be selected.  
The way in which emotion influences action can hence be divided it into two 
different modalities, one being positive and the other negative – or, in keeping with 
the mechanical analogy of the “push from behind” often used in these instances, the 
first being a “push towards” and the latter a “push away from”. Even though the two 
are not mutually exclusive, and often operate in consonance, the question may arise 
as to which one is most effective – and even more prevalent – in motivating our 
actions. Greenspan’s plausible answer to this is that the threat of continuing 
discomfort is the more powerful motivating force of the two. It is not that individuals 
lack a hedonistic urge – on the contrary, such an urge is very much present; however, 
as Schopenhauer puts it, between pain and pleasure the concern with the former often 
overwhelms the inclination towards the latter16. Following this line of reasoning, the 
escape from discomfort view of emotional motivation claims that it is precisely 
discomfort which “provides a rational ‘push from behind’ in the generation of action 
from emotion”, and that it does so “even if it is not on the tip of consciousness prior 
to action” (Idem, p. 154). This does not entail, as Greenspan admits, that all action is 
necessarily thus motivated; it does, however, aim to sustain that “action is commonly 
made more likely by a kind of subliminal reasoning from emotion, as a supplement 
to judgement” (Idem, p. 153).  
Emotions claim much of their motivational influence due to their connection 
with often subtly experienced bodily feelings. That they are able to affect us in this 
acutely somatic and visceral way is certainly at the basis of the ambivalence that 
often causes them to be construed as anti-rational: despite the fact that cognitive 
factors are decisively found at their inception, the actual experience of emotions 
frequently operates on multiple levels of consciousness – including the deeper, 
subliminal ones. Undoubtedly, that their “power lies beyond the threshold of full 
critical awareness” makes them “loom the more threatingly over simplistic notions of 
                                                           
16
 “Suppose that, with the exception of some sore or painful spot, we are physically in a sound and 
healthy condition: the sore of this one spot, will completely absorb our attention, causing us to lose the 
sense of general well-being, and destroying all our comfort in life” (Schopenhauer, 2007, p.7) 
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rational order” (De Sousa, 1987, p. 24). This, however, is no reason to forfeit our 
understanding of them – quite the opposite: regardless of our preference, emotions 
work in parallel to our will, and a genuine comprehension of our actions depends on 
the acceptance that many of them are a result of the interaction between both will 
and emotion. Nevertheless, and following what has been claimed so far, the 
observation could be made that, if our emotions are indeed able to operate 
surreptitiously to influence our decisions as often as I maintained above, perhaps we 
mistake what we here dub our “will” – or free will – for something else entirely; 
something which is found not within the realm of free spontaneous action, but rather 
of predetermined and near-instinctual reaction. Can a sort of emotional determinism 
presiding over our actions be the logical consequence of all that has been claimed so 
far? 
Even though I can begin to understand its reasons, this is an implausible 
conclusion. To begin with, it is a conclusion that seems to carry an inherent 
misunderstanding between the notions of influence and determination. The two are 
definitely not synonymous; in this context, to influence would be to create 
[potentially strong] response tendencies. But tendencies are not certainties. Although 
emotional influence may significantly sway our actions by making some options 
more likely to be ultimately chosen, this does not amount to determinism – for 
determinism deals with certainties, not probabilities. Regardless of how strong the 
response tendencies set in place turn out to be, there will always be a gap between 
certainty and probability, and within that gap human will can still find room to 
operate.  
Deeply connected with this misunderstanding is another, which likens 
emotionally influenced responses to instinctual ones. There are, however, ways in 
which the model of emotionally-motivated action that we have advanced decisively 
differs from the ordinary notion of instinct-based behaviour. First and foremost, there 
is a major operative difference between instinct and emotion: when time comes to 
act, instinct operates directly to produce “stereotyped responses to precise ‘releasing 
stimuli’”, while emotions fundamentally affect motivation; and motivation “can 
produce quite different patterns of goal-oriented behaviour in different 
circumstances” (Idem, p. 84). Even in biological terms, the connection between 
emotion and behaviour “cannot be entirely fixed and determinate” – otherwise, 
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emotions would “simply be reflexes without the flexibility that supposedly gives 
them their specific evolutionary advantage” (Parkinson, 2004, p. 122). The charge of 
determinism begins to unravel due to the fact that there is not a strict causal link 
between emotions and action, but rather an indirect influence of the former over the 
latter through the processes of motivation.  
In addition to this, there is another crucial difference between instinct and 
emotion. Instinct is, by definition, something innate and immutable. We are born 
with instinctual dispositions to, for instance, flinch when startled, scratch ourselves 
when we itch, or withdraw from pain-inducing external phenomena. These 
instinctual dispositions are innate – they dispense with a process of learning – and 
are, for the most part, immutable and insuppressible – we can force ourselves not to 
scratch an itch, but we cannot avoid feeling the urge to do so. Now, while an 
argument could be made for the innateness of emotions themselves, the fact is that 
they appear to be at least in equal parts the product of nature and nurture. Obviously, 
the debate concerning the seemingly paradoxical nature of emotions as being 
simultaneously particular (to the individual) and universal (common to all human 
beings) is one whose length and pervasiveness presently impedes a full exploration. 
For that reason, we will restrain ourselves to argue for our own perspective on the 
subject, and assume the aforementioned debate as the theoretical background of the 
latter. 
 
3.2. Paradigm scenarios and the development of emotion 
 
It is widely accepted, in the contemporary literature on emotion, that there 
exists a set of basic innate human emotions – or, perhaps more fittingly, innate 
emotional dispositions – such as the infant’s disposition to cry whenever discomfort 
is experienced or the disposition to exhibit the kind of behaviour that may promote 
an emotional attachment between child and caregivers (toddlers’ ability to smile and 
laugh, for one, fits the latter, as does the inclination to cling to familiar adults). These 
early emotional dispositions, however, can only be matured and refined into 
“emotions” in the full sense of the term through a process of learning interaction with 
the external world – inasmuch as the concrete and particular circumstances of that 
interaction play a decisive role in the way the individual later deems those emotions 
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to be properly experienced. In that sense, emotions can be said to be a product of 
both our natural genetic dispositions, present at birth, and the character of our 
subsequent life experience – thus making them markedly different from any kind of 
instinctual behaviour. Our emotions are partially constructed throughout the early 
stages of our life and hence can – and indeed should, I would argue – be the object of 
education. 
The consequences of this conception towards the charge of emotional 
determinism mentioned above are significant: first of all, even if we hypothetically 
disregarded what was previously argued regarding emotion and motivation, and went 
on to consider the effect of emotion over action to be absolutely binding, there would 
still not be any kind of a priori determinism to constrain our actions – for emotions 
would still have to be learned before they could have any such effect, and it would be 
the character of that learning process to ultimately determine the virtuousness (or 
viciousness) of the subsequently developed emotional inclinations. As such, this 
would then leave us with a charge of a posteriori determinism, according to which 
our emotions – having achieved crystallization through the learning process – would 
still henceforth utterly and necessarily determine our actions. But even this 
hypothetical scenario can too be refuted within the conception of emotional 
development that we have just proposed: for if emotions can be learned, they cannot 
be closed to change throughout our life – at least, not absolutely.  
To elaborate: as we have previously ascertained, despite being partially 
cognitive, emotions are not akin to beliefs. They are “not fully open to be developed 
ontogenetically, through culture and education”, inasmuch as they are, “to some 
extent, cognitively impenetrable” (the probable “evolutionary ‘price’ which is paid 
for speed of response”) (Goldie, p. 110). To change an emotion – that is, to change 
the way in which that emotion is experienced in terms of its opportunity, intensity 
and intentionality – is rather different than to change a simple belief. Emotions are 
neither verifiable nor falsifiable through the usual logical channels; indeed, they are 
“less malleable than beliefs in response to further evidence or to the recognition that 
further evidence is needed” (Greenspan, 1993, p. 88). None of this, however, means 
that emotions are completely closed to change.  
To clarify this apparent contradiction, De Sousa’s aforementioned theory on 
the existence of paradigm scenarios that ultimately shape the way we experience 
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emotions may prove particularly fruitful. According to it, “we are made familiar with 
the vocabulary of emotion by association with paradigm scenarios” (1987, p. 182), 
which can be found in both the empirical dimension of our daily lives (more 
decisively, at a young age) and in the cultural manifestations we are eventually 
exposed to (folk stories, art, literature, and so on). By being exposed to the kind of 
emotional responses to situations in paradigm scenarios, he argues, the child would 
eventually start identifying and learning how to experience particular emotions.  
Now, the Aristotelian influence on this conception is quite clear: what we are 
dealing with here is fundamentally the mechanism of emulation (zêlos) that Aristotle 
examines in his Rhetoric, albeit taken perhaps to new levels of psychological 
subtlety. Emulation, says Aristotle, “is pain caused by seeing the presence in persons 
whose nature is like our own of good things that are highly valued and are possible 
for ourselves to acquire” (Rhetoric, 1388a32-3), thus motivating us to attain those 
good things (e.g. character traits) for ourselves. Applying this reasoning to De 
Sousa’s theory of paradigm scenarios might help clarify the processes at play: we 
relate to the individual involved in the paradigm scenario, often attributing him the 
part of role-model, and emulation comes into effect. Now, looking back at the 
Aristotelian definition, and since much of this phenomenon takes place at an early 
age, it may appear unrealistic to assume that a child knowingly identifies the 
characteristics belonging to that individual and consequently consciously strives to 
emulate them; but that it not to say that it cannot happen at a subliminal level – 
concerning not only what we would logically deem to be desirable character traits 
and emotional responses, but all the instances of either of them that the child 
perceives as being significant to the scenario in question. 
This subject will be developed in subsequent chapters. For the time being, 
however, we can already begin to understand how the nature of our emotional 
repertoire may feasibly be altered later in life. It now becomes clear, considering the 
psychological depth at which the process of emotional learning takes place, why 
emotions cannot be said to be open to change to the extent that beliefs are. Properly 
speaking, emotions cannot be refuted in the same way as the latter. Unlike 
propositions, an emotion cannot be falsified by evidence. And even if the cognitive 
aspect of an emotion is affected in that fashion, there is still no guarantee of actual 
change in the concrete experience of that emotion. In a sense, then, “[w]e have no 
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more direct control over the content of our emotions than we have voluntary control 
over the past situations in which we learned them” (De Sousa, 1987, p. 263). 
Nevertheless, we retain some measure of indirect control, as we are able to 
“regestalt” those original paradigms. As De Sousa puts it, “[a] paradigm can always 
be challenged” and even revised “in light of competing paradigms” (Idem, p. 186). 
Naturally, this is no small feat; indeed, when it comes to the difficulty of 
significantly changing emotional responses there is little need to provide 
philosophical arguments, our own personal experiences assuredly bearing testament 
to the magnitude of the task. The weight of those early paradigms can frequently feel 
colossal, particularly since our approach to the problem is often originally flawed by 
the limitations of the method we choose to employ: reasoned argument. There is a 
culturally ingrained tendency to believe reasoned verbal argument to be effective in 
actually altering emotional dispositions and responses. Yet, “[a]t the level of the 
immediate content of emotions it doesn’t help much to repeat, like incantations, 
‘This isn’t really frightening’ or ‘There is really no reason to be 
angry/jealous/depressed/envious/sad’” (Idem, p. 263). Indeed, some studies on the 
effect of emotion in the political process even point out an apparently paradoxical 
phenomenon: as “individuals mature, they develop a more complex understanding of 
emotions and endeavor more to integrate emotions and cognitions” (Williams & 
Drolet, 2005, p. 344). Thus, contrary to expectation, as we grow older we do not tend 
to rely more on reason, but on emotion to inform our [political] decision-making, and 
are particularly susceptible to “emotional appeals focusing on the avoidance of 
negative emotional outcomes” – which further contributes towards the added 
resilience of established emotional dispositions (Idem, p. 351)17. 
These considerations, as one might have already realized, seem to lead us 
inexorably towards the contemplation of the necessity of an education of emotion 
and the manner in which such a thing could be accomplished in concrete terms. 
Following what was argued above – and borrowing Goldie’s words – it would seem 
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 Perhaps this difficulty is not necessarily a bad thing in itself: considering the role played by 
emotions in motivation, the fact that they “resist qualification in light of the total body of evidence” 
(Greenspan, 1993, p. 87) may very well prove instrumental to their effectiveness, since their reduced 
malleability is only disadvantageous when the learning process that presided over their development 
proves had less that virtuous aims – and results. If the opposite happens – if the process of emotional 
learning was conducted in a virtuous manner – the greater inflexibility of emotions may actually prove 
to be a check against instances of “weakness of the will” whenever disruptive factors should arise. 
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that “emotions can be educated: we can be taught to recognise, and to respond 
emotionally, as part of the same education” (2000, p. 28).Indeed, in order to “serve 
their obvious variety of functions”, emotions cannot be absolutely determined a 
priori – and, if that is the case, “at least some of their structure must derive from the 
contingencies of the unfolding interaction” between individuals and the world around 
them (Parkinson, 2004, p 125). For now, however, and despite the importance they 
shall undoubtedly have in later chapters, let us withhold any questions to do with 
those issues to focus specifically on the matter at hand. In sum, what is the key 
conclusion that we may draw from what has been argued thus far in the present 
chapter? 
Firstly, we established that emotions have a cognitive dimension, with 
cognitive elements being present in their inception and playing a significant role in 
emotional justification. Even though emotions are born out of a complexly woven net 
of personal and contextual factors, the fact that cognition features among those 
factors makes emotions ultimately intelligent and intelligible – thus contradicting the 
perspective that would disqualify emotional experience for being essentially chaotic 
and disturbing. 
Secondly, and following the ransoming of emotions from the realm of 
pernicious irrationality, we undertook an analysis of the influence of emotion on the 
processes of deliberation and decision-making, subsequently reaching the realization 
that emotions play a pivotal role in those processes – not only because they are 
instrumental in narrowing the field of possibilities by endowing some of them with a 
greater salience, but because their ability to do so fundamentally stems from the fact 
that they should actually be construed as an integral part of human rationality. 
The concept of an emotional rationality then led us to the consideration of the 
effect of emotion on action, the latter being the object of our labour in the present 
section. Concerning this, we surmised that emotion’s influence over the mechanism 
of action is as decisive as it was over decision-making processes, primarily due to its 
ability to control motivation – and consequently influence how we act or if we even 
act at all. 
Ultimately, what must be retained is this: if, contradicting rationalistic 
prejudices, emotions actually incorporate cognitive elements, if they play a 
determinant role in the way we reach our decisions, if they are instrumental in 
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motivating us to act – as well as in influencing the way in which we ultimately do so 
– and being deliberation and action indisputably political phenomena par excellence, 
then there is only one conclusion can be drawn – that emotions are, in themselves 
and by nature, inherently political. 
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Chapter III – Crowds, Publics, and Propaganda. 
 
We have been concerned with the emotional phenomenon as it pertains to our 
existence as individuals. As it has already started to become apparent in the previous 
chapter – namely, following De Sousa's theory of paradigm scenarios and all ensuing 
considerations regarding the process of "emotional learning" – the influence of the 
social collective upon the way emotions are assimilated, interpreted, and experienced 
by the individual is far from negligible. In light of this realization, it would be 
disingenuous to attempt the (regrettably frequent) conceptual leap from individual 
psychology (wherein the individual becomes an artificially atomised unit, chiefly for 
the sake of theoretical convenience) and political psychology, assuming that all 
conclusions of the former are valid for the latter and disregarding the markedly 
different circumstances between the two. Instead of falling prey to this critical error, 
what we propose to do in the present chapter is to gradually bridge the gap between 
those two dimensions, building up our understanding of political behaviour by laying 
our findings on group psychology upon the foundations provided by our previous 
analysis of its individual counterpart. Only thus will we be truly able to understand 
the origin and full ramifications of the political problems that ensue from a limited 
conception of rationality which chooses to disregard emotion's role in general 
decision-making and [political] behaviour.  
Before we begin in earnest, however, something must be said of transition 
that we ultimately intend to operate between group psychology and political 
behaviour, inasmuch as the two are sometimes construed as being theoretically 
independent. In essence, this is an issue that dates back to the Aristotelian definition 
of human essence as zôon politkon, posited in both his Politics and Nicomachean 
Ethics, meant to signify a being which could only fully fulfil his primary function 
when existing in a community of his peers – of which the polis was the ultimate 
expression. This rightful interpretation of Aristotle’s theory, ultimately rescued by 
Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition (1998), was muddled by his interpreters (Cicero 
chief among them), who traded zôon politikon – political living being – for animal 
socialis – social animal. In doing so, they blurred the line between what were, in 
Aristotle’s perspective, two different dimensions. It was a misunderstanding between 
what is human beings' ultimate goal and key element in fulfilling their function 
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(ergon) of acting virtuously – living in a political community which enables them to 
freely enact their virtues within the public sphere – and what is merely their natural 
starting point, in which they do not significantly differ from numerous other animals: 
the inclination to congregate with other individuals of their species, grounded upon a 
social (or gregarious) instinct. 
Although the definition of human being as a “social animal” may fail to 
accurately convey the higher purpose of human existence as understood by Aristotle, 
the philosophical debate on this subject has produced a sort of polarization that 
eventually led to an exaggerated and surreptitious notion that zôon politikon and 
animal socialis are indeed conflicting and nearly mutually exclusive concepts. This, I 
would argue, is simply not the case. Those two concepts would in fact be better 
understood as reflecting the very same aspect of human nature, and differing only in 
degree – inasmuch they both seek to convey human beings' natural inclination 
towards communal life. Taking this into account, and on a first level of 
comprehension, human beings can indeed be said to be social animals, instinctually 
driven to congregate with their peers and  thus form embryonic societies. Yet, they 
also hold the potential to become much more than part of a primitive social unit, 
formed on the grounds of that instinctual drive. Unlike other social animals – and 
because they are also, simultaneously and decisively, zôon logon ekhon18 – human 
beings alone have the ability to introduce purpose in the social unit, transforming it 
into an actual community directed not only by instinct, but by a common 
intentionality that unfolds into a sense of shared goal.  
Contrary to Arendt’s analysis of the relation between the two (Idem), the 
notion of human beings as zôon politikon does not necessarily contradict their nature 
as social animals, inasmuch as the two are intimately connected: if the social nature 
of human beings marks the instinct-driven genesis of the human community, their 
political nature aims towards its consciously intended perfection. Simply put, 
although we all begin our life as social animals, we hold within ourselves the 
potential – and, in all likelihood, the desire – to evolve into political living beings. 
Following these considerations, it is evident that one can coherently maintain 
a belief in the veracity of Aristotle’s zôon politkon as a concretely significant 
political concept, while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of an 
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 A living being capable of employing reason (and speech). 
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underlying social instinct capable of considerably influencing the behaviour of 
individuals – even in their role as political agents. With apparent disregard for this 
fact, however, much of contemporary research on political behaviour tends to focus 
exclusively on one of those aspects at a time, as if they were separate dimensions of 
human existence. On the one hand, we encounter studies inspired by economic 
theory, which assume the individual to be the atomic unit of analysis, and 
consequently employing individualistic models of explanation – cost-benefit 
analyses, maximization of utility, etc. On the other hand, studies based on political 
psychology, that focus on the social unit and the mechanisms of group influence, and 
are much more amenable to the idea of emotion’s influence upon the political 
process.  
In reality, both are partially right: yes, emotions have a decisive effect on 
political behaviour, and that effect can be potentially heightened by group dynamics; 
but logical reasoning and cognitive intentionality also play a significant role – even if 
many of the cost-benefit analyses that presumably drive political decisions happen 
only as ex post facto rationalizations. Taken separately, however, these perspectives 
configure a bicephalous approach that tends to yield unsatisfactory results – insofar 
as the explanations of each are unavoidably incomplete.  
The notion of emotional rationality that we developed in the previous chapter 
presents us here with the opportunity to understand our political existence in a 
manner that conjugates both its inherent dimensions, thus overcoming the unfruitful 
dissonance of current models. As citizens of contemporary democratic polities, we 
are taught to become, conscious and intentionally, political beings. We conceive of 
our relationship with political institutions as being grounded on logical reason, our 
responsibility being the reception, evaluation, and rational operationalization of 
factual information on relevant political issues. But we are also, and still, social 
animals, suscepible to the influence of group emotional dynamics. And thus we 
begin unveiling an apparent contradiction within our political condition: as a 
consequence of our inherited political rationalism, we not only want, but need, to 
behave “rationally” – that is, on the grounds of pure logical reasoning; our 
circumstances, however, render that desire highly improbable. Unlike the majority of 
political theorists, our political reality – as we will see – does not fail to reflect this 
fact, catering to our need with a variety of expedients to both mask and exploit its 
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unfulfillable nature. The pervasiveness of the dynamics of group influence provides 
the first of such expedients. 
 
 
1. Group Dynamics and the Crowd 
 
 In examining the issue at hand, there are two concepts one will surely come 
across, and which tend to be used rather indiscriminately: “crowd” and “group”. 
Although it could be argued that the semantic differences between the two are 
negligible, those differences are significantly amplified when one looks to employ 
these notions as philosophical concepts. Let us then begin by establishing a key 
distinction: while the word “crowd” represents a rather poorly organised and 
transitory gathering of people – its etymological origin in Old English (crudan, “to 
press, crush”) attests to this – we will henceforth take the word “group” to signify a 
congregation of people that is, at least to an extent, infused with some intentionality 
and implies at least the assumption of a somewhat continued existence. By thus 
understanding these concepts, it becomes apparent that, when dealing with the 
influence of the collective on the political action of an individual who is part of an 
organised and stable society, we should assume we are more closely dealing with a 
group than with a crowd. Yet, that distinction may not always be so straightforward. 
Consequently, even though we shall approach the problem by focussing primarily on 
the mechanisms of group influence, we shall likewise consider the dynamics of 
crowd behaviour, so that we may later attempt to deduce what the consequences of 
this combined exploration are for an organised political society. 
In order to do so, we must necessarily begin by considering the extensive 
studies on group dynamics on the part of both psychology and sociology, and which 
increased in popularity and interest in two very particular time periods: the 
nineteenth century, following the events surrounding the French Revolution, and the 
twentieth century, in the wake of both the first and second World Wars. Regarding 
the first moment, it was the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the mob 
phenomenon that intrigued and concerned thinkers – “a crowd, it was argued, is 
never far from a mob and potentially very close to an overthrowing force” 
(Brighenti, 2010, p. 292); concerning the latter, it was the apparent manipulation of 
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an entire people by means of propaganda and suggestion that seemed to reduce the 
rationalistic view of the human psyche to tatters and warrant reasonable explanation. 
In both instances, what proved to be truly surprising, perhaps even shocking, was the 
fact that not only the ignorant and uneducated – those who could be plausibly 
excused for “not having known better” – took part in such events; indeed, even 
otherwise educated, cultured and “rational” individuals seemed to fall prey to the 
wave of enthusiasm generated by the group, completely forsaking their better 
judgement in the process. At first glance, it was the very edifice of luminous 
rationality, erected by the Enlightenment, which was frighteningly under threat. 
Ultimately, this sort of group dynamics presented an opportunity to challenge the 
rationalistic take on human nature, on the grounds of its limitations – and that is 
precisely why it should interest us. 
There are, before we proceed, two caveats that must be made: firstly, it is 
obviously impossible to exhaust all that has been written of the subject of group 
psychology and on the study of the so-called “crowd mind” in this chapter19. As 
such, we will focus on those contributions which are clearly significant in light of our 
goal in terms of political philosophy, and intentionally forego the consideration of 
others which, despite relevant from the standpoint of psychology – such as Jacob L. 
Moreno’s contributions towards group psychotherapy, for instance – were not found 
pertinent within the scope of our analysis. 
Secondly, even though group dynamics was a scientific hot-topic in the two 
time periods mentioned earlier, one whose relevance lasted well into the 1980’s (due, 
in part, to the interest around propaganda techniques during the Cold War), 
contemporary work on the matter has drastically shifted its focus. A review of the 
literature now being produced on the subject predominantly yields results which have 
little in common with the work of the its pioneers – who were mainly concerned with 
the rationally regressive and contagious effects of group dynamics – and actually 
proceed in the opposite direction: the possibility of a wisdom of the crowds. This 
much more optimistic outlook, whose central argument is that the collective wisdom 
of reasonable individuals can (and often does) exceed that of purported experts on 
the matter being discussed, naturally proves much more palatable for an 
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 For a more comprehensive and genealogical view of the subject, see Serge Moscovici’s The Age of 
the Crowd (1985) and Jaap Van Ginneken’s Crowds, Psychology, and Power (2006). 
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understanding of politics which strives to view the latter almost exclusively as a 
reasoned activity, and is perhaps thus justified in its contemporary prevalence20.  
But despite this current trend towards an emphasis on the collective 
rationality of the crowd – which has found its way into common-sense knowledge 
through more mainstream sources such as James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of the 
Crowds (2004), Cass Sustein’s Infotopia (2005), or Jeff Howe’s Crowdsourcing 
(2009) – I find at least two compelling reasons to take a step back and consider the 
alternative, and supposedly dated, approach to the phenomena of group dynamics: 
for one, the motion towards “crowd wisdom” seems to almost entirely disregard the 
kind of emotionally-charged and potentially dangerous effects of the crowd mind, by 
placing its focus somewhere else entirely – the purely epistemic and probability-
based benefit of reasoned collaboration between large numbers of individuals; on the 
other hand, the same contemporary circumstances that proponents of crowd wisdom 
advance as the conditions for the latter’s great promise – mass media, widespread 
internet access, participation in social networks, etc. – can just as feasibly be 
construed as potentially widening the scale of the pernicious effects of group 
dynamics. 
 
1.1. The nature of the crowd 
 
With these caveats in mind, if one were to recover the study of group 
behaviour prior to its shift towards crowd wisdom, Gustave Le Bon’s seminal work 
La Psychologie des Foules (1905) should be the starting point. In it, he begins by 
arguing that a crowd is not defined by the casual simultaneous coexistence of a 
certain number of people in a given place, but the fact that that group of individuals 
has somehow managed to develop a sort of “collective mind” (1905, p. 18). The 
participation of the individual in that transitory collective mind, which necessarily 
implies the “vanishing of conscious personality and the orientation of feelings and 
thoughts in a determinate direction” (Idem, p. 18), has significant consequences: his 
suggestibility increases exponentially, his intellectual abilities are diminished, his 
critical thinking is dimmed – and his credulity consequently increased. He becomes 
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 Examples of this prevalence include Surowiecki (2004), Sustein (2006), Herzog & Hertwig (2009), 
Rauhut & Lorenz (2011), and Kremer, Mansour & Perry (2014), to cite a few.  
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less patient, more impulsive, quick to judge and even quicker to act upon those 
judgements. An abandonment of the individual’s very individuality seems to take 
place, alongside a regression to a degree of rashness and lack of critical restraint that 
both Le Bon and Freud (1922) identified as akin to a more primitive evolutionary 
state. The former puts it bluntly: “Isolated, he may very well be a cultured individual, 
but in the crowd he is a barbarian” (Idem, p. 22).  
Equally significant are Freud’s thoughts on the subject, expounded in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1991 [1922]), particularly in what pertains 
to the crowd’s potential relation with its perceived leader. The crowd, Freud argues, 
should be likened to a “revival of the primal horde”, insofar as a human being is not 
so much a “herd animal” but “rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde 
led by a chief” (pp. 154-5). This leader of the primal horde (the father or the chief) 
represented for Freud a departure from group psychology into individual psychology, 
to the extent that he [the primal leader], “at the very beginning of the history of 
mankind, was the ‘superman’ whom Nietzsche only expected from the future” (Idem, 
p. 156). Following Freud’s analysis, even in more complex and organized groups 
(such as the Church or the army, the examples provided by him) there is a remnant of 
the group dynamics of the primal horde: within the former, the “illusion that the 
leader loves all of the individuals equally and justly” is simply an “idealistic 
remodelling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knew 
they were equally persecuted by the primal father, and feared him equally” (Idem, p. 
157).  
The depth of this analysis was furthered by Adorno’s interpretation, driven 
and informed by the rise of fascist and totalitarian regimes leading up to the Second 
World War. In his essay Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, 
Adorno notes that Freud, despite being “hardly interested in the political phase of the 
problem, clearly foresaw the rise and nature of fascist mass movements in purely 
psychological categories” (1991, p. 134). Freud endeavoured not to demonize the 
masses but to understand what binds individuals to constitute a mass (or a crowd) in 
the first place. This is the same kind of knowledge pursued by the fascist demagogue, 
“who has to win the support of millions of people for aims largely incompatible with 
their own rational self-interest”, and “can only do so by artificially creating the bond 
Freud is looking for” (Idem, p. 135). That bond is, according to Freud, of a libidinal 
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nature, connected with the satisfaction of the primal desires of the horde. And in 
much the same manner as the latter, “fascist agitation is centred in the idea of the 
leader […], because only the psychological image of the leader is apt to reanimate 
the idea of the all-powerful and threatening primal father” (Idem, pp. 138-9). This, 
according to Adorno, is “the ultimate root of the otherwise enigmatic personalization 
of fascist propaganda, […] instead of discussing objective causes” (Idem, p. 139).  
What thus becomes increasingly clear is that, despite the seemingly dated 
views of thinkers like Le Bon and Freud, there are some aspects of their analysis of 
the crowd phenomenon which undoubtedly retain their validity even when 
considering a more evolved political community. What William McDougall – 
another key author in the study of the crowd mind phenomenon – dubs the principle 
of “primitive sympathy” (1927, p. 25), is a good example of this. “In the crowd”, he 
illustrates, “the expressions of fear of each individual are perceived by his 
neighbours; and this perception intensifies the fear directly excited in them by the 
threatening danger” (Idem, p. 25). Now, this is certainly true regarding the 
experience of panic in a crowd faced with an impending disaster; but it is equally 
true concerning a nation’s perception of the danger posed by a nationwide terrorist 
threat or a looming financial crisis.  
Another instance of the presence of crowd dynamics within contemporary 
political societies is the argument of the crowd’s intellectual inferiority. Le Bon’s 
original argument is that the crowd, inflicting a metaphorical evolutionary regression 
upon the individuals who comprise it, is always – and necessarily – “intellectually 
inferior to the isolated individual” (1905, p. 23).  The reason for this “low order of 
intelligence”, McDougall argues, is that “that the ideas and reasonings which can be 
collectively understood and accepted must be such as can be appreciated by the 
lower order of minds among the crowd” (1927, p. 41). While this may at first sound 
like an excessively abstract description of the phenomenon, one can translate it into 
concrete political terms: practically and realistically speaking, the issues which the 
majority of the citizens of contemporary polities are able to comprehend and 
politically act upon are either few in number or have to be simplified to the point of 
nullifying the actual political impact of their public consideration. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that the average citizen is unintelligent; more often than 
not, it simply means that the issue in question requires an in-depth specific 
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knowledge which is not widely available, and thus can only be fully understood by 
the experts in a given field – a problem to which we will return shortly.  
In addition to these two aspects, there is a third one that has a direct effect 
over the interaction between emotion and logical reasoning. It is a consequence of 
group dynamics that the individual experiences a diminishing in his sense of personal 
responsibility. When taking part in a collective, “[t]he weight of responsibility that 
would be felt by any one man, deciding or acting alone, is apt to be divided among 
all the members of the group” (McDougall, 1927, p. 42). But this does not simply 
imply the more obvious consequences of an increased impulsiveness and decreased 
inhibitions – that “violence of feelings” (Le Bon, 1905, p. 33) so typical of crowd 
behaviour and found at the basis of that sort of rash collective actions for which no 
member of the crowd feels individually responsible, even though they undeniably 
took part in them. This decreased sense of responsibility – particularly when applied 
to the analysis of political action – also has a bearing over the very way in which the 
individual deploys his critical instruments.  
Under these conditions – that is, when he feels part of a group – “the attention 
and care devoted by each man to the task of deliberation, observation, or execution, 
are less keen and continuously sustained” (McDougall, 1927, p. 43). Each individual 
in the groups trusts in the critical check provided by the judgement of the individual 
next to him, and thus decreases the incisiveness of his own consideration of the 
matter at hands. So long as the latter presents some degree of plausibility and does 
not seem to be rejected by the majority of the group, the individual feels inclined to 
add his assent to the general evaluation. It is easy to understand, however, that if 
every individual in the group does exactly that, the critical ability of the group as a 
whole is necessarily less than that of the isolated individual.  
This phenomenon, discussed in abstract terms by classic psychologists such 
as McDougall, is corroborated by the famous social experiment conducted by 
Solomon Asch in the 1950’s (and by similar ones that followed it). Succinctly 
described, the experiment consisted in assembling a group of seven to nine college 
students and informing them that they will be comparing the lengths of lines. They 
are then showed two large white cards, one of which displays the single vertical 
black line whose length is to be matched, and the other three vertical lines of various 
lengths. They are then asked to choose the one that that matches the length of the line 
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on the other card. One of the three actually is of the same length, while the other two 
are substantially different (Asch, 1955). What makes it a social experiment, however, 
is the fact that all members of the group except one – the actual experimental subject 
– were previously instructed to provide unanimous incorrect answers at certain 
points. Being preceded by the realization of this unanimity, the answer provided by 
the subject could then be evaluated in terms of group influence. “Two alternatives 
were open to the subject”, Asch describes; “[h]e could act independently, repudiating 
the majority, or he could go along with the majority, repudiating the evidence of his 
senses. Of the 123 put to the test, a considerable percentage yielded to the majority” 
(Idem, p. 3). Despite the fact that subjects taking the same test under ordinary 
circumstances were shown to make mistakes in less than one percent of their 
selections, that percentage increased to an average of 36.8 when exposed to 
erroneous unanimous group responses – ranging from individuals that were 
“completely independent and never agreed with the erroneous judgments of the 
majority” to others who “went with the majority nearly all the time” (Idem, p. 4). 
 When interviewing the subjects upon the completion of the experiment – and 
after clarifying their true role in it – Asch collected some very interesting replies 
regarding the reasons for the subjects’ behaviour. Among those who consistently 
agreed with the error of the majority, there were some that simply came to the 
conclusion that they were wrong, and the group was right. Others rationalized their 
behaviour by claiming that they did not want to spoil the results with their 
disagreement. But the truly remarkable reply – at least, regarding our present purpose 
– was that of those who admitted to having concluded early on that the majority was 
either sheepishly following the first responder or simply being the victim to an 
optical illusion, but still found themselves unable to break the trend when prompted 
to decide. This is an eloquent illustration of how the influence of the group can 
widen the gap between logical reasoning and emotional response, with the latter 
prevailing over the former virtually in the same way it does in instances of akratic 
behaviour. 
 The replies provided by those who managed to remain independent from the 
majority’s direction of response are also of interest here. “The most significant fact 
about them”, Asch says, “was not absence of responsiveness to the majority but a 
capacity to recover from doubt and to re-establish their equilibrium” (Idem, p 4). It is 
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important to note that what set them apart from those who were utterly swayed is not 
that they were impervious to group influence, quite the contrary: that influence was 
clearly and almost palpably felt. Their confidence was admittedly shaken by the 
group’s response. Self-doubt was introduced in the equation, and their judgement 
called into question. All those aspects of what is definitely a relatable human 
emotional experience were present: the insecurity produced by the realization of 
having a dissonant view of the matter, the discomfort caused by having to express 
that view to a group of people in blatant disagreement with it, and an eagerness to be 
accepted by the group that is a by-product of the human being’s social instinct. In the 
end, what made a difference for those individuals was not the fact that they were in 
possession of more information or had a greater ability to logically reason about the 
problem – some of those who ultimately agreed with the group actually knew that the 
answer was wrong – but the fact that they had a greater ability to manage the 
emotions aroused by the interaction with the group. They had, to introduce a notion 
that we will return to later on, a greater emotional vigour. 
  
1.2. The invisible crowd and crowd symbols 
 
 Elias Canetti’s Crowds and Power (1978) remains perhaps one of the most 
philosophically significant works on the intricate and often unspoken relationship 
between group dynamics and the political sphere. Although it would be difficult to 
deconstruct here the myriad of symbolically pregnant notions employed by Canetti in 
the latter, there are a few aspects of his analysis that merit definite consideration. For 
one, and despite the fact that many before him had studied the phenomenon of the 
crowd in terms of its nature and how the latter unfolds, few had attempted to 
understand its origins at a causal level. Canetti’s understanding of the raison d’être of 
the crowd, which famously opens the book, is therefore one of those aspects that 
deserve our attention: “[t]here is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the 
unknown” (1978, p. 15). This nearly pathological albeit deeply existential fear of 
being touched – manifested in things like our need for the protection of clothes and 
secure housing, as well as our aversion to being touched by strangers when walking 
down a busy street – is, almost paradoxically, what motivates our inclination to 
congregate in crowds. It is “only in a crowd”, Canetti states, “that man can become 
73 
 
free of this fear of being touched”, and the “only situation in which the fear changes 
into its opposite” (Idem).  
In a dense crowd, where every individual body is pressed against the next, the 
fear of being touched transforms into the security of the feeling of physical 
communion, “as though everything were happening in one and the same body” 
(Idem, p. 16). This “reversal of the fear of being touched”, as Canetti puts it, 
“belongs to the nature of crowds”, and is at the heart of its seemingly magnetic 
appeal. Contrary to much of the work that preceded him, Canetti therefore allows us 
to begin understanding the crowd as something that is not simply the result of 
excitatory circumstances – a popular grievance, a political injustice, or even the work 
of a so-called rabble-rouser – but rather an answer to one of human beings’ more 
deeply-seated ontological anxieties. As such, the phenomenon of the crowd, along 
with the group dynamics it implies, should be regarded as a far more ubiquitous and 
intrinsically existential human fact than we are perhaps used to conceding. 
 Labouring under that assumption, and beyond providing us with an 
ontological argument for the prevalence of the crowd phenomenon, Canetti’s efforts 
allow us to understand the latter’s true political significance – something which was 
accomplished through the introduction of two concepts that should particularly 
interest us here: the invisible crowd and the crowd symbol. Concerning the first of the 
two – the “invisible crowd” – what is at stake is the understanding that an abstract 
notion of the crowd should not be regarded as some novel conception of modern 
political theory; in fact, the lives of human being have nearly always been marked by 
their coexistence with invisible crowds. In early human communities, mystical and 
religious belief commonly professed the existence of the “invisible dead” – the 
ancestors that had passed away and somehow persisted in a different plane of 
existence. In addition to being commonly considered a source of influence upon the 
living, they “were thought of as being together and generally it was assumed that 
there were a great many of them” (Idem, p. 42). This belief persisted throughout the 
ages and across many world religions, among them Christianity – which added to 
them the legions of invisible angels and demons. In a sense, these invisible collective 
entities thus constitute the primordial invisible crowds whose existence and impact is 
felt by human beings in their everyday lives.  
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Although some of these early invisible crowds have since disappeared in the 
wake of the evanesce of the beliefs that founded them, others exist which bear no 
relation to religion or mysticism and are nonetheless still felt by us to be present in a 
significant manner:  the idea of posterity, for instance, the invisible crowd of those to 
come which has today “detached itself from our own progeny and transferred itself to 
the future of humanity as a whole” (Idem, p. 46). And an equally good example is the 
invisible crowd that came to replace demons in the age of science: bacteria. As 
Canetti puts it, only “a tiny minority of people have looked into a microscope and 
actually seen them there”; nevertheless, everyone “is continually aware of them and 
makes every effort not to come into contact with them” (Idem, p. 47). As such, it 
seems that the notion of the invisible crowd is not merely an abstract and theoretical 
concept, but rather a defining feature of human life in itself. There are indeed crowds 
which, despite their apparent intangibility, have a commonly acknowledged and 
therefore undeniable bearing upon our concrete existence. The question now is: can 
we, as concrete individuals, ever be part of such a crowd? 
Now, although the notion of a crowd that extends beyond physical boundaries 
had already been touched upon by some thinkers before him, Canetti developed it to 
a much deeper level of significance. In order to answer the question we just posed, 
we must hence first consider the second of Canetti’s concepts mentioned earlier: 
crowd symbols.  
 The latter are defined by him as “collective units which do not consist of men, 
but which are still felt as crowds” – in the sense that each of them “comprehends 
some of the essential attributes of the crowd” and “stands as symbol for it in myth, 
dream, speech and song” (Idem, p. 75). Providing what is at first glance an unusual 
and almost poetic list of crowd symbols (Fire, the Sea, Rain, Rivers, Forest, Corn, 
Wind, Sand, the Heap, Stone Heaps, and Treasure), Canetti proceeds to derive from 
them the characteristics that make them effective crowd symbols not only in poetic 
and mythological sources but also – and consequently – in our own minds. We will 
not go into it in great detail here, but we may offer a few illustrative examples: fire, 
for instance, is “the same wherever it breaks out; it spreads rapidly; it is contagious 
and insatiable; it can break out anywhere and with great suddenness; it is multiple; it 
is destructive; it has an enemy; it dies” (Idem, p. 77). All this, Canetti states, is true 
of the crowd. Similarly symbolic of crowds, the sea is “dense and cohesive”, 
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constituted by individual drops of water that “only begin to count when they can no 
longer be counted, when they are part of the whole”, it “has a voice” and is 
“changeable in its emotions” (Idem, pp. 80-1). And so on. 
 The existence of these crowd symbols is significant in a twofold manner: on 
the one hand, they help validate and consolidate the crowd phenomenon in our 
shared imagination; images such as the sea or the treasure, where strength or value is 
dependent on a combination of multiple individual parts to form a more significant 
whole –surrendering individuality for collective existence – can just as easily 
motivate crowd formation as it does social and political cohesion. On the other hand 
– and more crucially – it allows us to understand how political entities such as 
nations may themselves function as crowd symbols, while simultaneously 
functioning as invisible crowds of which we, as concrete individuals, are a part.  
According to Canetti, there are two common approaches to define a nation: an 
“objective” one, which attempts analytically identify the key characteristics of 
nations and thus produce a universally valid definition, and another, which we may 
call subjective by contrast, that focuses instead exclusively on one’s own nation. The 
latter – which is at the heart of much patriotic feeling and comes about more often 
than not – often implicitly harbours the “unshakable belief in the superiority of this 
one nation”, “prophetic visions of unique greatness, and a peculiar mixture or moral 
and feral pretensions” (Idem, p. 169). It is a view that imbues nations with an almost 
religious nature: the “germ [for nations to become something like religions] is always 
latent in them, becoming active in times of war” – their “faith” being precisely that 
“distinctive character of a nation” which cannot be pinned down by an objective 
description of “customs, tradition, politics, and literature” (Idem, p.170). No member 
of a nation, Canetti states, ever regards himself as being alone; as soon as he 
acknowledges himself as the former, “something more comprehensive moves into his 
consciousness, a larger unit to which he feels himself to be related” (Idem).  
The nature of that unit and the individual’s relation to it is not founded upon 
those elements that are traditionally thought of as comprising a nation (geographical 
location, language, history, and so forth.). Instead, the “larger unit to which he feels 
himself related is always a crowd or a crowd symbol”, having many of the latter’s 
distinctive characteristics: “density, growth, and infinite openness; surprising, or very 
striking, cohesion; a common rhythm or a sudden discharge” (Idem). Nations are 
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determined by the crowd symbols that define them in the eyes of the individuals that 
comprise them and which, in turn, end up defining the political existence of those 
individuals as well. Every member of a nation, Canetti notes, “always sees himself, 
or a picture of himself, in a fixed relationship to the particular symbol which has 
become the most important for his nation” (Idem, pp. 170-1). As such, even in 
organized political structures such as the contemporary state, the crowd and its 
symbols may still play a significant role: on the one hand, it is upon the latter’s 
“periodic reappearance when the moment demands it [that] lies the continuity of 
national feeling”; on the other – and as a consequence of the first – a “nation’s 
conscience of itself” can only be changed when “its symbol changes” (Idem, p. 171).  
 All of the aspects of group dynamics that we have so far deduced from the 
work of some of the more eminent scholars on the subject should serve as a reminder 
that the potential for crowd behaviour is ever present – even in complex political 
collectives. To put it concisely, and once again borrowing McDougall’s words, it 
becomes increasingly clear that “[t]he peculiarities of simple crowds tend to appear 
in all group life” (1927, p. 48). Our analysis, therefore, should not cease here. As the 
modes of collective interaction increase in their level of organization and complexity, 
so does the pertinence of their exploration in what concerns our understanding of 
group dynamics within modern political societies.  
 
 
2. Mediatised society and the rise of public opinion 
 
 The most immediate image conjured by the word “group” is, in all likelihood, 
that of an actual gathering of people, united by some common purpose or 
circumstance. Much like what we have just discussed regarding Canetti’s notion of 
invisible crowds, however, a group does not necessarily have to be understood in this 
concrete fashion. Its nature can be much less palpable: a religious community, a 
political party, a professional association and so on, all constitute collectives which 
are able to create and maintain the dynamics of group influence without requiring the 
permanent coexistence of its members in the same physical space.  By endowing 
individuals with a clear set of ideals to pursue, role-models to emulate, or 
expectations to meet, and by periodically reinforcing them, this kind of group has 
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always been – at least, to some extent – able to virtually reproduce the conditions and 
the outcomes of the group dynamics characteristic of their more concrete 
counterparts. 
There is perhaps no other time in history where this has been more clearly 
demonstrated than our own. With the advent of mass media, contemporary society 
has managed to take the already significant political relevance of group dynamics to 
an even higher level. Marshall McLuhan’s famed “Global Village” does not simply 
represent the approximation of people throughout the globe via immediate 
communication and information channels; it represents also the possibility to 
introduce group dynamics at a much greater scale.  
This happened progressively, and in parallel with changes in the way in 
which the political elites of modern democracies reached out to the electorate. The 
impact of mass media such as newspapers on the interactions between individuals 
and political actors and institutions, for instance, had already been acknowledged by 
such early theorists of group psychology as Gabriel Tarde – namely, in his L’Opinion 
et La Foule (1916), which later came to deeply influence the work of Le Bon. At that 
point in time, and particularly later with the introduction of radio and the 
broadcasting of political speeches, citizens’ political existence became increasingly 
dependent upon mass media. As this situation evolved to include even wider-ranging 
communication pathways – such as television and the internet – the politics of 
western democratic polities not only became mediated, but increasingly mediatised. 
The distinction is significant within political communication theory: mediated 
politics simply refers to a situation “in which the media have become the most 
important source of information and vehicle of communication between the 
governors and the governed” (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 230). In other words, “people 
depend on the media for information about politics and society […], just as 
politicians and other powerful elites depend on the media for information about 
peoples’ opinions and trends in society, and for reaching out to people” (Idem).  
Mediatised politics, on the other hand, is a significantly more complex 
concept, and one that bear considerably greater political consequences. Perhaps one 
of the most currently debated topics in political communication theory, the notion of 
mediatisation (or mediatization, as it is sometimes also spelled) is the subject of 
many significant contemporary studies in the field (McQuail, 2006; Strömbäck, 
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2008; Lundby, 2009; Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014; Veron, 
2014) – all of which contribute to make it an “influential new concept that places the 
media at the centre of all kinds of important cultural, political, and social 
developments” (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, p. 1032).  
A complex process, the mediatisation of politics is notably defined by 
Strömbäck as encompassing four key phases: the first phase is accomplished when 
“the mass media come to constitute the most important source of information and 
channel of communication between citizenry and political institutions and actors” 
(2008, p. 236) – in other word, when politics become mediated; the second phase 
happens when media become “independent from governmental or other political 
bodies and, consequently, have begun to be governed according to media logic, 
rather than according to any political logic” (Idem, pp. 236-7)21; the third phase takes 
place when the media “have become so independent and important that political and 
other social actors have to adapt to the media, rather than the other way around” – 
rendering “media considerations an increasingly integral part of even the policy-
making processes” (Idem, p. 238); finally, the fourth phase is attained when political 
and social actors “not only adapt to the media logic and the predominant news 
values, but also internalize these and […] allow the media logic and the standards of 
newsworthiness to become a built-in part of the governing processes” (Idem, pp. 
239-40). The mediatisation of politics can thus be succinctly described as the process 
through which the traditional view on the subservience of media to politics is 
gradually inverted, with the latter possibly coming to be dependent on the former, 
and even inherently shaped by its agenda and specific logic. 
This phenomenon naturally bears significant consequences for the 
individual’s action and interactions with other political actors within the public 
sphere. For as the latter gradually comes to be dominated by modern media – and 
thus produces a society that is in itself mediatised – the classically pivotal concept of 
political persuasion is forced to reshape itself and give rise to an equally “mediatised 
                                                           
21
 Media logic is defined here as the specific process through which the media present and transmit 
information, marked by the dominance of “news values and storytelling techniques the media make 
use of to take advantage of their own medium and its format, and to be competitive in the ongoing 
struggle to capture people’s attention”; political logic, on the other hand, focuses on “collective and 
authoritative decision making as well as the implementation of political decisions”, encompassing 
both a “policy dimension” – the attempt to address socio-political problems via political and 
legislative means – and a “process dimension” – the process of securing official and collective 
acceptance of the proposed program of action (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 233).     
79 
 
rhetoric” (Fidalgo, 2009). The latter, by adding the media to Aristotle’s triangular 
model of rhetoric – orator, message and audience – fundamentally alters the relations 
between its elements, and transforms it into a “communicational square” (Idem, p. 
232). This, in turn, may crucially alter our understanding of what constitutes a 
political audience in the first place.  
Whereas in most instances an audience would classically be understood and 
approached as a crowd – a physical gathering of individuals within hearing range of 
the orator, susceptible to phenomena of psychological contagion – the audience of 
most rhetorical processes has been conceptually transmuted by modern media from a 
crowd into a public. And while the latter notion may seem to invoke the image of a 
less concrete and therefore less psychological vulnerable kind of audience – a 
collective of physically separated but somehow mentally or spiritually connected 
individuals, as it were – it would be a mistake to assume that to be the case. The 
perceived functional divide between crowd and public when it comes to political 
communication is, once again, merely apparent. In this regard, we do not find 
“watertight realities between crowd and public or a one-way path, but a commutable 
situation of collective ways to listen to a speaker”; in fact – and echoing 
McDougall’s earlier warning – “every crowd tends to become a public and every 
public can give birth to a crowd” (1927, p. 8). As such, the public is yet another 
budding invisible crowd. 
The potential to foment group dynamics at a much larger scale, and in a much 
subtler manner than the one evidenced by the crude anecdotes of the rabble-rouser 
who spews incendiary appeals for revolution or the minister who manipulates the 
religious fervour of the desperate, obviously means that it becomes possible to 
drastically affect popular assent (or reprobation) regarding political players and 
events, public policies, and so on. But beyond that, it essentially means that the 
“public” – along with its “opinion” – therefore ceases to simply constitute the prime 
target of political mechanisms of persuasion to become a key political instrument in 
itself. Public opinion – the once rather amorphous and unpredictable force that 
democracies struggled to keep in check – has since been circumscribed and focussed 
by modern media and transformed into a political instrument of influence over the 
very public whom it supposedly belongs to. In an oddly symbiotic relationship that 
has been formed between the political institutions and the media on one hand, and 
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the public on the other, we find that the latter is simultaneously influenced and is 
itself a source of influence – all the while being subject to the same kind of group 
dynamics as those affecting conceivably smaller and less complex groups. This 
phenomenon is, I would argue, intimately connected to the concept of emotional 
rationality advanced earlier. In order to fully understand that connection, however, it 
is necessary to briefly consider the nature of what we call “public opinion”.  
 
2.1. Public opinion 
 
The prevalence of the notion of “public opinion” is commonly regarded as the 
result of the emergence, during the 18th century, of a public sphere “in which 
political life can be discussed openly in accordance with standards of critical reason” 
– the development of which was promoted by the bourgeoisie “in opposition to the 
traditionalist and hierocratic forms of authority of feudalism” (Giddens, 1977, pp. 
204-5). Through that process, public opinion “becomes differentiated from mere 
‘opinion’, prejudice, or habit”, inasmuch as the former “presupposes a reasoning 
public” (Idem, p. 205). Consequently, it is often viewed as one of the key socio-
political aspects which marked the “division between civil society and the state 
characteristic of the emerging bourgeois order” – with the formation of a rational 
public opinion being assumed as an effective strategy to ensure successful mediation 
between the two dissimilar dimensions (Idem). 
With this key socio-political role in mind, the study of public opinion has 
been a concern for social sciences ever since the development of the modern press, 
and even more so with the appearance of mass media – which were found not only to 
convey public opinion, but also to help shape it. Renowned interwar thinkers such as 
Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann hence made public opinion the centrepiece of 
their reflections on human nature and communication, and there is, I believe, 
something to be gained from reconsidering their analysis in light of our 
contemporary reality. As Alan Chong puts it, “the advantage of reading interwar 
international theory lies in their eclectic appreciation of the power of public opinion 
and leadership without undue fixation with realist and idealist labels” (2007, p. 615). 
For Bernays and Lippman, public opinion – and particularly, its volatile nature – 
could not be simply understood as a consequence of the “public use of reason”, but 
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rather as a direct result of the combination between the nature of the relation that 
individuals establish with the world around them, and the very specific type of 
democratic mediatised society that gradually became the norm during the twentieth 
century. 
Adopting an unidealized conception of individual epistemology, Lippman 
posits that what “each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on 
pictures made by himself or given to him” (1956 [1922], p. 25). While we have 
grown to believe that it is our analytical rationality which allows us to perceive and 
accurately interpret the world around us, there are actually more complex 
mechanisms at play. “[F]or the most part”, Lippmann elaborates, “we do not first see, 
and then define, we define first and then see”. Faced with an often incommensurably 
complex and volatile external reality, “we pick out what our culture has already 
defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form 
stereotyped for us by our culture” (Idem, p. 80). Regarding this, Bernays’ own 
analysis is very much in agreement: the majority of the judgements which constitute 
the “mental equipment” of the average individual, the main tools one employs in 
everyday life, come to be “not on the basis of research and logical deduction, but for 
the most part dogmatic expressions accepted on the authority of his parents, his 
teachers, his church, and his social, his economic, and other leaders” (1923, p. 62). 
Stereotypes work at the collective level much in the way in which we, in the 
preceeding chapter – and following De Sousa (1987) – argued paradigm scenarios to 
function at the individual one, and the two are therefore necessarily intertwined.  
In all likelihood, many of us would be inclined to deny this view – for reasons 
of intellectual pride, if nothing else. It seems implausible that one could be so 
blatantly influenced by preconceived notions and passively accept it. Like most truly 
significant influences to our behaviour, however, the question is that the 
phenomenon is not so evidently felt or identified by the individual affected by it. As 
Lippman puts it,  
 
[t]he subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the 
repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most 
things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made 
us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception (1956, pp. 89-90).  
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Now, if this reliance on pre-established judgements – stereotypes, if you will 
– is prevalent in the [social] individual’s general cognitive processes, it stands to 
reason that it should also be so concerning the particular instance of political 
deliberation. Indeed, both Lippman and Bernays argue that to be the case. “In so far 
as political habits are alike in a nation”, Lippman states, “the first places to look for 
an explanation are the nursery, the school, the church” – that is, precisely the places 
where stereotypes are explicitly or implicitly fomented and perpetuated (Idem, p. 93). 
Once the latter come into play, political reasoning can no longer be perceived as 
fundamentally logical and rational exercise, but must instead be regarded as being 
motivated by non-rational sources; instead of seeking the relevant information on 
specific political issues, one is often motivated to seek information that supports 
one’s pre-existing inclination or preference regarding that issue (Nir, 2011). 
Lippmann’s vision is also very much in line with what has been more recently 
proposed by social sciences researchers such as DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel, 
who advanced a model of opinion formation which relies on the notion of 
“persuasion bias” (2003). This persuasion bias is created via three interconnected 
phenomena: repetition of information (the amount of times a given idea or political 
perspective finds itself echoed in the media), social influence (the fact that one’s 
influence on group opinions depends “not only on accuracy, but also on how well 
connected one is in the social network according to which communication takes 
place”), and unidimensional opinions (the tendency for multidimensional individual 
opinions to be reduced to a narrow “left-right” spectrum) (Idem, pp. 909-10).  
As we can surmise, all of the factors – repetition, social influence and 
unidimensionality of opinions – that underpin the persuasion bias that DeMarzo, 
Vayanos and Zwiebel identify are predictable effects of the prevalence of certain 
stereotypes over political thought and public opinion in a given polity. If social 
thought-processes are determined by a set of stereotypes, there is bound to be a 
repetition of stereotypical answers to political questions and issues. Furthermore, the 
more in line one is with the prevailing stereotypical view, the greater the chance of 
one being well-considered and respected by the social network which is already 
determined by that view to begin with – and, consequently, the greater one’s 
potential influence over that network. Finally, the prevalence of a given stereotypical 
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view means that any dissenting ideas will necessarily tend to be interpreted in light 
of that view and subsequently assimilated by it, by translating them into its familiar 
language – e.g. anyone concerning themselves with environmental issues is 
necessarily “left-wing”, while any advocate of patriotism is indubitably “right-wing”. 
We can now recover the idea which we hinted at previously: in a political 
sphere where the crowd-mind is easily summoned and stereotypical shortcuts made 
to answer deliberative challenges become commonplace, the involvement of 
emotions in the decision-making process seems to be unavoidable. But more than 
merely unavoidable, the involvement of emotions in this process is made necessary 
by the specific circumstances of contemporary society and the nature of the 
stereotypes that pervade it. The latter are not essentially rational elements; indeed, if 
they aim to provide a virtually immediate and efficient answer to questions that may 
arise in our collective existence, they cannot be of a rational nature. Pure rational 
deliberation, the exhaustive listing and evaluation of pros and cons leading up to a 
decision, as it is usually conceived of, is already exceedingly time-consuming at the 
individual level, let alone multiplied by the multitude of individuals that constitute 
the public. There is good reason for thinkers such as Kahneman (2011) and Evans 
(2001) to equate emotional responses to a sort of fast, “quick-and-dirty” modality of 
thought-processing – even though this perspective often seems implicitly to 
subscribe to the sort of reason-emotion dichotomy we have been striving to 
deconstruct.  
A cursory glance at contemporary western societies should prove sufficient to 
reveal a simple truth: there is too much information, simultaneous events and urgent 
matters, and not enough time for the average – or even the above-average – voter to 
assimilate and examine them all under the light of “cold reason”. Emotional 
responses – or rather, rational responses which rely upon certain emotions – are 
indeed often the most time-effective way to meet a deliberative challenge. It 
therefore makes sense that the stereotypes mentioned by Lippman must have the 
ability to beckon that very kind of reasoning – and thus once again evidence the true 
nature of human rationality as an emotional rationality. 
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3. Democracy, propaganda and emotion  
 
In addition to the need for celerity and efficacy in deliberation processes 
within contemporary democratic states whose citizens commonly number in the 
millions, there is another characteristic of the latter that motivates an increased 
reliance upon emotions in instances of political deliberation. Political questions seem 
to be ever-increasing in their complexity and level of specialization, rendering 
anyone not an expert in the particular field that they concern unable to truly 
comprehend them – even if allowed a reasonable amount of time for deliberation. 
Despite all this, citizens of a democratic polity are necessarily pressed to decide on 
those matters, or at least on the most suitable political representative to do so in their 
stead. As such, contemporary democracy often – or even as a rule – seems to 
implicitly warrant citizens to forego careful rational deliberation in place of an 
almost intuitive decision regarding what appears to be the “best” course of action or, 
at the very least, what is the most trustworthy source to inform us regarding the latter 
decision. As Lippmann puts it, “[e]xcept on a few subjects where our own 
knowledge is great, we cannot choose between true and false accounts. So we choose 
between trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters” (1956, pp. 222-3).  
Since our knowledge is not likely to be “great” – that is, specialized – on 
many subjects, it would seem that, for the most part, we tend to rely on those who 
purportedly possess that specialized knowledge to inform our thoughts and decisions. 
The acknowledgement of our [over-]reliance on “experts” is further emphasised in a 
time when, in the wake of the 2008 economic collapse, notions such as technocratic 
governments and the priority of economics over politics have become commonplace. 
All around the world, media outlets make a common practice out of presenting so-
called experts on the most varied of subjects, from domestic politics to international 
crises, from air travel accidents to natural disasters. The world around us appears to 
increasingly corroborate Giddens’ description of the workings of what he famously 
called expert systems22. The latter, he posited, are one of the key “disembedding 
mechanisms” that define modern social institutions, mechanisms that cause social 
relations to transcend their immediate context. In the case of expert systems, that 
                                                           
22
 Defined as “systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas 
of the material and social environments in which we live today” (Giddens, 1996, p. 27). 
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disembedding is accomplished by “providing ‘guarantees’ of expectations across 
distanciated time-space” (1996, p. 28). This apparently complex phenomenon can be 
illustrated in very concrete and straight-forward terms; as Giddens exemplifies,  
 
[s]imply by sitting in my house, I am involved in an expert system, or a series of such 
systems, in which I place my reliance. I have no particular fear in going upstairs in the 
dwelling, even though I know that in principle the structure might collapse. I know very 
little about the codes of knowledge used by the architect and the builder in design and 
construction of the home, but I nonetheless have “faith” in what they have done. My faith 
is not so much in them, although I have to trust their competence, as in the authenticity of 
the expert knowledge which they apply – something which I cannot usually check 
exhaustively myself (1996, pp. 28). 
 
This description leads us to another key aspect of expert systems, in terms of 
how they exist and operate concretely: they imply a significant degree of trust. It is 
only by believing that they are indeed able to provide guarantees of expectations 
across time and space that they are legitimized – after all, one very rarely has the 
possibility to verify the knowledge and supervise the work of either the architect or 
the builder of one’s home as its design and construction takes place. If those 
guarantees exist, they must lie on the impersonal and independent nature of the tests 
applied to evaluate expert knowledge, the existence of regulatory agencies mandated 
to enforce that testing, and public critique. Nevertheless, as Giddens states, for the 
lay person “trust in expert systems depends neither upon a full initiation into these 
processes nor upon mastery of the knowledge that they yield. Trust is inevitably in 
part an article of ‘faith’” (Idem, p. 29).  
Now, what is true for our relation with expert systems regarding life in the 
concrete space of our home, is logically just as true concerning the abstract space of 
the public sphere; much of our political existence is conducted through faith that 
[trustworthy] expert systems are in place to address complex questions and, when 
necessary, to simplify them to the extent that they become comprehensible to the 
non-specialist who is called to intervene in them – either by voting or simply by 
participating in the formation of public opinion. As such, if any true “veil of 
ignorance” were to exist in our political lives beyond Rawls’ famous thought 
experiment, it would be located between the average citizen and many of the most 
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significant questions pertaining to economics, science, politics, and so on. Behind 
such veil of ignorance, our opportunity for “pure” rational deliberation concerning 
the answer to any of those questions does not proceed directly – for no conclusion 
can be reached if none of the premises are understood – but rather indirectly – in 
deciding what experts we lend credence to23.  
This “choice of the expert”, while it may appear to be “a great deal easier 
than the choice of the truth”, may however still prove “too difficult and often 
impractical” (Lippmann, 1956, p. 223). Here too the process does not tend towards 
rational deliberation of the purely objective kind: the choice on who or what 
constitutes a reliable source of expert advice remains as liable to be influenced by 
pre-existing emotional paradigms as any other that we have previously considered – 
it is a process that ultimately involves faith. What we may hence come to 
pessimistically realize is that, in most instances of our political existence, the “utmost 
independence that we can exercise is to multiply the authorities to whom we give a 
friendly hearing” (Idem, p. 224). 
From the other side of the spectrum – that is, on the side of the political 
agents in positions of power – comes another equally uncomfortable realization: the 
fact that “the traditional democratic view of life is conceived, not for emergencies 
and dangers, but for tranquillity and harmony”, and that whenever “masses of people 
must cooperate in an uncertain and eruptive environment, it is usually necessary to 
secure unity and flexibility without real consent” (Idem, p. 238). In other words, 
whenever an urgent situation arises that would require the majority of citizens to 
possess specific or expert knowledge in order to be able to quickly perceive the best 
course of action, there is not even enough time for the dissention that might arise 
from allowing each citizen to choose their preferred expert; as Lippmann pithily puts 
it, “[t]here is no time during mutiny at sea to make each sailor an expert judge of 
experts”, for “education is a matter of years, the emergency a matter of hours” (Idem, 
pp. 413-4). What this implies is that, even in democratic polities, political institutions 
and decision-makers may be faced with what appears to be a practical need to 
circumvent that particular tenet of democracy – the importance of popular consent 
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 Further illustration of this phenomenon is provided by Burstein (2006), who demonstrates that the 
reason why estimates of the impact of public opinion on public policy are often exaggerated is that 
many issues that are the subject of the latter are too obscure and specialized for the average citizen – 
and thus become essentially invisible as far as public opinion is concerned. 
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regarding the political decisions of the state – without openly abandoning it. This 
results in a tendency to engage in what Lippmann calls the manufacture of consent24: 
the creation and direction of popular consent top-down, using the means available to 
the state to ensure that public opinion follows what political decision-makers have 
already identified as the optimal course of action – thus circumventing not only the 
danger of a time-consuming process of “spontaneous” formation of public opinion, 
but also the need for the state to appear tyrannical (if the latter is found to be 
mistaken and must be contradicted). 
 As a consequence of this perceived need to manufacture consent, democratic 
politics are faced with two of its most dangerous temptations, whose danger ensues 
precisely from the fact that they too tend be implicitly regarded as inherent 
necessities of democracy: the systematic use of propaganda, and the abuse of the 
state of emergency as a political instrument. Both aspects are umbilically connected 
to – and therefore relevant for the study of – the involvement of emotions in political 
decision-making processes and the kind of group dynamics we have been analysing. 
But let us defer an examination of the state of emergency to the following chapter, 
and focus presently on the phenomenon of propaganda in democratic states. 
 
3.1. Propaganda and democracy 
 
When one thinks of propaganda, chances are that the first thing that comes to 
mind is the notion of a tool of manipulation exclusively employed by totalitarian 
regimes in order to either maintain domestic political docility and numbness, or to 
foster unwarranted and exacerbated feelings of hostility that justify political 
persecution and military engagement. Now, out of all the assertions that make up 
such a spontaneous attempt at describing propaganda, the one that should interest us 
the most for the time being is the first: that propaganda is the exclusive domain of 
totalitarian states. It should come as no surprise to the most attentive political 
observers among us that this is simply not true. The use of propaganda is not 
restricted to totalitarian states; it is actually a fairly commonplace practice in 
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 A key notion in Lippmann’s work – later appropriated by Herman and Chomsky (1988) – which he 
tellingly describes as a “very old [art] that was supposed to have died out with the appearance of 
democracy”, but which “has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based in 
analysis rather than on rule of thumb” (1956, p. 248). 
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democratic ones as well. One may even argue that citizens of contemporary western 
democracies are in many respects – and largely due to the specific characteristics of 
the latter – surprisingly exposed and susceptible to propaganda. In order to accurately 
understand what the ensuing discussion of this complex relation between democracy 
and propaganda entails, we must elaborate briefly on the nature of the latter – bearing 
in mind that it is not our intention presently to provide an exhaustive definition of 
propaganda, but rather examine some of its key features as they appear and operate 
within a democratic polity. 
Throughout the years, propaganda has been the subject of many well-known 
studies, stemming from the most varied fields of knowledge. The need experienced 
by countries such as the United States to counteract what leading officials perceived 
to be extremely effective propaganda machines on the opposite side of the trenches 
during the I and II World Wars – and the Cold War that followed – was one of the 
key motivators of the study of propaganda not only as a social phenomenon but also, 
and primarily, as a considerable tactical asset in times of war – open or otherwise. 
The so-called “seven-devices framework of propaganda analysis”, which first 
achieved widespread attention in the USA around November of 1937 (Sproule, 2001) 
was one of the visible results of this effort to understand, mitigate – and eventually 
harness – the power of propaganda. According to Sproule, “in the second issue of 
Propaganda Analysis, the bulletin of the newly chartered Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis (IPA)”, readers were advised to acknowledge – and thus resist – 
propaganda’s power of influence by becoming “familiar with the seven common 
propaganda devices” (Idem, p. 136).  
The latter were indexed as name-calling (to attach repealing labels to 
individuals, groups, races, etc.), glittering generalities (to associate the 
propagandist’s program with “virtue-words” like “truth”, “freedom”, “honor”, etc.), 
transfer-here (to carry over the authority, prestige or sanction of something we 
respect to something the propagandist would have us accept [e.g., reverence for 
national or religious symbolism]), testimonial-here (to link an idea or program to 
some specific favoured person or institution), plain-folk (persuaders and leaders 
presenting themselves as “just plain folk”, in touch with the ordinary individual’s 
goals and concerns), card-staking (the use of repetition and over-emphasis of ideas 
or proposals to obscure the true nature of the programme being advanced), and band-
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wagon (the appeal to group psychology and dynamics, intended to make individuals 
accept ideas or plans because “everybody is doing it”) (Idem). 
Upon a quick consideration of this list of “propaganda devices”, two things 
should strike us as particularly noteworthy: first of all, there is a clear predominance 
of emotional appeals in what is considered by the propagandist to constitute effective 
persuasion devices. The attempt to attach emotionally charged symbols and figures 
to certain ideas and proposals in order to bypass logical reasoning, to “make people 
form a thoughtless judgement under the influence of an emotional impression” 
(Idem, p. 136), is a clear example of it, as is the effort to conjure the sort of group 
emotional dynamics we have been focussing on in this chapter. The identification of 
the persuader with the persuaded (plain-folk) and the reliance on pre-existing 
paradigms and stereotypes (name-calling, glittering generalities) fits equally well 
with our previous analysis of the phenomenon. 
Secondly, when examining the nature of the devices being pointed out it is 
possible to perceive an already clear and foresighted concern not only with preparing 
citizens for the dangers of propaganda arriving from foreign sources, but also the 
dangers of propaganda from within. In other words, what could conceivably be 
applied to a foreign propagandist trying to persuade (in this case) the American 
people, could perhaps even more aptly be said to apply to a domestic propagandist 
with a similar agenda – inasmuch the latter has better means and opportunity than the 
former, without being subject to any of the natural mistrust and wariness that an 
external source might. Here was hence an already serious concern regarding the 
sustainability of the democratic political system and way of life, in an era when it 
started becoming apparent that, even domestically, propagandistic “charges and 
counter-charges were placing democracy itself in peril” (Idem, p. 136). 
In order to understand how one might speak of the danger of a democratic 
pervasiveness of (and even increased openness to) propaganda, our comprehension 
of the latter must transcend dated notions of it amounting to little else than lies and 
tall-tales, immediately transparent to the keenest minds among us. Moralistic 
considerations should also be suspended and replaced with a deeper understanding of 
how the frequent involuntary involvement in crowd-mind phenomena such as the 
ones mentioned earlier in this chapter affects our contemporary openness to 
propaganda – regardless of whatever cognitive disso
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of that latter realization. It is with considerable irony that one might realize that, as 
Ellul puts it, despite being unavoidably subject to group dynamics that regularly 
render his discernment “sub-human”, the “mass man [...] pretends to be superman. 
He is more suggestible, but insists he is more forceful. He is more unstable, but 
pretends he is strong in his convictions” (Idem, p. 8).  
As “mass” men and women, our susceptibility to propaganda ensues not only 
from that aforementioned misconception and overestimation of human rationality, 
but also the effects of a political existence often led behind a veil of ignorance whose 
fabric is provided by the intricate weaving of expert systems. Ursprung’s statistical 
study on political propaganda in democracies illustrates this clearly: “[a]lthough the 
voters are rationally uninformed due to their negligible influence”, he concludes, 
“they still attempt to reach as ‘well-founded’ a decision as possible”, and are thus 
“receptive to the free information supplied by interest groups about the consequences 
of the ‘political decision’”. Their decision is then ultimately the result “of their 
opinion and the parts of the information they received in which they have 
confidence” (1994, p. 279). Now, if we reconsider Giddens’ theory of expert systems 
it should be possible to perceive an inherent (and critical) difficulty on the part of the 
average citizen in distinguishing between impartial and trustworthy experts, and 
those who – despite presenting themselves as such – are actually veiled 
representatives of interest groups. The latter, whenever they manage to gain credence 
with the public, exponentially increase our vulnerability to whatever political agenda 
it is in their interest to promote, and should therefore be viewed as propagandists – in 
both theory and practice. 
Furthermore, contemporary propaganda will likely be broadcast via a media 
system increasingly involved and determined by the very economic and political 
powers it could theoretically serve to regulate. One of the most notable studies of 
propaganda of the latter half of 20th century (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) focused 
precisely on how the media consorts with those in positions of political and 
economic power through relationships of ownership and funding, to create a 
widespread system of propaganda that enables the former to surreptitiously – or 
otherwise – advance their goals. In our times, this tendency is exacerbated by the rise 
to near-monopoly positions of certain media conglomerates, thus making it 
increasingly difficult to recover (or discover) “a public purpose of news”, in which 
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the latter provide a forum for “meaningful public information, discussion, and debate 
in order to advance democracy” – to such an extent that the “only hope” appears to 
lie in a “protective response” from independent regulatory instances that proves able 
to counteract the “market-dominated mass media’s systematic propaganda and 
power” (Jackson & Stanfield, 2004, p. 481). 
In light of this gloomy scenario, and in face of our current situation – when 
technological progress has made information omnipresent and ever updating at pace 
none of us can hope to accompany – it makes sense to recover Ellul’s assertions 
regarding the psychological type of what he dubs the “‘current events’ man”: 
because “he is immersed in current events”, he is “a ready target for propaganda [...]; 
lacking landmarks, he follows all currents” (1973, p. 47). Contrary to what might be 
expected, Ellul argues, the individual who is “better informed” is thus revealed as 
one of the most permeable to the effects of propaganda. The reason for this has to do 
with two critical distinctions regarding the nature of contemporary propaganda. 
Firstly, the one between propaganda of agitation and propaganda of integration: the 
former, “being the most visible and widespread”, is “led by a party seeking to 
destroy the government or the established order”, and its blunt and unrefined 
character makes it relatively ineffective towards educated and well-informed 
individuals (Idem, p. 71); the latter – which ordinarily follows any revolutionary 
attempt successfully accomplished by the former – is a “propaganda of conformity”, 
aimed at “stabilizing […], unifying, and reinforcing” the social body, and grounded 
upon the sentiment that individual fulfilment is optimally achieved through one’s 
integration into the social collective – by becoming a “member of the group” (Idem, 
pp. 74-5). 
Secondly, and intimately connected with this first distinction, comes the one 
between rational and irrational propaganda. As Ellul remarks, “that propaganda has 
an irrational character is still a well-established and well-recognized truth”; it is what 
grounds the common difference traced between propaganda and information, 
according to which “information is addressed to reason and experience – it furnishes 
facts”, while “propaganda is addressed to feelings and passions – it is irrational” 
(Idem, p. 84). Although, as Ellul also points out, there is some truth to this, the reality 
of the matter cannot be so simplistically put: “there is such a thing as rational 
propaganda, just as there is rational advertising” – that is, advertising which 
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essentially consists of enumerating the factual and technical characteristics of the 
product, and yet still manages to thus elicit some sort of emotional disposition or 
desire to acquire the latter (Idem). The more our society becomes mediated and 
mediatised, the more propaganda does the same25  – thus becoming increasingly 
“rational and […] based on serious arguments, on dissemination of knowledge, on 
factual information, figures, and statistics” (Idem, p. 85). 
This rational nature is the hallmark of propaganda of integration: irrational 
propaganda – purely “emotional and impassioned propaganda” – is gradually 
disappearing, as contemporary democratic polities tend to become increasingly 
stabilized in their status quo; the citizen of the latter “needs a relation to facts, a self-
justification to convince himself that by acting in a certain way he is obeying reason 
and proved experience” (Idem). As such, the content of propaganda tends to become 
increasingly muddled with information. Whereas excessively passionate and shock-
provoking propaganda may actually repel the (theoretically) well-informed citizens 
of contemporary democracies, the same message will probably gain significant 
traction if presented in a more “informative” (mediatised) and reasonable manner. 
Because we are accustomed to regarding factual information as a purely objective 
(because unemotional) appeal to “pure” reason, our “critical powers decrease if the 
propaganda message is more rational and less violent” (Idem, p. 86). This is 
corroborated by current studies on the subject, which demonstrate that, despite the 
general importance of “elite cues”26 in shaping the public opinion regarding political 
matters, “at least for the more politically knowledgeable and sophisticated segments 
of the public, the influence of raw facts can be substantial” (Gilens, 2001, p. 392). 
 As such, it would seem that even the most well-informed and cultured 
individuals – those who would theoretically be almost immune to the blatantly 
emotionally-charged propaganda of agitation – can fall prey to the influence of this 
rational propaganda of integration. Indeed, given their greater permeability to mass-
media sources of information, as well as culturally established stereotypes and 
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 In light of our previous discussion of the concepts of mediation and mediatisation, this means that 
propaganda becomes disseminated primarily through mass-media, and adopts the inherent media logic 
of the latter. Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between propaganda and 
“mere” information. 
26
 Roughly defined as explicit indications concerning the appropriate course of [political] action, 
provided by trusted individuals or entities of reference – such as experts, political leaders, and interest 
groups. 
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paradigms scenarios, the latter are perhaps even more likely to do so; as Ellul 
prosaically puts it, “intellectuals are more sensitive than peasants to integration 
propaganda” (1973, p. 76). At the root of this phenomenon there is an aspect that 
must be observed, inasmuch it is deeply and intrinsically connected with the notion 
of emotional rationality. As stated earlier, a rational form of propaganda based on 
facts operates much in the same manner as, for instance, an advertisement for a car 
which focuses on technical details: is it likely that the average viewer will truly 
understand the mechanical and technological intricacies of the surface-sensitive anti-
lock brake system, the variable valve timing engine, or the magnetic adjustable 
suspension? No. All the technical descriptions, however, will contribute to form a 
general image which is “rather vague but highly coloured”, and liable to motivate an 
affective pull towards the vehicle in question (Idem, p. 86). 
It is exactly the same, Ellul argues, with “all rational, logical, factual 
propaganda”: despite the rational nature of its arguments, what lastingly remains 
with the individual affected by the latter “is a perfectly irrational picture, a purely 
emotional feeling, a myth. The facts, the data, the reasoning – all are forgotten, and 
only the impression remains” (Idem). This seeping of factual information into 
emotional disposition, simultaneously demonstrative of and made possible by the 
fact that emotion and reason coexist in human rationality, is ultimately what is 
intended by the propagandist. After all, as we too claimed in the previous chapter, 
“the individual will never begin to act on the basis of facts, or engage in purely 
rational behaviour. What makes him act is the emotional pressure, the vision of the 
future, the myth” (Idem). As such, propaganda in contemporary democratic polities – 
which chiefly consists of a rational propaganda of integration – remains not only a 
strong influence upon the political behaviour of individuals, but, in many instances, 
one whose power is amplified by its paradoxical ability to elude rational control in 
virtue of presenting itself as rational. Masking itself as information, and exploiting 
common misconceptions concerning the purity and prowess of human rationality, 
“rational propaganda thus creates an irrational situation, and remains, above all, 
propaganda” (Idem, p. 87) 
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3.2. The democratic need for propaganda 
 
The fact that propaganda manages to survive – or even thrive – within 
democratic states is only partially explained by an increased susceptibility to it, 
stemming from the reasons that we have just expounded. To paint a complete picture 
of the phenomenon we must consider not only that susceptibility but go beyond it, 
and consider whether the situation in contemporary democratic states has evolved to 
the point where we may even speak of a need for propaganda. Granted, to speak of 
democratically necessary propaganda will immediately strike most of us as a 
contradiction in terms. The opposite view – that propaganda is antithetical to 
democracy – is much more likely to garner the approval of most current political 
theorists, whose key concern regarding propaganda is usually the fact that “if an 
issue is distorted or muted in the press due to corporate pressure or government 
propaganda, as it is often the case, […] the democratic process cannot accurately 
assess society’s problems or prescribe a solution” (Jackson & Stanfield, 2004, p. 
476). This view, however, has historically been accompanied by a somewhat 
contrary tendency – and still often reflected in contemporary studies – that advocates 
for a more pragmatic view of propaganda on the part of democracies, presenting it as 
instrumentally indispensable in the panorama of competitive international relations – 
and particularly when that competitiveness degenerates into all-out aggression 
(Kaylan, 2007).  
Dispensing with consideration of this Machiavellian argument of the 
necessity of propaganda as a instrument of external politics on the grounds of 
familiarity, one might move on to the argument that contemporary democracy is 
liable to degenerate to the point where propaganda becomes just as necessary 
internally. The latter notion could in fact already begin to be perceived among the 
substantive implications of our earlier remarks concerning the demands faced by 
contemporary democratic polities: on the one hand, the latter generally cannot afford 
to call for public deliberation of the majority of the key issues at hand, and especially 
so when confronted with emergency situations – neither time nor practicality allows 
for it. It is a realization which, read in light of the sheer dimension and complexity of 
the contemporary democratic state, arguably presents one of the key justifications for 
its representative nature.  
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On the other hand, it remains vital for democratic states that the official 
decisions made by its highest agents of executive and judicial deliberation are – or at 
least appear to be – reflective of what Rousseau famously dubbed the “general will” 
(la volonté générale) of the people being represented. To achieve a genuine consent 
that might be regarded as amounting to that general will, however – proceeding 
through purely “rational” means, the sort of “communicative rationality” proposed 
by Habermas and endorsed by many following him – often seems impractical if not 
impossible. Therefore, the temptation is to manufacture that consent, and thus ensure 
that there exists a harmony between the decisions of the State and what the public 
considers to be the best course of action. It is at this point that propaganda begins 
affirming itself as a necessity in a democratic polity. 
As Ellul puts it, the requirements posed by contemporary democracy and the 
technological civilization that it is inextricably linked to have made propaganda “an 
inescapable necessity for everyone” (1973, p. XV). To call it “necessary”, however, 
should not legitimize it. To “say that a phenomenon is necessary”, Ellul elaborates, 
“means, to me, that it denies man; its necessity is proof of its power, not of its 
excellence” (Idem, p. XV). If anything, then, the existence of propaganda within a 
democratic state might be – and indeed, I would argue, often is – regarded as a sort 
of pragmatically “necessary evil”. And herein lies the principal difficulty of its study 
as such: the fact that it is regarded as an “evil” almost inevitably entails that it cannot 
–  or rather, it should not – exist in a system that most of us have become accustomed 
to regard as the most virtuous among all the alternatives.  
 The view that propaganda is the work of “a few evil men, seducers of the 
people, cheats and authoritarian rulers who want to dominate a population” must be 
overcome if we are to understand the true depth of the phenomenon (Idem, p. 118). 
In contemporary democratic states, propaganda is largely the result of the specific 
circumstances and conditions of collective life within the latter that we have been 
discussing. Succinctly put, the conjugation between a pervasive misrepresentation of 
human rationality, the mediatised nature of our society, the magnification of the 
crowd behaviour phenomenon that the former entails, and the technological and 
political reality provided by contemporary democratic polities – the veil of ignorance 
associated with expert systems, for instance – means that propaganda is an ever-
present and influential aspect of our (political) lives. In fact, and although we have 
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only just briefly alluded to the democratic need for propaganda on the part of the 
State, this confluence of factors might lead us to consider a sort of symbiotic 
relationship between the latter, citizens and propaganda – to the extent that one might 
even pose the controversial question of whether there is similar need for propaganda 
on the part of the individual being subjected to it. 
 That is precisely what Ellul posits: the notion of propaganda as an active 
power, employed by the state or those in positions of power against the passive 
masses who are victimized by it, is one that must be dispelled in order of understand 
the phenomenon at hand. For “propaganda to succeed”, he claims, “it must 
correspond to a need for propaganda on the individual’s part”; without that need – 
which is “strictly sociological”, with “roots and reasons in the need of the group that 
will sustain it”, and “experienced by practically every citizen of the technological 
age” – propaganda “could not spread” (Idem, p.  121). As such, we are faced with a 
two-fold need, on the part of both the state that ordinarily produces propaganda, and 
the individual who seemingly surreptitiously requires it. In order to explain this 
controversial proposition, we will begin with the first part – the need of the state – 
and subsequently attempt to deduce the reasons for the second – the need of the 
individual. 
On the part of the contemporary democratic state, the need for propaganda 
has a number of causes. First and foremost – to reiterate – the citizens who comprise 
it feel compelled to act politically and entitled to be consulted regarding political 
matters (the notion of the sovereign “general will”), but are generally not found to be 
up to the task – be it due to lack of interest, political knowledge, or plain 
epistemological impossibility (one cannot be an expert on all subjects that pertain to 
the governing of a modern state). As such, even in a democracy, “a government that 
is honest, serious, benevolent, and respects the voter cannot follow public opinion. 
But it cannot escape it either”. Thus, only one solution remains: “as the government 
cannot follow opinion, opinion must follow the government” (Idem, p. 126). Thus, a 
democratic state invested in preserving public opinion, “precisely because it believes 
in [its expression] and does not gag it, must channel and shape that opinion if it 
wants to be realistic and not follow an ideological dream” (Idem). The endemic 
limitations of public opinion and the possibility of it falling prey to dissenting 
interests might otherwise pose a significant threat to the maintenance of that state. 
97 
 
In addition to this aspect that we had already referred, Ellul cites another two 
which may be used to justify democratic states’ need for propaganda: the competitive 
nature of international relations, and the danger posed by an eventual disintegration 
of national identity and civic duties. The first of these aspects essentially refers to 
that need for propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy that we mentioned 
above. In a world where genuinely ideological international conflicts – which would 
emphasise the importance of propaganda – tend to become scarce (with the so-called 
“war on terror” perhaps providing the notable exception), one might doubt the 
current pertinence of this alleged need. That sceptical attitude does not, however, 
take into account that which has become the most prevalent form of international 
conflict since the time of Ellul’s writing: economic conflict.  
Political ideology, as we have previously argued, has become increasingly 
replaced by economic considerations. And on the field of economic “battle”, 
propaganda is still regarded as a much needed and powerful weapon. If one simply 
considers the manner in which different European states have reacted to the recent 
economic crisis which has severely affected countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain, the involvement of propaganda in the process is quite obvious: the 
governments of northern European nations tend to paint a picture of economic and 
fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the affected countries, and argue the latter to be 
abusing the good-will of the European Union as a whole; southern European nations, 
on the other hand, often portray their (generally) more economically sound northern 
counterparts as exploiting the economic crisis for their own gain, and profiting from 
the suffering of “the people”. Both dissenting views are commonly imbued with a 
clear propagandistic intent, patent in the widespread use of such things as stereotypes 
(the lazy southern European and the calculating northern European), tales of 
culturally-ingrained vices, and even the appeal to international resentments dating 
back to the World Wars. 
 The second aspect – the concern with national identity and civic duties – 
provides further reason for what we previously dubbed the internal need for 
propaganda in democratic states. The latter’s evolution into increasingly globalized, 
cosmopolitan, and multicultural states tends to lead to the effacement of what were 
traditionally well-defined and strong national identities. With this comes the concern 
that the patriotic sentiments which constitute the base of the individual desire for 
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civic involvement will eventually disappear as well – a significant problem for a 
democratic polity whose political health and legitimacy depends on it. At this point, 
democratic governments are confronted with a pragmatic question: the safekeeping 
of those indispensable elements might be achieved purely through “information and 
good example” if there were enough time and resources available; in today’s fast 
paced and highly competitive international panorama, however, the latter is simply 
not the case. Action “must be fast, with few educators at hand; therefore, only one 
way can be taken: the utilization of the most effective instruments and proved 
methods of propaganda” (Idem, p. 137). The latter thus comes to be seen as sine qua 
non to ensure the psychological and ideological reconstruction of the nation. 
  It is now time to move away from the perspective of the state and consider the 
democratic need for propaganda on the part of the individual. That need, of course, is 
not explicit or even truly conscious; on the contrary, most citizens of democratic 
polities will wholeheartedly declare that they abhor propaganda at least to the same 
degree that they consider themselves to be immune to it. In reality, however, due to 
the particular circumstances of their political existences, propaganda surreptitiously 
establishes itself as necessary means to “ward off certain attacks and reduce certain 
pressures” (Idem, p. 138). Firstly, citizens ordinarily want to perceive themselves as 
being involved in the political life of the state, but simultaneously feel that they are 
unable to genuinely do so. As it should be immediately obvious, this is the flipside of 
the argument that we have used above regarding the state’s need to use propaganda 
to shape public opinion (or to manufacture consent); that need is actually shared by 
citizens, albeit from their own particular perspective: since they are effectively 
unable to become experts in all – or indeed most – issues that arise, propaganda is 
what provides them with a way to overcome any disturbing feelings of inadequacy or 
incompetence. 
 Secondly, contemporary individuals are called upon to make what Ellul 
characterizes as “enormous sacrifices which probably exceed anything known in the 
past”: albeit they pride themselves on being free, circumstances force most to lead 
lives in which work is so all-consuming that it almost equates to slavery; they are 
expected to pay ever-increasing taxes to levels that further dehumanize that work; 
they are expected to risk their lives in wars waged for increasingly dubious reasons; 
and even their overall living conditions – the working hours, the low wages, the 
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noise, the pollution, the housing shortage and living costs, etc. – are near intolerable. 
In all those instances, they need propaganda to justify their sacrifices; it alone insures 
that they are “given strong enough impulses as well as good enough reasons” for the 
latter (Idem, p. 143). 
 Thirdly, and as we have said before, the individual who tries to keep informed 
lives today in a constant whirlwind of information, determined by rapid and often 
unintelligible changes. Consequently, “[he] needs a framework in which all this 
information can be put in order; [...] he needs coherence. And he needs an 
affirmation of his own worth” (Idem, p. 146). Propaganda presents itself as uniquely 
able to satisfy all those needs, providing almost immediate explanations for all new 
developments and promising simple solutions for seemingly insoluble problems – 
while simultaneously providing a unifying world-view into which they can all be 
integrated and explained away. 
 Fourthly, contemporary individuals, being part of ever-growing mass 
societies, are faced with an equally increasing difficulty in perceiving themselves as 
just that – autonomous and valuable individuals. This poses a serious psychological 
problem: as Ellul puts it, “man cannot stand being unimportant; he cannot accept the 
status of a cipher. He needs to assert himself, to see himself as a hero” (Idem, p. 
149). Once again, it is propaganda which allows us to do so, by providing us with a 
tempting political mythology in which each of us can reassert our individual 
authority and independence, trivialize our non-political daily struggles, overcome the 
passivity into which we find ourselves increasingly forced, and thus become its 
heroes. 
 Fifth and finally, the contemporary individual is plagued by an idiosyncratic 
anxiety which ensues from all the specifically democratic and modern limitations 
that we have been discussing. That overall feeling of anxiety “is irrational, and any 
attempt to calm it with reason or facts must fail” (Idem, p.154). The only thing 
capable of assuaging it is neither rational nor irrational, but simultaneously both: 
propaganda. By understanding the emotional nature of human rationality – and 
adjusting both medium and message to it – propaganda provides the individual with 
assurances equivalent to those previously provided by religion. As Ellul states, it 
offers a simple explanation of the world, both obvious and satisfying, through which 
all worldly [political] phenomena can be explained and made unthreatening.  At the 
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same time, it endows the individual with a world-view and a sense of finality that can 
be used to contextualize present events into past history, bringing coherence to the 
otherwise incoherent. The “propagandee” thus “experiences feelings of mastery over 
and lucidity towards this menacing and chaotic world, all the more because 
propaganda provides him with a solution for all threats and a posture to assume in 
face of them” (1973, p.159). 
Ultimately, propaganda feeds into what we have thus far been attempting to 
expose as the hubris of our rationality. Because of our almost hereditary difficulty in 
accepting the true scope and nature of our rational ability, we are willing to take 
shortcuts that allow us to feel that the world around us is absolutely intelligible and 
even controllable through its powers. In doing so we are inviting propaganda into our 
lives, because then it truly becomes a psychological – nearly existential – necessity. 
It artificially dispels fears and anxieties of which many are caused by our 
unwillingness to acknowledge the fact that emotions play a part in our reasoning in 
the first place, and its ability to influence is amplified by the perpetuation of this very 
attitude. Unless something is done about the latter, the presence of propaganda 
cannot be regarded merely as an accident or the unscrupulous design of some 
obscure political figure. After all, under this circumstances the “politician who uses it 
is not a monster; he fills a social demand”, and he has a “close accomplice” – the 
very individual who is being targeted (Idem, p. 160). 
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Chapter IV – Rationalism, Emotion, and the Exception 
  
In light of the analysis developed in the preceding chapters, we now find 
ourselves better able to understand that which is arguably the most significant (and 
dangerous) of the consequences of the kind of political rationalism that we have been 
criticising: the use and status, in most contemporary democratic states, of what is 
known as the state of exception [or emergency].The reasons for delaying an 
examination of this crucial problem until now should be made clear throughout the 
present chapter. In essence, however, we might say that it is because the 
circumstances surrounding the use, scope, and legitimization of this particular 
political expedient arise not only from the relation that each individual citizen is 
culturally predisposed to establish between reason, emotion, and the political 
process, but also from the further complexity afforded to that relation by the 
phenomena of group influence and dynamics identified in the previous chapter. 
In a sense, then, the problem surrounding the contemporary existence of the 
state of exception represents the culmination of the politically perilous road that our 
work so far has endeavoured to shed light upon and extract consequences from. A 
philosophical examination of that problem and its implications must therefore 
constitute the necessary next step in our critique: what exactly defines a state of 
exception, who decides on it, who acknowledges its legitimacy and why, and how 
this entire process is affected by political rationalism's disregard for emotion, are the 
questions that must now be answered within the scope of what has been argued so 
far. 
Let us begin the aforementioned examination with a truism that lies at the 
heart of the problem and its politico-philosophical framing: decision-making is one 
of (if not the) key components of political action. What is meant here by decision-
making, however, warrants further clarification. At first glance, “good” political 
decision-making essentially reflects the political actors’ ability to accurately 
ascertain a given situation and subsequently select the most advantageous course of 
action. The accuracy of this description notwithstanding, there is, in addition to this 
deliberative process, yet another equally crucial (and obvious) element of decision-
making: actually making a decision. The difference here – as made clear by our 
analysis of emotion's role in the mechanism of action in chapter II – is between a 
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process of fundamentally rational calculation which produces a logical conclusion, 
and the motivational pull that drives us towards selecting one of the alternatives at 
our disposal – thus resulting in concrete action 27 . This latter aspect actually 
represents what is at the heart of a true political decision. Analytical and calculative 
prowess is, after all, of little political worth if even our most detailed examination of 
a given problem ultimately proves unable to materialize itself in an actual decision. 
The ability to overcome the psychological obstacles which often stand in the way of 
making a political decision – the uncertainty of success, the fear of unforeseen 
consequences, the anxiety felt over the public evaluation of implemented policies, 
and so on – is what allows for the transition between deliberation and decision, and 
ushers in the attainment of a true political decision. 
 When speaking of the decision in the political sphere – and particularly, as we 
intend to do, of the decision on what constitutes an exception – one must turn to a 
thinker who devoted unparalelled attention to the issue: Carl Schmitt. Despite all the 
muddling controversy (and even repulsion) stemming from his political affiliations, 
Schmitt, in such works as Political Theology and The Concept of the Political, 
stressed the importance of both the political aspect of human existence and political 
decision-making (albeit of a very specific kind), at a time which he felt was 
characterized precisely by the increasing depoliticization and dehumanization of 
everyday life. 
 Schmitt’s relevance to contemporary political philosophy is undeniable; in 
recent years, alongside the perhaps most famous renaissance of Schmittian ideas 
promoted by Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception (2005) and Homo Sacer (1998), 
Schmitt has been present in discussions ranging from international law and human 
rights (Roach, 2005; Vincent, 2009; Criddle & Fox-Decent) to theology and religious 
studies (Yelle, 2010). His presence in debates within political science and 
philosophy, often focussing on issues such as legality, legitimacy, and sovereignty 
(Norris, 2007; Shapiro, 2007; Vatter, 2009) is – albeit more predictable – equally 
noteworthy. 
 Recent attention devoted to Schmitt’s political theory has meant that his ideas 
gradually found their way into mainstream political theory. That is certainly the case 
                                                           
27
 Yet another reflection of emotion’s role in decision-making, perhaps best summarized by Donald 
Calne: “[t]he essential difference between emotion and reason is that emotion leads to action, while 
reason leads to conclusions” (2000, XII, para. 1). 
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with the Schmittian notions of the [state of] exception and the friend-enemy 
distinction.  But despite their now relative familiarity in political parlance, they are 
often understood superficially at best. They can only be genuinely comprehended 
when incorporated in a broader scheme of political thought, one which – as we have 
just stated – regards political existence as an inalienable determination of what it 
means to be human. Our intention here is thus not only to contribute towards that 
comprehension, but to do so in a novel fashion, exploring what seems to be a 
critically neglected area in the study of Schmittian theory: the relationship between 
liberalism, rationalism, and emotion, and its consequences towards the establishment 
of a state of exception. 
 
 
1. The Decision on the Exception 
 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2005, p. 5). This 
laconic sentence introduces the key argument of Political Theology: that the decision 
on what constitutes an exceptional state of affairs is the sort of phenomenological 
moment when political sovereignty is revealed28. No other instance in the life of the 
State, Schmitt argues, can express with this utmost clarity just how political authority 
is actually structured within the latter. Consequently, any attempt at constructing “a 
philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the exception and the extreme 
case, but must be interested in it to the highest degree” (Schmitt, 2005, p. 15). 
Regarding our concrete political existence, the exception is actually more significant 
than the rule, insofar as “the rule proves nothing”, but “the exception proves 
everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only 
from the exception” (Idem). 
As is apparent from these brief considerations, the exceptionality of the 
exception manifests itself in a crucial way as far as legality is concerned: it evades 
                                                           
28
 The title “Political Theology” is justified by Schmitt with the assertion that “[a]ll significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”, not only because they 
were historically “transferred from theology to the theory of the state” (the “omnipotent god became 
the omnipotent lawgiver”, for example), but also because they impart a certain “systematic structure” 
on the latter – which, among other things, makes the “exception in jurisprudence […] analogous to the 
miracle in theology” (Schmitt, 2005, p. 36). For a more in depth exploration of this matter, and its 
relation with Schmitt’s thesis on sovereignty in the same book, see Franco de Sá (2003). 
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complete codification in legal norm. It is the very definition of “exception” that a 
“normal” situation has – at least momentarily – ceased to exist. When such a 
situation arises, therefore, there remains no norm from positive law which can be 
applied, since such norms are conceived to function within a normal – and 
normalized – legal framework. In face of abnormality, the sort of decisionism 
advanced by Schmitt “assumed that order was being produced from disorder by 
means of a 'decision' that at the same time made the one making it sovereign” 
(Norris, 2007). 
The decision on the exception is thus a true decision and, consequently, the 
ultimate expression of that which is the fundamental political act: to decide. It is a 
decision which, as Schmitt puts it, “frees itself from all normative ties and becomes 
in the true sense absolute” (2005, p. 12). Simultaneously – and crucially – it also 
reveals who the sovereign is: he who decides not only whether there is an 
exceptional situation at hand, but also what must be done to restore normality. 
Sovereignty, then, should not be understood simply as “the monopoly to coerce or to 
rule”, but – and essentially – “as the monopoly to decide” (Idem, p.13). 
Schmitt’s chief criticism of influential jurists of his time, such as Krabbe and 
Kelsen – whose normativist theory of State features prominently across his work as a 
decisive cause for his pessimistic view on the politics of the Weimar Republic – 
arose from their seeming intention to remove the decision from the realm of politics 
– to “conceive of law (Recht) devoid of the realization of law 
(Rechtsverwirklichung)”, thus “rendering that law something purely ideal, not only 
situated outside the plane of existence, but deprived of the power, that is, the decision 
which, by applying it to a given situation, would grant it effectiveness” (Franco de 
Sá, 2003, pp. 93-4)29. 
The emphasis placed by Schmitt on the crucial importance and almost 
absolute power of the decision – especially in such stark contrast to the more 
normative focus of liberal theories – is definitely something which clearly challenges 
the rationalistic view which we have argued has become predominant in 
contemporary politics. Indeed, Schmitt’s very use of the “analogy of the miracle to 
illustrate the state of exception, in which the sovereign decision suspends the norms 
                                                           
29
 We understand normativism here as a legal theory that holds that law must be considered in “pure 
form” independently of social, economic, and political conditions – such as Kelsen’s “pure theory of 
law” (1934).  
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of statutory liberalism, just as the miracle suspends natural law” (2010, p. 192) feels 
like a clear declaration of intent, when it was evident that, in the intellectual history 
of ideas, “Deism and Enlightenment rationalism had prohibited the miracle together 
with the sovereign exception” (Idem, p. 196). 
Schmitt insisted that a rationalist approach to politics fails to deal with the 
exception, and indeed that the latter is incommensurable with the former. The 
exception, he claims, “confounds the unity and order of the rational scheme” (2005, 
p. 14), constituting a sort of impurity which must be purged from the rational 
ordination of politics, lest it corrodes the formal perfection which the latter seeks to 
attain. This discomfort seems to be, at least in part, at the root of the antipathy that 
the scope and nature of Schmittian notion of exception motivated among proponents 
of legal normativism, who perceived in it an element of dangerous and potentially 
unbound irrationality. Both Krabbe and Kelsen, Schmitt’s frequent interlocutors in 
absentia, sought to “avoid the binding of sovereign power to a subjective and 
arbitrary will, free from commitments and determination”, thus preventing the legal 
realm from being “contaminated” by something alien and pernicious (Franco de Sá, 
2003, pp. 92-3). The exception, along with the implications of the decision 
concerning it, represented a real danger in that sense. 
The key to fully understand the true nature of the conflict between Schmittian 
decisionism and legal normativism lies indeed, I would argue, in the fundamentally 
non-rational nature of the decision Schmitt is referring to. The usage of “non-
rational” in this case, however, should not be taken as a synonym of “irrational”, but 
rather as symbolizing something which does not conform to the reductionist notion 
of rationality that we have been criticising, and which was often employed by jurists 
and constitutionalists such as Krabbe and Kelsen (who was a professed Kantian). The 
seemingly absolute faith of the latter group in the possibility of achieving a “pure 
theory of law”, from which any semblance of subjectivity or particularity would be 
utterly removed – thus making it “universally valid for all times and all situations” 
(Strong, 2005, p. xvii) – struck Schmitt as not only amounting to a blatant 
misunderstanding of the reality of law and the act of legislating, but of human nature 
itself.  
As Franco de Sá puts it, Schmittian decisionism – “the thesis that sovereignty 
resides not in the law, but in the decision that realizes that very law” – finds “its basis 
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not on an irrationalism, but on what we might call an alternative rationality to 
normative rationality” (2003, p. 100). This alternative rationality lies, in a first 
instance – and the one that explicitly concerns Franco de Sá – in “the right of the 
State to its self-preservation” (Idem, p. 101), which justifies and legitimizes the 
decision on the exception as a means to safeguard the very legal constitution which is 
suspended in a state of emergency. Read in light of Schmitt’s assertion that all 
political concepts are essentially “secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt, 2005, 
p.36), this means that the Schmittian defence of sovereign power ultimately consists 
“in avoiding the consequences of fanaticism, consequences that necessarily result 
from the destruction of the political mediation of the theological” (Franco de Sá, 
2003, p. 109). 
In a second instance, however – the one which concerns our purpose here 
more specifically – the alternative rationality implied by Schmitt’s theory also 
represents an enlarged and enriched version of the purportedly pure, instrumental 
rationality which often seemed to inform legal normativists’ conception of human 
reason. The rationalism of liberal theorists – going as far back as Locke – struck 
Schmitt as promoting “technological, formal, or instrumental reason”, a “kind of 
‘aesthetic’ rationality, which is concerned with the production of artifacts, above all 
with the state as an artifact” (Kahn, 2014, p. 71). In contrast, Schmitt’s conception 
implicitly denies the assumption that it is possible to fundamentally reduce our 
political existence to a pre-established system of norms and regulations, which would 
in turn entail that human beings are either rationally determined automatons or that 
they should at least behave as such for the most part.  
It is then perhaps understandable that Schmittian decisionism is frequently 
regarded with suspicion or repulsion by liberals, whose view is conceptually and 
historically much closer to a normativist conception of State, and consequently often 
embraces a conception of rationality in line with the latter’s. Despite some more 
recent reinterpretations of Schmitt as an ally rather than an opponent of liberalism, 
motivated by the aforementioned revival of his ideas and the attempt to read them 
under a new light, the prevailing view of most liberal thinkers on Schmitt tends to be 
one of uneasy coexistence, coupled with vigorous disagreement. 
Indeed, read as a whole, Schmitt’s ideas seem to stand diametrically opposed 
to at least two of the most often cited tenets of liberalism: that a polity must be 
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completely ordained by a rationally determined set of rules and legislations, and that 
any political decision must not be reached through a spontaneous and absolute act of 
sovereignty as such, but mediated by rational consideration and discussion. Schmitt 
himself was not oblivious to this conflict. In fact, he embraced it, setting his own 
theory against the prevailing – and, as he saw it, deeply flawed – liberal tendencies of 
some of his contemporaries. In advancing his own perspective on the political, 
Benhabib comments, Schmitt attempted to pursue “the rationalistic fallacies of 
liberalism until its ‘limit concepts’ – die Grenzbegriffe – were uncovered”, concepts 
which “constituted the secret and unthought foundations on which the structure of 
the modern state rested. Sovereignty is one such limit concept; government by 
discussion, and the assumption that all opinions will eventually converge through 
deliberation upon a rational outcome, are among the other unquestioned 
presuppositions of liberalism” (Benhabib, 2012, p. 689). 
A consideration of the arguments he employs in this attempt to deconstruct 
liberal thought and expose its frailty as a potential foundation for a political system 
should now also prove helpful towards understanding the limitations of liberalism’s 
rationalistic assumptions. 
 
 
2. Norms and Exceptions 
 
Schmitt’s negative view of liberalism was fundamentally motivated by what 
he perceived to be its inability to provide a truly political theory of the state (one that 
transcends normativism) and, therefore, its unsuitability to constitute the theoretical 
basis of any concrete form of government: “[t]here exists a liberal policy of trade, 
church, and education, but absolutely no liberal politics, only a liberal critique of 
politics” (2007, p. 70). Liberalism is, for him, a negation of the political rather than a 
manifestation of it. Thus the process of “rationalization” of politics promoted by 
liberals entails goals whose direction is not only politically counterproductive, but 
often even anti-political. For Schmitt, according to Kahn’s interesting analysis, the 
development of capitalism and the indifference of technological production to its 
material “found an analogue in the indifference of aesthetics to ethics and politics, or 
at least in the aesthete’s inability to come to a decision about any concrete course of 
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political action” (2014, p. 68). The political equivalent of that indifference was 
liberalism, and thus “the modern age of technology, liberalism, and aesthetics was 
antithetical to any genuine conception of ‘the political’” – since “the genuinely 
political involves a decision about an exceptional state of affairs, and sovereignty 
must accordingly be defined as the power to decide the exception” (Idem). 
Liberalism’s aversion towards the notion of the exception is, therefore, one of 
the aspects in which it fails to grasp what Schmitt deemed genuinely political. 
Political [co]existence, liberals would argue, is only possible in any desirable form if 
the former is fully regulated according to rational tenets. But human society, as 
Strong (2005) points out, can never be made to rest solely on the determination and 
application of rules to individual situations; decisions and judgements are always 
necessary. Since the decision is regarded, in Schmittian terms, as the quintessential 
political act, to assume the contrary – that is, that the decision should be removed 
from the political sphere – would be to amputate the political of its most essential 
quality.  
The motives for liberalism’s stance concerning this matter warrant 
clarification. Liberal theory, as we have already mentioned, seeks primarily to foster 
the normative conditions, conditions subsequently necessary to allow for not only 
peaceful coexistence but also a just and free society. That remains clear in the work 
of thinkers such as Habermas and Rawls, who, philosophically speaking, are perhaps 
the most preeminent contemporary representatives of this intention. Habermas, for 
instance, tells us of political action resulting from the application of his 
communicative rationality that one can “only speak of communicative action in a 
strong sense as soon as reaching understanding [Verständigund] extends to the 
normative reasons for the reflection of the [social] goals themselves (1999, p. 326). 
What Habermas came to call “strong communicative action” thus first implies a 
conception of human rationality which is “proportionate to his [the individual’s] 
expressing himself rationally and to his ability to give account of his expressions in a 
reflexive stance” (Idem, p. 308) – a conception whose scope is the rough equivalent 
of the one employed by legal normativists such as Kelsen. In addition to that, it also 
points to the acknowledgement of normative reasons as a obligatory frame of 
reference for political action, providing the latter with motives which are not 
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necessarily the individuals’, but rather “intersubjectively shared value orientations 
that – going beyond their personal preferences – bind their wills (Idem, p. 326).  
When it comes to Rawls’ conception of political liberalism, on the other 
hand, it too is one which “has been frequently criticized for suggesting a normative 
idea of politics, which considers only the possibility of deep-seated consensus 
instead of radical antagonism, rational deliberation instead of political decision, and 
justice instead of power” (Vatter, 2008, p. 240). And even though it can be argued 
that the later Rawls redirected the focus of his attention to the political, advocates of 
Rawls' position tend to understand the term “as a synonym for ‘the reasonable’, that 
is, as a universally shared faculty or moral sense of justice aimed at seeking ‘neutral’ 
normative conditions around which everyone could come to stand in agreement” 
(Idem). Generally speaking, there seems to be a generalized discomfort regarding the 
act of political decision within contemporary liberal theory – a discomfort regarding 
any political decision which might generally evade the established normative 
framework, being significantly (and understandably) magnified when the decision in 
question is implies the manifestation of a sovereign potestas capable to completely 
suspend the legal norm itself. 
Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism would appear to be originally rooted in the 
latter’s primacy of the norm to the detriment of the decision. For liberalism, the 
norm, ideally devised to be valid in all instances, ultimately plays – in addition to 
responding to whatever demands a particular situation might present – a crucial role: 
it curbs the danger entailed by the State actually making a decision whose magnitude 
is liable to structurally compromise the very foundations it purportedly rests upon. 
By establishing complex overarching legislative structures, liberal theory essentially 
seeks to dilute the notion of State sovereignty by restricting the latter’s ability to 
make a “true” political decision, according to Schmitt’s standards.  
Another reason for Schmitt’s radical disagreement with the political project 
of liberalism is that the Schmittian idea of democracy “ultimately relies on a 
‘principle of representation’ that he finds in the political tradition of Roman 
Catholicism” – in which “the omnipotent sovereign ‘represents’ an entire people as 
well as every individual member of this people” (Idem, p. 251). In Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form – whose central thesis is that “the technical-
economic rationality of modern capitalism and its dominant political expression, 
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liberalism, stood at odds with the truly political power of the Catholic Church” 
(Kelly, 2004, pp. 114-5) – Schmitt developed a concept of representation which 
assumed that the political form embodied by the Catholic Church (namely, the unity 
in the relation between divine authority and the interests of humanity, along with the 
simultaneous representation of both by the Pope) was the “true heir of Roman 
Jurisprudence” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 17). That formal nature of the Church, Schmitt 
claimed, is “based on the strict realisation of the principle of representation”, which 
he regarded as antithetical to “the economic-technical thinking dominant today” 
(Idem, p. 8). The historical evolution of liberalism was regarded by Schmitt as a 
motion away from the true nature and political significance of representation, to the 
extent that Hobbes’ Leviathan “had been transformed by liberalism and capitalism 
into a simple machine” (Kelly, 2004, pp. 117-8) devoid of any truly representative 
character.  
The genuine nature of representation, according to Schmitt, relies not on the 
political actors and institutions’ ability to act as emissaries or agents on behalf of the 
represented, but rather on the capacity “to ‘make present’ the true nature of 
something by ‘representing it’ (Idem, p. 115). Furthermore, he claims, the meaning 
of representation as a political principle 
 
is that the members of Parliament are representatives of the whole people and thus have 
an independent authority vis-a-vis the voters. Instead of deriving their authority from the 
individual voter, they continue to derive it from the people. "The member of Parliament is 
not bound by instructions and commands and is answerable to his conscience alone". This 
means that the personification of the people and the unity of Parliament as their 
representative at least implies the idea of a complexio oppositorum, that is, the unity of 
the plurality of interests and parties. It is conceived in representative rather than economic 
terms30 (Schmitt, 1996, p. 26). 
                                                           
30
 The notion of complexio oppositorum, employed by Schmitt in this passage – which translates into 
a unity (an embrace) of opposites – is a philosophical notion famously (and slightly differently) 
employed by Heraclitus and Nicholas de Cusa, but which Schmitt adopts following its particular use 
in Catholic theology. Within the latter, it is commonly meant to represent the coincidence between the 
One and the Multiple (the unity in the wholeness of God coincides ontologically with its apparent 
opposite of the multiplicity in Creation). As Kam Shapiro (2010) notes, this coincidence of opposites 
“does not involve a rational or logical mediation, but a kind of catechretic unity whereby diverse 
individuals and qualities remain copresent in God” (p. 26). For Schmitt, the Catholic Church assumes 
an analogous function through its ability to “’represent’ diverse values and positions at different times 
while maintaining an overarching unity” (Idem), thus exhibiting a model of representation that 
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Quite the contrary is true, as far as Schmitt is concerned, of contemporary 
liberal parliamentarism, since the latter negates the “necessarily personal or eminent 
character” (Kelly, 2004, p. 117) of an idea of representation which “is so completely 
governed by conceptions of personal authority that the representative as well as the 
person represented must maintain a personal dignity” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 17) – and, in 
doing so, empties it of its political substance and usefulness. 
Standing in stark opposition to this Schmittian view on political 
representation – whose process of legitimization is arguably liable to be 
misunderstood as proceeding “top-down”, due to its emphasis on personal authority 
– one usually finds the liberal democratic ideal, which operates inversely: 
sovereignty is placed at the level of the citizens, who, by collaborating via a free and 
reasoned pursuit of political consensus, build the legitimacy of the State “bottom-
up”. Further deepening the scission between both views, Schmitt’s conception is 
predominantly regarded from the liberal side of the equation as one which also 
“disempowers citizens by giving the state the monopoly of interpretation over its 
own strategic interests of survival in the multiversum of states” (Benhabib, 2012, p. 
706). A limitation of sovereignty – at least, of the kind of sovereignty Schmitt has in 
mind – through careful and comprehensive legislation is therefore justified as a 
necessary check against the power of the State, which would otherwise be liable to 
succumb to the temptation of limiting critical individual liberties. 
Now, while this stance seeks to address a crucial issue of political 
jurisprudence – the potential abuse of sovereign power by the State – it may also 
entail some unexpected and politically relevant pernicious consequences: first and 
foremost, as we have already emphasised, it chooses to ignore the concrete reality of 
the exception and how it is impossible to legislate for a truly exceptional situation; 
secondly, by attempting to remove (or at least lessen) an element of [genuine] 
decision-making from the political sphere, it may paradoxically negate the political 
utility of politics, and leave in its place a void which must necessarily be filled by an 
alternative notion. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Schmitt deems substantially political, insofar as it is independent from external constraints (namely, of 
the economic kind). 
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Let us now address the latter issue. If liberalism – as Schmitt sees it – does 
indeed neutralize and hollow out our political dimension of its genuine content, what 
does it seek to employ as a substitute? According to his analysis, liberalism sees in 
this opportunity the potential to realize the depolitization of the political sphere, a 
process which it presents as amounting to “the creation of a neutral sphere—initially 
modelled on the natural sciences instead of theology—in which parties could reach 
agreement through discussion and consensus” (Kahn, 2014, pp. 67-8). In order to 
achieve such a goal, it seeks to carry into the political sphere philosophical and 
scientific concepts free from the kind of pre-existing political charge that 
characterizes those which form the basis of ideology – a dogmatic and archaic 
vulgarity which must be purged to make way for rational politics. But although the 
notions it calls upon are essentially non-political, the latter's adoption as frames of 
reference for political behaviour still bears political consequences capable of 
rivalling with the some of most pernicious consequences of ideological partisanship. 
Let us examine, for instance, the notion of morality in this regard.  
When considering the position of liberalism in the ideological debate 
concerning the inherent moral inclinations of human beings, one can easily realize 
that it is one of anthropological optimism. The moral perfectibility of human beings, 
along with the assumption of an intrinsic willingness to engage in the pursuit of that 
moral perfection, is one of the cornerstones of liberal thought. And it makes sense 
that it is so: after all, if we conceive of human beings as ideally rational creatures, 
then all their ethical failings must amount to either a lack of knowledge of universal 
moral imperatives or a misunderstanding of how they should be applied to particular 
circumstances.  
This highly debatable view has significant political ramifications. As Schmitt 
points out, for liberalism this belief in “the goodness of man signifies nothing more 
than an argument with whose aid the state is made to serve society” (2007, p. 60). 
For if the individual is inherently good, then the cause of evil deeds must be found 
elsewhere. In an unexpected turn of the idea of the “noble savage” usually attributed 
to Rousseau, however, it is not civil society, but rather the political entity of the State 
which is found to blame. What follows from this reasoning, in fact, is precisely the 
conclusion that in an ideal liberal polity, civil society – the entity most immediately 
constituted through the aggregation of private individuals – “determines its own 
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order and that state and government are subordinate and must be distrustingly 
controlled and bound to precise limits” (Idem, pp. 60-61). 
The resonance of this diagnosis, it is worth noting, cannot help but be 
heightened when we consider the horror that contemporary advocates of 
libertarianism visibly experience concerning state intervention in everyday life, and 
how anathemas of “police” or “nanny state” become commonplace on that side of 
public debate whenever the state threatens to exceed the “precise limits” mentioned 
by Schmitt31. Incidentally, it is also a by-product of the bourgeois civil society of the 
modern era – the so-called “economic interests” – which seems today to play the key 
role in determining the political fate of states all over the globe. 
To borrow the felicitous analytical framework employed by Hannah Arendt 
in The Human Condition (1998), it seems that liberalism ultimately promotes a 
substitution of the political (public) sphere with the private one – or perhaps the 
image of an absorption of the former by the latter is a more accurate illustration. It is 
not that public interests disappear entirely; they are simply replaced by private 
interests, as the latter become gradually construed as having a public dimension. And 
with the elevation of the dynamics of the private sphere to a public dimension comes 
the other great political ramification of the depolitization of politics, the origins of 
which we have just alluded to: the adoption of economic theory as an explanatory 
and structural basis of political existence. 
Through the negation of the political, which is “inherent in every consistent 
individualism” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 70), liberalism has not “radically denied the state”; 
it has, on the other hand, “neither advanced a positive theory of the state nor on its 
own discovered how to reform the state, but has attempted only to tie the political to 
the ethical and to subjugate it to economics” (Idem, p. 61). As a corollary of the 
excessive rationalization of politics, “[j]ust as the sciences are governed by 
instrumental reasoning, so liberal democracy [...][comes to involve] a purely 
instrumental conception of politics as the instrument for harmonizing conflicting 
interests”. And thus “liberal democracy amounts to ‘political relativism’” (Kahn, 
2014, p. 71) 
 
                                                           
31
 Although in international politics it is perhaps the U.S.A. which systematically provides us with 
vociferous examples of this kind of behaviour, many others could be cited. 
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2.1. Economicism and the negation of politics 
 
Continuing this movement towards the neutralization of politics, we are once 
again faced in economic theory – which, as we argued previously, can widely be 
regarded as the purportedly de-ideologized consequence (or continuation) of 
liberalism – by the overwhelming prevalence of a reductive account of human 
rationality, with perhaps one key difference: the laws of economics are admittedly 
and unremorsefully apolitical. Whereas within liberalism there would be a 
comprehensible degree of compunction regarding not being able to provide what 
Schmitt terms a “positive theory of the state” – a theory which is politically 
substantial and constructive, rather than simply analytical and deconstructive – in 
economics we find no such qualms. States are as subject to the laws of the market as 
individual citizens – or consumers – and the market has no political (and therefore 
intrinsically human) concerns; it stands above them. As Schmitt puts it, “[t]hat 
production and consumption, price formation and market have their own sphere and 
can be directed neither by ethics nor aesthetics, nor by religion, nor, least of all, by 
politics was considered one of the few truly unquestionable dogmas of this liberal 
age” (2007, p. 72). 
The prevalence of economic theory in the political sphere, along with its 
essentially apolitical nature, impacts on how the political existence of states and their 
citizens unfolds. When Francis Fukuyama’s much discussed book The End of 
History and The Last Man (1992) postulated that the growing ubiquity of western 
liberal democracy represented the culmination of a long process of sociocultural and 
political evolution, its implicit announcement of the death of political ideology[ies] 
seemed, for some, to hold the promise of the end of “dirty” politics and the ushering 
in of a new era of politics based on reason. The merits of Fukuyama’s conclusions 
notwithstanding, western liberal democracy has indeed, generally speaking, become 
globalized – and alongside it, western capitalism and economicism. Far from a 
politically irrelevant fact, it has become increasingly clear that it is the de facto 
ubiquity of the latter and not the former which is responsible for any effacement of 
ideology – consider, for instance, the reinvention of Russia and China as 
fundamentally economic (albeit therefore ultimately “political” by contemporary 
standards) superpowers. Should the goal to replace politics with economics be 
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ultimately achieved, however, the results may very well not be the purportedly 
desired end to the ideologically fuelled partisan conflict and the protection of 
individual civil liberties from a potentially overbearing state, but rather something 
else entirely.  
As the worldwide economic crisis of 2008 and the events leading up to it 
have served to demonstrate, the ascendancy of the economic over the political (under 
the guise of a cold, objective rationality and promises of a world where freedom and 
prosperity become globalized commodities), entails serious implications concerning 
the motivations presiding over the decision-making processes and subsequent 
accountability for decisions “made” – the quotation marks warranted here because, 
under the economic paradigm of politics, no real decisions are actually made; simply 
systemic (and apolitical) occurrences that take place, and must be reacted to. As 
Schmitt puts it, “[a] domination of men based upon pure economics must appear a 
terrible deception if, by remaining non-political, it thereby evades political 
responsibility and visibility” (2007, p. 77). It thus becomes possible to perceive how 
such a political arrangement may actually prove more undesirable than an alternative 
in which the political and the decision still prevail – even if it entails the possibility 
of a state making wrong decisions.  
One of the most significant consequences of this rising prevalence of the 
economic paradigm in politics, coupled with the generally rationalistic perspective 
adopted by liberalism, is the negation of another critical aspect of Schmittian 
political theory: the friend-enemy distinction. The latter is, according to Schmitt, not 
only an essential element of the political life of a given people – it is the one 
specifically political antinomy of human existence – but it also provides the most 
accurate measure of the political health of that people. A people which “no longer 
possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction”, Schmitt argues, “ceases 
to exist politically” – for “[t]herein resides the essence of its political existence” 
(Idem, p. 49). The political importance of the friend-enemy distinction is further 
emphasised by the fact that it is not arbitrary or normatively determined, but rather 
something much more philosophically rich: “[t]he political enemy is [...] existentially 
something different and alien”, he is an adversary who “intends to negate his 
opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve 
one’s own form of existence” (Idem, p. 27). The nature of the distinction is, thus, 
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existential; on a meta-political and quasi-ontological level, the enemy is the 
background against which the foreground of our own political identity stands in stark 
contrast, and consequently becomes clearly defined. 
To deny the friend-enemy distinction would thus be tantamount to denying 
the very foundation of our political existence. Yet, that is exactly the consequence of 
the rationalistic [non-]ideology derived from liberal theory and the economicism 
which often accompanies it today. If one aims to make the human world conform to 
an idealized universal rationality, it stands to reason that any instances of irrationality 
– even if they are not actually irrational, but a deviation from the pre-established 
narrow notion of rationality – must be regarded as pebbles in an otherwise well-oiled 
machine. And the friend-enemy distinction is certainly one notion which does not fit 
in the scheme carefully woven by liberal theorists. For that reason, liberalism has 
tried to conceptually neutralize it, thus rendering it safe under rational control. In 
order to do so, it has “attempted to transform the enemy from the viewpoint of 
economics into a competitor and from the intellectual point into a debating 
adversary” (Idem, p. 28).  
Now, one may certainly ask why such an intention should be construed as 
harmful. Indeed, it would seem that, by neutralizing the friend-enemy distinction, 
one would be in a position to potentially efface the key underlying cause of political 
conflict and therefore enable reasoned discussion to take place in its stead. This, 
however, may prove to be a naive and pernicious understanding of human nature and 
of how decisively politics is an intrinsic part of it. If the political is crucial to the 
essence of human existence – in the sense of Aristotle’s conception of human being 
as zôon politikon, which Schmitt indirectly emulates – the friend-enemy distinction 
is, in turn, an equally decisive element of the essence of the political. Furthermore, 
negating that distinction does not remove political conflict and use of force from the 
plane of human existence; it merely induces it to assume a seemingly subtler form.  
The universalistic origins and aspirations of liberalism, coupled with a 
political agenda guided by the dictums of economics, Schmitt argues, produces a 
kind of “economic imperialism” which retains the instrumental use of force – “a 
stronger, but still economic, and therefore (according to this terminology) non-
political, essentially peaceful means of force” (Idem, p. 79). The reality of politics is 
not significantly changed by this conceptual shift: “[w]ar is condemned but 
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executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, 
international police, and measures to assure peace remain”. And since the 
rationalistic universalism of liberalism is present, the “adversary is no longer called 
an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of 
humanity” (Idem, p. 79).The purported intent to neutralize and rationalize the 
political hence falls prey to the same kind of dynamics of power it was seemingly set 
to challenge. It does not negate of the political, but subverts it and retains it in a more 
precarious variety.  
 
 
3. The Exception as Norm 
 
 So far, we have been examining how the application of Schmitt’s conception 
of the political can be used to bring into light the potential failings of the 
establishment of liberalism as the preferred foundation for our political system. We 
have, however, yet to establish a connection – at least explicitly – between that 
assessment and the main issue at hand: how is it exactly that the Schmittian 
discussion of the political and the exception come into play regarding the problem of 
emotions’ place in politics? In order to fully grasp the scope this essential question, 
we must engage in a twofold analysis: to begin with, the true nature and place of the 
exception in contemporary realpolitik must be made clear; concurrently, this 
progressive unveiling of the political reality of the exception must be systematically 
related to – and explained by – the very limitations of liberal rationalism that it 
previously helped expose. 
  When discussing the concrete political existence of the exception in 
contemporary politics, a consideration of the work of Giorgio Agamben – in both 
Homo Sacer and, even more so, State of Exception – seems unavoidable. One of 
Schmitt’s most eminent contemporary interpreters, Agamben is a leading theorist of 
the exception, taking it upon himself to test not only the theoretical boundaries of the 
concept made famous by the German philosopher, but its practical ones as well. And 
the exception, for Agamben, has today become a supremely practical concept. 
 Far from mere philosophical whim or legal oddity which deviously eludes 
constitutional codification, a careful examination of the political world around us 
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might very well lead us to the realization that the [state of] exception has gradually 
assumed the role of “the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary 
politics” (Agamben, 2005, p. 2). But how was it that the state of exception, 
theoretically intended to represent only what its name entails – a political tool to be 
employed solely under an exceptional set of circumstances – managed to become the 
norm? 
 Without delving into an extensive genealogy of the concept and its practical 
application, it should suffice to say that the declaration of a state of exception has – 
albeit to varying extents – been a political expedient available to the State since the 
times of the ancient Roman republic. The proclamation of a iustitium, a feature in 
Roman law, represented the legal culmination of the acknowledgement of a situation 
which severely threatened the life and preservation of the State. By proclaiming a 
iustitium – which Agamben tells us was etymologically constructed in the same 
manner as solistitium (when the sun [sol] stands still [sistere]) – the State essentially 
proclaimed “a ‘standstill’ or ‘suspension of the law’”, a suspension “not simply of 
the administration of justice, but of the law as such” (Idem, p. 41). This then allowed 
for a concentration of power that, while not being inscribed in the law, ultimately 
aimed to preserve it, by removing the source of threat and therefore protecting the 
integrity of the State.  
 Presented under this form – which the subsequent legal figures of state of 
exception throughout history have essentially mirrored – the state of exception 
defined by the Roman iustitium appears to harbour an inherent and inescapable 
paradox. On the one hand, the [political] acts committed under a iustitium “seem to 
escape all legal definition”: they “are neither transgressive, executive, nor 
legislative”, and thus “seem to be situated in an absolute non-place with respect to 
the law” (Idem, p. 51). On the other, while they are situated outside normal law – 
which it has, by definition, been suspended – they still retain the legitimacy and force 
of law of the latter, inasmuch as they are intended to preserve it and insure the 
eventual creation of the conditions for its reinstatement. As Agamben puts it, it is a 
state of law “in which, on the one hand, the norm is in force [vige] but is not applied 
(it has no ‘force’ [forza]) and, on the other, acts that do not have the value [valore] of 
law acquire its ‘force’” (Idem, p. 38). 
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 This paradoxical nature of the state of exception concerning the law 
understandably raises major questions regarding the true scope and legitimacy of the 
actions taken under its umbrella. But it also entails an additional and equally 
significant problem: the one concerning the criteria for its proclamation. If we return 
once again to the Roman notion of iustitium, it is possible to ascertain from historical 
sources that the criterion for its proclamation was the declaration of a “tumultus” by 
the Senate. The definition of tumultus, however, is the real issue at hand. Generally 
speaking, it signified an emergency situation which threatened Rome; but it was not 
necessarily the equivalent of bellum, war. Cicero tells us that “there can be a war 
without tumult, but no tumult without a war” (Phillipics, 8.1, apud Agamben, 2005, 
p. 42), thus further emphasising the rather ambiguous nature and degree of the 
emergency which warranted a iustitium. 
 As one can easily surmise, the problem regarding the criteria of proclamation 
of a state of exception or (emergency) is related to the possibility of the abuse of the 
powers granted by the latter via the declaration of a fictitious or feigned emergency. 
Historically speaking, there are two particular instances of sovereign decisions which 
are frequently cited as examples of this phenomenon. The first of them pertains to the 
so-called Ship Money crisis of the 1630’s, when King Charles I of England 
attempted to enforce extraordinary taxation upon the country during peacetime 
without Parliamentary approval, by resorting to an obscure legal expedient that 
allowed the monarch to levy taxes for the Royal Navy in times of war. Exploiting a 
naval-war scare, Charles I “claimed both that he as sovereign must have the power to 
raise military forces to defend the nation and that the Crown must be the sole judge 
of whether such a threat existed” (Norris, 2007, p. 44). This was met by heavy 
Parliamentary resistance and eventually became one of the reasons for the ensuing 
English Civil War. 
 The second example is provided by the Napoleonic decree of December 24, 
1811, which “provided for a state of siege that the emperor could declare whether or 
not a city was actually under attack or directly threatened by enemy forces” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 4). This decree allowed for the bolstering of both numbers and 
powers of the military police whenever circumstances required it – the latter being 
legally defined, with the unusual political forthrightness of a man whose ego had 
reached its pinnacle, as any moment when the emperor so desired it. As with the 
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previous case, this issue at hand does not merely concern the legitimacy of the 
criteria for the declaration of a state of emergency, but also – and much more 
decisively – who should be allowed to decide upon that legitimacy and, therefore, 
enforce the exception. It is, as Schmitt accurately perceived it, a moment when 
“sovereignty” ceases to be a philosophical and legal notion to assume a very concrete 
political existence.  
 
3.1. Perpetual war and the tyranny of the exception 
 
Contemporarily, the problem of the legitimacy (in positivistic terms, the 
“veracity”) of the exception being declared is still very much alive in the discussion 
concerning Schmitt’s work and its application to concrete politics. Politically 
speaking, emergencies are moments which “may compromise legal order by 
generating political pressures to augment executive power at the expense of 
legislative and judicial institutions”, insofar “courts often dial down the intensity of 
judicial review during emergencies in deference to the executive branch, enabling the 
executive to sidestep ordinary legal restraints” (Criddle & Fox-Decent, 2012, p. 46). 
As such, they constitute a real danger for the existence of individuals not only in the 
most immediate sense – whatever physical threat to their biological survival they 
may entail – but also in political terms. If the declaration of a state of emergency is 
allowed to be employed as a political tool for the convenience of those who hold 
positions of authority, there is a chance that “emergency powers can become 
permanently entrenched, facilitating the further abuse of public powers long after the 
crisis has passed” (Idem). 
 The political aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 in New York 
City is regarded by several sources – Agamben among them – as providing us with 
the clearest example of the contemporary materialization of that danger, while 
simultaneously enlightening us on the true scope and status of the state of exception 
today. Parallels with the examples we have previously mentioned are, in fact, clearly 
visible. According to Norris, for instance, there were (and still are) similar debates in 
the post-9/11 world to those surrounding the actions of King Charles I, both in the 
USA and abroad. Writing in 2007, he adds that although “the Bush-Cheney 
administration does not claim to be making Schmittian decisions, but rather regularly 
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traces its supposed legal authority to the September 2001 congressional 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40 [S. J. RES. 23]), it does 
repeat claims such as Charles's” (2007, p. 44).  
Referring to the same issue, Agamben emphasises the attempt on basic 
human rights and civil liberties ensuing from the “military order” issued by the 
president of the USA in November 13, 2001, “which authorized the ‘indefinite 
detention’ and ‘trial by military commissions’ [...] of noncitizens suspected of 
involvement in terrorist activities” (2005, p. 3). This military order, Agamben notes, 
expanded perversely on the powers granted by the USA Patriot Act of October 26, 
2001, that already allowed for the lawful imprisonment of any alien suspected of 
activities which posed a threat to national security, but forced authorities to release 
that individual within seven days if he or she had not been charged for any violation 
or criminal offence. 
Further deepening the problem made clear here, the evolution of the so-called 
“global war on terror” which ensued after 9/11 served as justification for additional 
limitations of civil right and liberties which bear even greater political consequences 
than the ones cited by Agamben. Acting under the initially consensual perception of 
the necessity of conceiving and implementing “exceptional measures” to preserve the 
safety of citizens, governments were legitimized in turning those exceptional 
measures against the very citizens they were presumed to protect. In addition to the 
powers we have just mentioned, the USA Patriot Act of 200132 enabled the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to access private information (telephone, e-mail, and 
financial records) of citizens and non-citizens alike, further granting law enforcement 
officers the permission to search a home or business without the owner’s knowledge 
or consent, and expanded access to business records.   
In 2011, ten years after the beginning of the “war on terror”, and twenty four 
days after the reported death of Osama bin Laden, the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension 
Act was signed by president Barack Obama, extending the provision of the original 
Act in matters like the use of roving wiretaps, access to business records and wide-
ranging surveillance of suspected terrorists. In September of the same year, Anwar 
al-Awlaki and his son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki – both of whom were legal American 
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 An act whose title, despite its common transliteration, is actually an acronym for “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act” – a formulation remarkably pregnant with ideological and moralistic zeal. 
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citizens – were killed in separate drone strikes conducted by the USA military and 
sanctioned by the president, with Anwar al-Awlaki thus becoming the first USA 
citizen to be targeted and killed using such an expedient. This was viewed by many 
as essentially amounting to an execution of American citizens by the government 
without granting them their constitutional right to judicial process. In a previously 
classified memorandum issue by the United States Department of Justice, released in 
2014, the killing of both men was presented and justified as an unavoidable yet 
“lawful act of war”, despite the fact that the country was not officially at war with 
any party – Yemen, for instance, where the strikes took place – in a conventional 
sense. It was still the “war on terror” being used to legitimize depriving citizens of 
their rights in the most essential of senses. 
 The “war on terror” that has more or less explicitly been evoked as the 
linchpin of the legitimacy of exceptional measures such as wiretaps and drone strikes 
– and which is beginning to bear an uncanny likeness to an Orwellian state of 
“perpetual war” – served equally as the rationale behind more mundane instances of 
limitation of individual liberties like the growing ubiquity of CCTV surveillance 
(particularly visible in the UK) or the airport security officers’ prerogative to conduct 
comprehensive searches. And in addition to the successive emergencies caused the 
terrorist threat that are systematically invoked by governments worldwide in order to 
justify exceptional situations (and claim exceptional powers), there is the threat 
posed by economic and medical emergencies, such as the aforementioned global 
economic crisis of 2008 (the pretence behind several “exceptional” and unpopular 
political measures in countries like Portugal, Spain, and Greece) and the seemingly 
cyclical pandemic alerts concerning swine flu, avian flu, cholera, and so on. We 
seem to be surrounded by emergencies of all sorts in today’s world, all of which 
serious enough to justify the temporal and political extent of the state of exception 
which – as Agamben recognized – thus seems to have indeed become the most 
paradigmatic form of government of our time33. 
 If, paraphrasing Cicero’s formulation, there can be wars that do not warrant 
the implementation of a state of exception, but no state of exception that can be 
declared without reference to a war, then it would seem that contemporary states go 
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 On the role of the economic emergency in the establishment of a state of permanent political 
emergency, see Žižek, 2010. 
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to great lengths to find “wars” that allow them to justify their preferred means of 
government. The “war” on terror, the “war” on impending economic collapse, the 
“war” on disease; this successive recourse to the analogy of war has become a 
hallmark of contemporary political discourse – it is present, as Agamben points out, 
as early as in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidential addresses regarding the 
necessity to assume extraordinary powers in order to cope with the Great Depression, 
by asking the Congress for “broad Executive power to wage war against the 
emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact 
invaded by a foreign foe” (Roosevelt, 1938, 14-15, apud Agamben, 2005, p. 22).  
The prevalence of this analogy provides us with a clear picture of the 
understanding of politics being fostered today. In no other situation is a strong and 
clearly defined leadership more important than in matters of war – the very notion of 
dictatorship, in fact, was in the Roman Republic originally used to represent a 
transient state of concentration of powers most often deemed necessary in face of the 
threat of war. The nature of the exception is one which does not easily coexist with 
our democratic ideals, but whose urgency feels enough to warrant the (partial) 
suspension of the latter. As Lippmann puts it, “every democrat feels in his bones that 
dangerous crises are incompatible with democracy, because he knows that the inertia 
of the masses is such that to act quickly a very few must decide and the rest follow 
rather blindly” (1956, p. 272).  
At this point, perhaps a caveat is warranted: it is absolutely not our intention 
here to suggest that any contemporary democratic state endeavours to produce 
situations which facilitate or legitimize the establishment of a state of exception – a 
notion that would bring us haplessly close to certain forms of conspiracy theory, far 
removed from any serious consideration of the matter at hand. Conversely, what we 
maintain is that such exceptional situations, when they spontaneously occur, awaken 
what appears to be a somewhat latent temptation in democratic politics: the 
temptation to gradually represent everyday politics as the equivalent of their wartime 
counterpart, and thus benefit from an widening of executive powers that allows 
governments to shed some of the restrictions inherent to most democratic 
constitutions. By its very nature as an political expedient intended to streamline 
executive action, the state of exception appears to intrinsically tend towards making 
itself permanent – something which can be interpreted either critically, as a 
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materialization of a yearning for [greater] political power on the part of elected 
officials, or benevolently, as a genuine desire to prevent any future exceptional 
situations from ever taking place. In either case, the transubstantiation from the 
exceptional into the status quo is usually pursued via juridical provisions which 
contemplate the eventual necessity to temporary suspend certain individual liberties 
– regardless of those provisions being pre-existing or put into place by the 
proclamation of a state of emergency itself. That was the case, as Agamben points 
out, with one of the most infamous political regimes in the contemporary western 
world: Hitler’s Third Reich. As Agamben notes,  
 
[n]o sooner did Hitler take power (or, as we should perhaps more accurately say, no 
sooner was power given to him) than, on February 28, he proclaimed the Decree for the 
Protection of the People and the State, which suspended the articles of the Weimar 
constitution concerning political liberties. The decree was never repealed, so that from a 
juridical standpoint, the entire Third Reich can be considered a state of exception that 
lasted twelve years (2005, p. 2). 
 
In accepting the political legitimacy of the declaration of a state of exception, 
the key political problem regarding it becomes not its use, but its abuse – whether the 
latter is manifested in the attempt to declare a state of exception unjustifiably or, 
even if it was originally justified, to prolong it beyond what circumstances warrant. It 
is this abuse which, in essence, poses a threat to democratic precepts: when the 
exception becomes permanent, it is no longer the exception, but the norm. And as 
Agamben adds to the above considerations, since the precedent set by Nazism and 
other totalitarian regimes, “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency 
(though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential 
practices of contemporary states (including democratic ones)” (Idem). The danger 
unveiled by taking the analysis of the contemporary application of Schmittian 
thought to its final consequences is hence that of the surreptitious establishment of a 
pseudo-tyranny of the exception. 
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4. Exceptional Emotions 
 
What should strike us as the most significant aspect of our political landscape 
today is not the fact that most states seem to abuse the expedient of the state of 
exception as a means to increase the breadth and autonomy of their powers34, but 
rather the fact that this abuse appears to be generally regarded as legitimate by 
citizens of those states. Most of us today are citizens not of dictatorships but of – at 
least de jure – democracies. The inflation of executive power and the subsequent 
waning of certain individual liberties are hence not imposed on us, but rather 
something that we – either willingly of unwittingly – allow to happen. If we regard 
citizens as rationally-driven calculators of costs and benefits, however, this 
phenomenon seemingly defies all logic. Granted, one could argue that the 
safeguarding of life and physical integrity is in itself a benefit worth any cost, and 
therefore rationally justifies the limitation (or even the abdication) of some individual 
rights and liberties. But if that choice clearly harbours the potential to lead us to a 
political situation in which caused the very “public use of reason” that made it 
possible in the first place to be abolished, should it still be rationally desirable? 
Agamben’s theory regarding the true status of the exception in today’s 
politics – which, as himself acknowledges, echoes Walter Benjamin’s earlier 
assertion that “the state of exception [...] has become the rule” (Benjamin, 1942, 
697/257, apud Agamben, 2005, p. 6) – appears to be, in light of all that has been 
discussed, a fairly accurate diagnosis of the situation. But something can – and 
should – be added to this idea, for although the end result may be clearly perceived, 
the causes of the process leading up to it still warrant further clarification. How 
exactly did the exception managed surreptitiously become the norm? What were the 
political, sociological and psychological conditions that made it possible? In order to 
properly answer these critical questions, I would argue, one must take the issue 
beyond the realm of conventional political theory and take into account the key role 
played by emotions in politics.  
The tacit choice, made by a majority of individuals, to accept the dubious 
legitimacy of the political status quo embodied by the permanent state of exception – 
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 Essentially promoting an “abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive and judicial 
powers”(Agamben, 2005, p. 7) or, more succinctly, an absorption of legislative power by the 
executive branch. 
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along with everything the latter entails concerning individual rights and liberties – 
thus appears to be the result of a combination of the factors that we have been 
discussing in the preceding chapters. First and foremost, the citizens of today’s 
western liberal democracies are the (often) unsuspecting heirs to currents of political 
thought – such as liberalism, cosmopolitanism and economicism – that are deeply 
permeated by markedly rationalistic conceptions of human nature and politics, which 
are therefore systematically fostered and reinforced in the minds of individuals.  
Secondly, and partially caused by this first aspect, there is generalised 
ignorance regarding the true nature of the processes of deliberation, motivation and 
decision-making, which are commonly regarded as being essentially (or even 
exclusively) based in cognition and logical reasoning, despite a wealth of scientific 
evidence to the contrary stemming from the fields of neurology and 
neuropsychology. This evidence demonstrates that emotions not only exert a decisive 
influence – both potentially beneficial or detrimental – upon such aspects of our 
mental life, but that the latter are actually not even possible in the absence of a 
healthy and fully-functioning emotional processing system.  
Thirdly, because human beings are essentially social animals, the processes of 
deliberation and decision-making do not occur ex-nihilo in the mind of the 
individual, but actually exist – and must therefore be understood – as phenomena 
inscribed in a socio-political context which both influences and is simultaneously 
influenced by them. The psychological dynamics of life in a social unit and their 
effect on our perception of the world around us, our pre-conceptions, our prejudices, 
and even our inclination towards certain opinions, decisions and actions, must 
therefore be acknowledged as a key component of our political existence. The fact 
that it commonly is not, and that hence each of us tends to operate under an 
excessively optimistic evaluation of our own critical prowess, enhances the efficacy 
of mechanisms of political influence which can be encompassed by the umbrella 
notion of propaganda, and which are made ubiquitous and inescapable by the scope 
of contemporary mass media. 
Finally, the fact that most states are today grounded upon some form or 
derivative of liberalism renders their citizens ill-equipped to comprehend the nature 
of the exception – its “topological structure” in regards to conventional law of 
“being-outside and yet belonging” (Idem, p. 35) – and its relationship with the 
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manifestation of sovereignty as a concrete political reality. Our difficulty in properly 
evaluating the legitimacy and extent of the state of exception is also the result of a 
normativist conception of politics that itself struggles to incorporate it into its rigid 
and formalistic schemata.  
What is it then that makes us so receptive to the state of exception today? The 
answer, I would argue, is intimately connected with our inability (or unwillingness) 
to acknowledge the rightful place of emotions in our decision-making processes and, 
consequently, in our political lives. This claim is not only supported by the 
theoretical analysis that we have undertaken thus far, but also by the contemporary 
instances when the state of exception becomes political practice. The latter exhibit a 
distinct pattern regarding the tactic commonly employed to assure public acceptance 
of its justification – albeit not necessarily of its legitimization: an appeal to emotion. 
Specifically, it is an appeal to what Aristotle categorizes as practical emotions, 
emotions such as fear and anger which, by definition, are intrinsically connected with 
and conducive to certain patterns of action. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the 
American government arguably instrumentalized the events themselves and others 
that followed them – the so-called 2001 anthrax attacks, for instance – by calling 
upon sentiments of fear (regarding additional attacks) and anger (against the 
presumed authors of the attacks) in order to justify not only the military intervention 
in Afghanistan and Iraq – along with the loss of American lives it would necessarily 
entail – but also the limitation and revocation of civil liberties we mentioned above35. 
In fact, according to Moïsi (2009), it is both possible and plausible to regard fear as a 
key element in shaping and determining the contemporary political culture of the 
USA and Europe, along with the latter’s position in terms of global politics – thus 
further elucidating the prevalence and effectiveness of a political intrumentalization 
of that specific emotion in those cases.  
In addition to these examples, we might cite others whose external 
appearance may seem different, but which coincide in essence: in the economic crisis 
of 2008, for instance, the paradoxical appeal to provide significant financial aid to 
banking institutions – some of which were directly responsible for causing the crisis 
itself – at the expense of public funds, all while enforcing austerity measures upon 
                                                           
35
 David Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006) and Thrall & Kramer’s American 
Foreign Policy and Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11 (2009) provide interesting and 
thought-provoking accounts of this phenomenon.  
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common citizens, was justified by exploiting the fear of an even greater danger posed 
by the purported imminent collapse of the entire financial system. To the time of this 
writing, that very fear is still being harnessed as the driving force behind the 
manufacturing of consent regarding the implementation of “exceptional” economic 
measures by several western states, measures whose immediately perceptible effect 
consistently is the gradual diminishing of individual economic and political self-
determination. As we pointed out earlier, economic “emergencies” have come to be 
understood as tantamount to political emergencies in terms of both consequence and 
urgency, and perhaps today’s most globally and consensually acknowledged instance 
of a permanent state of emergency can even be said to be one of an economic nature 
(Žižek, 2010) 
In all of the instances when the exception becomes a political instrument of 
dubious legitimacy, the common denominator is provided by an exploitation of the 
emotional frailty of individuals – with causes of the latter being, with tragic irony, 
found in the beliefs of those very individuals. As logically consistent inheritors of a 
rationalistic conception of human reason, we believe that we are above such lowly 
attempts at political manipulation. When we decide on the best course of action in 
face of a given political crisis or imminent threat, we do so subconsciously heeding 
the old adage that one should not decide on the ground of emotions. We believe that 
we have managed to completely exclude emotions from the process. We believe that 
we are responding rationally. Indeed, even when emotions are present we truly are, 
because they are an inextricable part of rationality. But in not acknowledging our 
emotions, we are allowing them to be manipulated and being led to believe that we 
are responding purely rationally. Our response, whatever it may be, is therefore 
endowed with the absolute certainty of logical truth. A truth which is not open to 
challenge and that renders all of its logical consequences logically necessary – even 
if among them are the concession of illegitimate powers to the State and the 
renunciation of individual liberties. 
This emotional frailty, resulting from the overestimation of logical reasoning 
and a misconception of human rationality, is then amplified by a belief that our 
permanent access to information provided by mass media provides us the necessary 
knowledge to clearly perceive and evaluate everything involved in a given political 
issue. In truth, the complexity of contemporary politics effectively creates a veil of 
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ignorance – to borrow Rawls’ term – between the reality of the problem and our 
understanding, placing the former beyond our ability to accurately comprehend it and 
forcing us to lend credence to experts on the subject. Ironically, though, this does not 
preclude our prejudices from influencing our decisions, but actually reinforces their 
effect, with the choice of experts being made more often than not on the basis of their 
political alignment with our preconceived notions on the issue. And if this is true 
even for more conventional political issues, it is even more so in the case of 
exceptional ones; paraphrasing Lippmann’s quote from the previous chapter, during 
a mutiny at sea there is no time to make each sailor an expert judge of experts 
In the end, the ignorance of emotion’s place in decision-making contributes 
decisively towards the creation of what Jacques Ellul dubs the “political illusion”, an 
illusion “destined, as always, to hide a reality that haunts us and that we do not know 
how to master” (2004, p. 30). We wish to believe that, with methodical and surgical 
use of our pure rational ability, we can accurately read political problems, make 
consistently “right” political decisions, and ultimately control the workings of the 
State. The truth, however, is that the opposite is much more often the case. The 
political illusion of our time is thus one grounded on the overestimation of our ability 
to rationally control the political system, while ignoring that, by ostracising emotion 
from the process, we are actually creating the conditions for that system to control 
us. As far as our autonomous political existence is concerned, this is “an illusion 
which [...] presents a mortal danger” (Idem, p.190). 
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Chapter V – Political Virtue and Liberal Education 
 
Thus far we have argued – and endeavoured to demonstrate – that our 
perceived ability to rationally control the political sphere constitutes one of the most 
dangerous political illusions of our times. That danger is materialized in a clear 
opportunity for political agents and instructions to exploit our disregard for 
emotion’s role in (political) decision-making processes, leading to such phenomena 
as the potential establishment of the state of exception as “the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics” (Agamben, 2005, p. 2). This possibility, which 
critically threatens the very foundations of western liberal democratic politics, is 
ironically provided by our (either explicit or implicit) adherence to what we argued 
to be one of the founding tenets of liberal theory: the belief in the primacy of 
rationality as the defining human faculty, to the detriment of all other dimensions of 
human existence – emotion in particular. 
At this point in our work, having identified the problem that we set out to 
unveil, we find ourselves before a significant choice regarding its continuation. There 
are, indeed, many routes open to us: we could focus, for instance, on other 
dimensions of the political sphere where the consequences of the dissonance between 
the expectations of political rationalism and their frustration by realpolitik are 
particularly obvious and significant – such as party politics, economic policy, 
political communication, voter behaviour, and so on. It is a choice that would be not 
only valid, but perhaps even expected, considering all that has been argued and 
expounded upon so far. At a meta-critical level, it is also, however, a choice that 
would represent a desire to emphasise the aporetic dimension of the problem, 
uncovering and examining it in its different incarnations. While undoubtedly 
interesting and still politically worthwhile, this route nevertheless strikes me as the 
less arduous – and, crucially, less fruitful – out of the two now before us. Philosophy 
demands us to take any perceived aporia to its final consequences, thus reaching the 
place where its actual insolubility can best be ascertained. In what pertains to the 
matter at hands, despite its undeniable and – given our present cultural and political 
circumstances – almost ontological complexity, I am not yet convinced of the 
impossibility of a solution. 
131 
 
It is therefore a conscious and fully intentional choice that we make to 
proceed down an alternate path, the one which urges us to conduct a deeper 
examination of the roots of the problem in search of its possible solution. What we 
might almost instantly find following this choice, however, is that the first step 
towards a clearing in that seemingly winding and obscure path has already been 
taken for us, considering the nature of the problem itself and the political reality it 
inhabits. To put it concretely, the conjunction between the factors conducive to the 
state of affairs identified in previous chapters and the political entities that regard it 
as politically useful – and therefore become complicit with it – configures a political 
problem which, in democratic terms, can only entail one route towards its solution: 
education. These two dimensions – politics and education – are, after all, umbilically 
connected: a philosophy of education can always be deduced from a philosophy of 
the political, in the same manner that a specific ethical and political conception can 
invariably be extracted from the former. And particularly in democratic politics – 
where such problems cannot be unilaterally solved by decree, under penalty of 
undermining the very foundations of the political process – education presents itself 
as the sole means to significantly affect change at the wide and deeply seeded level 
demanded here. 
Our subsequent efforts will henceforth follow a twofold approach, through 
which the problem will be simultaneously addressed at the level of a political 
philosophy and a philosophy of education – insofar as its solution should 
conceivably be found in a politically involved and relevant form of education. If the 
latter is true, however, the question may arise of how it has not happened yet, given 
that comprehensive and compulsory formal schooling is virtually universal in 
contemporary western democracies, and often explicitly embraces the cross-
disciplinary aim of educating citizens. The only plausible answer to this seems to be 
that formal schooling under the moulds adopted by those polities, as well as the 
educational theory that underpins it, are inadequate regarding the issue at hand. And 
given that, as previously argued, a great number of our choices and beliefs within the 
realm of the political are informed by a form of political rationalism promoted by 
liberalism – and often even by the political economicism which stems from it – one 
may suspect the same to be true of our conception of education. Whether there can 
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be said to exist a specifically liberal theory of education and, if so, what might its key 
features be, thus become pressing questions. 
Upon preliminary inspection, the answer to the first of those questions is 
affirmative. Not only are educative concerns clearly present in many of the 
foundational texts of liberalism – Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
Mill’s On Liberty, and Rawls’ Political Liberalism, to name a few – but a 
considerable amount of significant research on the subject has been produced in 
recent years (Callan, 1997; Brighthouse, 2000, Levinson, 2002; McDonough & 
Feinberg, 2007; McLaughlin, 2012). Reflecting what is perceived as the specific 
contribution of liberalism to educational theory (and practice), most of these authors 
focus on what is known as “liberal education”. Yet, the notion of liberal education, 
while often perceived as self-evident when taken at face value, is infused with a 
degree of philosophical and pedagogical complexity which certainly warrants further 
consideration. 
 The current discussion around liberal education focuses almost exclusively on 
either attempting to promote its benefits for the political education of the future 
citizens of increasingly globalized and multicultural states, or on the criticism it 
merits from proponents of theories like communitarianism, who regard its purported 
commitment to political and philosophical individualism as inimical to the sense of 
community indispensable for a healthy democratic society (White & Callan, 2003; 
McDonough & Feinberg, 2007; Williams, 2007). A critical examination of liberal 
education, informed by a deeper understanding of the political role of emotion, and 
taking into account all the significant challenges to the democratic process that ensue 
from the latter, is however something that has yet to be attempted. By pursuing it, we 
will not only be adding something new to the ongoing debate, but also contributing 
for a clearer comprehension of the nature and possible limitations of liberal 
education. 
 
 
1. Liberalism and Liberal Education 
 
 Liberal education is a concept which – as made evident by the variety of 
approaches that its discussion presently harbours – entails an inherent difficulty of 
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definition: is liberal education an education conducive to the formation of citizens 
endowed with the ideal abilities and characteristics required by a liberal polity, or 
rather an education aiming to foster liberty in the most deeply ontological sense – of 
an individual who is liberated from contingent sentimental attachments or pre-
existing political allegiances, and therefore free to lead a truly autonomous 
existence?  
On the one hand, there are liberal theorists who maintain that “liberalism is 
not perfectionist, in the sense that it does not aim to shape the citizen to a vision of 
the common good” (Appiah, 2007, p. 59); according to the former, the very 
conception of an umbilical connection between the educational and the political 
mentioned above – which hinges precisely on the establishment of an ideal model for 
citizenship and the acknowledgment of education’s duty to contribute towards the 
“common good” – should be regarded as incompatible with liberalism.  
On the other, there are also those within liberalism who argue in the opposite 
direction, proposing that “[j]ust as liberal political theory has important political 
ramifications for the aim, structure, and content of education, so education has 
important ramifications for liberalism in both theory and practice (Levinson, 2002, p. 
4). As such, and while “there is disagreement about exactly what abilities citizens 
should possess” – ranging from Rawlsian “capacity for democratic citizenship”, a 
respect for difference, to the “capacity for autonomy” – “all contemporary liberal 
theories require that adults have some opportunities and capacities provided for by 
education” (Idem). 
This apparent internal contradiction of liberalism regarding its perspective on 
education and the latter’s role in political terms is essentially motivated by many 
liberal theorists' discomfort when dealing with a pedagogical operative concept 
which John Dewey dubs “direction”. Dewey – who, despite being often characterized 
as “the liberal philosopher of education par excellence”, produced a body of work 
decisively marked by “deep communitarian currents” which attempted to “construct 
communitarian theory of democracy and democratic education that absorbs 
important liberal elements” (Callan & White, 2003, p. 104) – presents direction as 
one of the forms of the “general function of education”, and equates it with 
“guidance” and “control” (Dewey, 2008, p. 27). Ultimately electing for direction as 
the more felicitous of the three notions – because it better conveys the idea of an 
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orientation which is neither tyrannical nor dehumanizing in the sense of Kantian 
instrumentalization – he goes on to define it as a “guiding of activity to its own end”, 
an “assistance in doing fully what some organ is already intending to do” (Dewey, 
2008, p. 27). 
Dewey’s caveat notwithstanding, to conceive education as an inherently 
directive activity is a view still regarded as untenable by many liberal theorists of 
education. Traced back to its origin, this aversion finds its roots in Book I of John 
Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, where he “formulates a central 
credo of the Enlightenment and in doing so crafts a classic definition of liberal 
autonomy: ‘Men must think and know for themselves’” (Burtt, 2007, p. 179). Albeit 
not explicitly employing the notion of autonomy itself, Locke’s arguments in 
paragraph 24 of Chapter IV still reflect the essence and central importance of the 
latter in the Enlightenment’s conception of liberalism. In the pursuit of truth, Locke 
states, we must not “[take] up another’s principles without examining them” and 
“give up our assent only to reverend names”; rather, we “should employ our own 
reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation”. It is not a “small 
power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of 
principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths”, he adds in paragraph 25, further 
emphasising the importance of the use of our “own reason and judgement”. 
What explains the apparent contradiction regarding liberal education 
mentioned above is thus the fact that, in spite of their reluctance to adhere to a closed 
notion of “ideal citizen” (and all that the latter entails) contemporary liberal theorists 
still largely acquiesce in Locke’s portrayal of autonomy as a character trait which is 
ideal – not only in the pursuit of scientific and philosophical truth, but also in what 
concerns the erection of a just and equitable polis. Expanding on Locke’s arguments, 
“[c]ontemporary liberal theory” has come to associate “autonomy with the 
willingness and ability to distance ourselves critically from the roles or ends we have 
been raised to value” (Burtt, 2007, p. 182). The ability to fully determine the nature 
of our own existence in an independent fashion has become the hallmark – and 
requisite – of contemporary liberalism: “autonomy is the ability to control our lives 
by reasoned choice”; people are “autonomous rather than heteronomous, to the 
extent that they choose the principles by which they live” (Dagger apud Burtt, 2007, 
pp. 200-1). 
135 
 
Translated by liberalism into educational terms, the notion of autonomy 
retains its central importance. Liberalism’s project of education is, in fact, 
philosophically founded upon the concern to foster individual autonomy in the 
pursuit of knowledge, not only in the scientific field, but also in all other facets of 
human existence – including ethics and politics. As Appiah argues, “[t]he key to a 
liberal education is the development of an autonomous self” (2007, p. 64). Liberal 
educators should thus embrace the “need to prepare children with the truth, and the 
capacity to acquire more of it” (Idem, p. 68). Here too – or rather, here especially – 
Locke’s original idea of the opposition between autonomy and the “dictatorship” of 
external authority bears considerable fruit, and provides the rationale for liberals’ 
distrust regarding any pedagogic conception which affords theoretical credence to 
the importance of direction. There is in liberal education a marked aversion for 
directive methodologies and any pedagogic approaches that presuppose an ideal 
model of character or behaviour to which students are expected to conform, 
inasmuch as it is assumed that these things unavoidably represent an encroachment 
upon individual liberty and autonomy.  
With this philosophical substratum nourishing it, liberal education has grown 
to express itself concretely with increasing diversity. Its historical connection to the 
medieval liberal arts, while still bearing some vestigial effects on the general 
program of liberal education today, has to a large extent been abandoned and 
replaced with the more inclusive perspective inherited from the Enlightenment – 
which emphasises individual autonomy, and is therefore suited to be applied to any 
discipline that can be argued to advance an individual’s knowledge and the ability to 
adapt that knowledge to any given situation (the now familiar and ubiquitous notion 
of “transferable skills”). Liberal education has thus gradually adapted to the demands 
of a socio-political situation brought about, in great part, due to the political 
influence of liberalism itself. Traditionally viewed with suspicion in the late-modern 
industrial society due to its lack of “practical” application, liberal education has since 
evolved to not only include some of the very disciplines that previously represented 
its opposition, but also adjusted its original content accordingly. As Blitz puts it, 
subjects that appear to offer something “useful” – such as the sciences – are 
favoured, while others like “psychology, government and economics” are “pushed to 
make their more useful elements their dominant ones” (2004, p. 47). Liberal subjects 
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which are deemed of little utility, on the other hand, “either ossify or are 
overwhelmed by their technical elements”: language skills replace literature, art 
becomes graphic design, music and philosophy gradually fade away from 
proeminence, and so on (Idem).  
 Considering this actualization of liberal education in light of the demands of 
contemporary society, the very promise entailed by the former is bound to change. 
What then, might we ask, are presently the main aims of its educative project? In 
other words, what educational and political advantages can we then expect to derive 
from liberal education today? Based on an overview of the literature on 
contemporary liberal theory, the benefits of the latter are especially significant in 
four key areas: civic education, global politics, social justice, and economic 
competitiveness. Let us now succinctly examine the claim of liberal education’s 
contribution to each of them. 
 
1.1. Civic education 
 
As Levinson argues, “civic education is essential to any coherent program of 
liberal education”, inasmuch as the former “is critical to ensuring the stability and 
sustainability of the liberal state” (2002, p. 100). Despite the divergence between the 
proponents of what Rawls differentiates as the “comprehensive liberalism” of Kant 
and Mill – which seeks to “foster the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals 
to govern much if not all of life” (Rawls, 1996, p. 199) – and his own “political 
liberalism” – which focuses on conveying the political knowledge required to make 
effective and just citizens – there is still agreement on both parts regarding the 
necessary overlapping between liberal and civic education36 . And if the kind of 
knowledge regarding the political sphere prescribed by Rawls is immediate and 
evidently a pre-requisite of democratic citizenship, an equally persuasive case can be 
made concerning the relationship between citizenship and autonomy: children must 
“learn to evaluate the arguments made in a democratic and political world, as well as 
to put forth such arguments themselves”; in practice, “this means that children need 
                                                           
36
 For a more in-depth analysis of comprehensive and political liberalism in educational terms, as well 
as the possibility of their convergence, see Callan (1997), Burtt (2007), and Davis & Neufeld (2007). 
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to develop many of the same skills as those [involved in] their development of 
autonomy” (Levinson, 2002, p. 102). 
To further reinforce the symbiotic connection between the two, liberalism is 
often presented as the only viable inspiration for a project of civic education able to 
cope with the unique challenges of contemporary multicultural states. On the other 
side of the spectrum, conservatism – or, worse even, nationalism – with its excessive 
valuation of ultimately contingent aspects such as tradition, culture, and nationality, 
is viewed as a dangerous and unacceptable alternative. According to Nussbaum, an 
“education that takes national boundaries as morally salient too often reinforces this 
kind of irrationality, by lending to what is an accident of history a false air of moral 
weight and glory” (2002, p. 11). Being based on rational and universal principles, a 
civic education derived from liberal theory will enable citizens to distance 
themselves critically from those contingent aspects and thus foster a peaceful and 
fruitful coexistence between the ethnic and cultural differences which unavoidably 
share the same space within the contemporary democratic state. A civic education 
founded upon the key liberal virtues – comprised of the “toleration, mutual respect 
and deliberation” of political liberalism and the “individuality and autonomy” of 
comprehensive liberalism – is thus what “supports the widest range of social 
diversity that is consistent with the ongoing pursuit of liberal democratic justice” 
(Guttman, 1995, p. 579). 
 
1.2. Global Politics 
 
Intimately connected with the previous point comes liberalism’s claim 
regarding its singular ability to educate citizens for life in an increasingly globalized 
world. For reasons that we have expounded on a previous chapter – and whose 
repetition we will hence forego – liberalism is inextricably connected with 
cosmopolitanism. As such, because of the latter’s universalistic nature – underpinned 
by an equally universal notion of human reason – liberal theory naturally tends 
towards the effacement of nationalistic political divisions. In doing so, it provides an 
opportunity to transcend national politics and reach wide-spanning consensus on key 
political issues which international relations. As Robert Audi expresses it, in “the 
plausible versions of cosmopolitanism, it is people who have basic moral status; 
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nations have derivative moral status” – that is, they “derive their value from their role 
in serving people” (2009, p. 372). 
By endowing potential citizens with a cosmopolitan worldview, liberal 
education is assumed to foster the kind of political mind necessary to deal with the 
challenges that contemporary – and globalized – citizenship entails. It aims to 
prepare citizens to conceive of and understand their political action at a meta-
national level, thus indirectly allowing states to effectively address global issues (e.g. 
environmental problems, humanitarian crises, pandemics) on the grounds of a 
primacy of human interests over those of any other kind. Furthermore, that same 
cosmopolitanism worldview imparted through liberal education might even allow for 
an enhanced ethical understanding of our political existence, by providing a moral 
framework which permits the introduction of issues such as the necessary political 
and moral responsibilization of multinational corporations in our increasingly 
interconnected world, particularly in “matters of human rights, social and 
environmental justice” (Maak, 2009, p. 361) – although it remains dubious whether 
this is a desired effect in light of the economic liberalism that often accompanies its 
political counterpart. 
  
1.3. Social justice 
 
A third aspect towards which liberal education is often argued to positively 
contribute is the promotion of social justice. As a caveat, we will dispense here with 
a direct consideration of Rawls’ (1999) now widely-familiar arguments ensuing from 
his philosophical exploration of the original position and the “veil of ignorance”, 
along with his reflections on the principles of justice. Instead, we will employ for the 
purposes of this summary those arguments which, albeit certainly often animated by 
Rawls’ work, are specifically concerned not with the general scope of political 
liberalism, but with a liberal theory of education.  
Incorporated into pedagogic practice, liberalism’s central axiological trinity 
of reason, individuality, and autonomy results in a commitment to foster the rational 
capacity of individuals in a manner conducive not only to an increase in true 
knowledge, but also to the development of the ability to later recognise and acquire 
that knowledge on their own. Equally crucial in the process of fostering individual 
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autonomy is the development of critical reason, to an extent that promotes the 
rational examination of our own beliefs and sentimental attachments. Due to all these 
factors and their effect in socio-political terms, it is argued, liberal education can 
feasibly act as the guarantor of social justice not only in contemporary democratic 
states, but also in what concerns the latter’s relation with the globalized world around 
them: 
 
[t]he justice we need under pluralism requires us to think for ourselves in a much more 
radical way than we must when all can take for granted the same conception of the good 
and right. To give the respect due to ethical viewpoints in deep conflict with our own, we 
must learn to enter them imaginatively and to understand that much of the pluralism that 
permeates our world is a consequence not of evil or folly but of the inherent limits of 
human reason (Callan, 1997, p. 43). 
 
  By liberating the individual from ingrained prejudices concerning 
heterogeneous ethical, cultural, and political perspectives, liberal education brings 
about the possibility to think about justice in a purely rational and balanced manner – 
a manner which is, therefore, just in itself. Diverging views may thus cease to be 
hurriedly perceived as evil or wrong to be better understood as simply mistaken – 
and therefore ransomable from error through reasoned argument. To this outcome 
contributes not only the rational development promoted by liberal education, but also 
the latter’s fostering of autonomy: a “good civic education” includes “encouragement 
to reflect independently on the strengths and weaknesses of the existing social and 
political order”, inasmuch as “good citizens must be able to challenge the 
community’s dominant understanding of justice” (Burtt, 2007, p. 195). 
 Also significant regarding liberal education’s claim of advancing social 
justice are its arguments concerning equality. Although it may be argued that 
equality in itself constitutes a political aim at odds with autonomy – at least in the 
sense that different conceptions of liberalism may exclusively adopt either one as the 
telos of liberalism’s political project – a persuasive case can be made for their 
compatibility in matters of education. This is the position adopted by Levinson 
(2002), who nevertheless warns that, in order to ensure that compatibility and avoid 
enforcing an “equality as such” which would render it “tyrannical”, the “political 
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value of equality must be circumscribed” by a liberal state: it “must choose a 
particular good or goods to equalize, such as opportunity, resources, outcome, or 
welfare” (Idem, p. 141). Out of all those possible goods, and in light of the demands 
of liberal education, “it makes more sense to talk of equality of opportunity – where 
opportunity refers [...] both to the opportunity to develop autonomy and the 
opportunity to exercise it” (Idem, p. 142). 
 Equality, one of the key principles of liberalism, is thus qualified and 
integrated into a theory of education. Neither “the liberal education ideal nor, more 
generally, the theory of liberal education [...] needs to be modified in response to 
egalitarian concerns” (Idem, p. 143). Furthermore, “insofar as the same question 
about aims must be answered for equality of opportunity (‘opportunity to do what?’) 
as has to be answered for equality itself (‘equality of what?’), autonomy provides a 
promising object for liberal egalitarianism” (Idem). As such, it can be argued that a 
liberal education finds itself in an ideal position to foster not only the 
acknowledgement of equality as a foundational political principle of contemporary 
democratic polities, but also the kind of understanding of equality required by the 
specific educative demands of the latter: an equality in terms of the acquisition of 
autonomy and the opportunity to act autonomously, on the grounds of critical 
judgement. 
 
1.4. Economic competiveness 
 
We finally reach what is, prima facie, perhaps the most unexpected of all 
claimed contributions of a liberal education to the life of contemporary democratic 
states: economic competitiveness. The reason for its unexpected nature, indubitably, 
is the subliminal persistence of the aforementioned understanding of liberal 
education as being focussed on the liberal arts – and, therefore, standing in stark 
opposition to the inclusion of any kind of economic considerations in the educative 
process. That incarnation of liberal education, however – and as argued above – has 
since been forced to evolve in order to accommodate the demands of a market-based 
economy.   
In the case of the UK, for instance, the “application of market principles to 
education in the Thatcher/Major years” became increasingly clear (Bridges & 
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Jonathan, 2003). According to the same authors, who followed the phenomenon 
rather closely throughout its development (Jonathan, 1983, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997a, 
1997b; Bridges, 1994; Bridges & Husbands, 1996), many educators at the time 
supposed its “cause to be a particular feature of the Anglo-American liberal 
conservatism”, an “approach to social policy […] that might be overthrown, in some 
countries at least, with a swing to the left in their politics and a change of 
government” (2003, p. 126). Contrary to this view, Jonathan argued that “the 
competitive individualism which legitimates a quasi-market in education” was in fact 
an “unacknowledged feature of that form of liberalism that informed both the social 
expansion of liberal education from the mid-twentieth century and the liberal 
philosophy of education” of that time (Idem) – a perspective corroborated by the 
chronological evolution of the phenomenon, which now leads us to the realization 
that policies pertaining to the application of market principles to education are indeed 
“more deep-seated and more widespread that some expectations might have 
suggested” (Idem). As such, even in countries where a political shift to the left did in 
fact take place – in the case of the UK, with Tony Blair’s “New Labour” – left-
leaning governments tend to exhibit “no less a passion for market principles” than 
their predecessors (Idem). 
 Alongside the more perceptible and politically determined application of 
market principles to the organizational aspect of education, theorists of liberal 
education have endeavoured to demonstrate the inherent suitability of the latter’s 
educational goals with the demands of a market-driven society37. Dealing with this 
topic in The Demands of Liberal Education (2002), Levinson begins by advancing a 
somewhat critical view of the contemporarily widespread “subordination of 
education to economic concerns (often termed ‘economic imperatives’)”, which is 
materialized by an increased involvement of businesses in education, a renewed 
interest in vocational education, “and especially an increased comparison – to almost 
                                                           
37
 That application of market principles being manifested, in terms of concrete policy, by five key 
stipulations: i) The dismantling of state monopolies on education to allow a choice of service provider 
for “customers” and competition between providers; ii) The creation of real opportunities for choice 
among consumers, and an appreciation for that choice (diversification into private schools, 
technological institutes, religious schools, vocational training, and so on); iii) The provision of reliable 
and quantifiable data to inform consumer choice (independent assessments, league tables, etc.); iv) 
The encouragement for educational providers to be independent from state funding, by becoming 
entrepreneurial and generating alternative sources of income; v) The enabling of consumers to secure 
the option of their choice, whether from a public or private provider (Bridges & Jonathan, 2003, pp. 
127-8). 
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an obsessional level – of one’s educational system with those of other countries 
deemed economically successful or competitive” (2002, p. 135). The nature of her 
initial consideration notwithstanding, Levinson goes on to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to the problem: given that economic concerns are a seemingly unavoidable 
presence in educational policy today, rather than bluntly refusing their legitimacy, 
the liberal theorist of education should strive to demonstrate the potential 
compatibility between the former and liberal education. 
 Levinson thus asserts that, while whenever the development of autonomy 
clashes with economic competitiveness it is the former that should take precedence – 
because “individuals’ development and exercise of autonomy is a more fundamental 
interest” – such a thing would only occur in a state whose “economic order will 
likely be illiberal”, and therefore undesirable (Idem, p. 136). In a desirable liberal 
democratic state, on the contrary, an “education for autonomy [such as the one 
promoted by liberal education] will create an economically competitive workforce” 
(Idem). And it will do so for a number of reasons; firstly, the development of 
children’s autonomy implies teaching them self-sufficiency, which “must in turn 
include teaching children the skills, knowledge, and habits necessary to find 
(preferably fulfilling) employment” (Idem).  
Secondly, in our “modern, information-based economy”, there is often an 
overlapping between the capacities required by autonomy and those needed in the 
workforce: contrary to what happened in the early stages of industrial society, 
economic success “now relies on flexibility, creativity, adaptability, an ability to 
learn new skills quickly, and self-reliance” – which are exactly the characteristics 
“which one learns in the process of developing one’s capacity for autonomy” (Idem, 
p. 137).  
Third and finally, the development of an autonomous workforce, comprised 
of individuals who are able to live authentic and fulfilling lives and according to the 
prescriptions of their reason, is a pre-requisite for the kind of freedom demanded by 
the overall success of the liberal democratic state’s political project. If education for 
economic competitiveness is found to be incompatible with education for autonomy, 
then that state (along with its economic success) ceases to represent a worthwhile 
aspiration – and “we should therefore be unconcerned if education for autonomy 
does not support such an economy” (Idem, p. 138). As such, there is seemingly good 
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reason to conclude not only on the compatibility between educating for autonomy 
and underlying economic concerns, but also on the clear benefits of liberal education 
towards economic competitiveness (and success) within a truly liberal democratic 
state. 
 
 
2. The Limitations of Liberal Education 
 
 Following this brief outline of liberal theory of education – or, in roughly 
equivalent terms, of the theory of liberal education – we are now in a better position 
to perceive its shortcomings. This, in turn, allows us to ascertain the extent to which 
the latter can be deemed responsible for problem at hand: the pervasiveness of an 
emotional frailty – and consequent permeability to political expedients fuelled by 
emotional appeals – on the part of citizens of contemporary democratic states. Before 
doing so, however, we must begin by stating the immediate necessary condition for 
that hypothesis to be true: the current pervasiveness of that liberal theory of 
education itself within our educational systems. Obviously, regardless of its 
shortcomings, the former can only be legitimately held responsible for the limitations 
of the latter if it is found to underpin its more fundamental principles and practices. 
The reasons for believing this to be true are, I would argue, quite convincing. 
Without any aspiration (or possibility) to exhaust them here, suffice to say that 
simply by looking at the fundamental principles of liberal education – including 
those pertaining to the application of a market-deduced rationale to educational 
policy – and comparing them to what we know in practice to be true of formal 
schooling today, one may easily conclude that a liberal theory of education is indeed 
what informs most contemporary systems of compulsory, state-mandated education 
within western democratic states. 
 The qualification of the kind of education we are referring to is also essential 
here, for even within what we may generically term “formal education” one finds a 
myriad of pedagogic conceptions that may sit well outside the lines of what is 
stipulated by a liberal theory of education. The moral and social education of 
children by primary caretakers, religious education, artistic education (comprising 
musical, plastic, and performance arts), and even physical education, are all 
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examples of pedagogic activities which can still be considered as “formal” 
(depending on our criteria), but nevertheless often take place under fairly different 
educational assumptions and aims than those set forth in liberal education. For the 
purpose of this analysis we will try to evade any such confusion by focussing our 
efforts on the dimension of educational practice endowed with a purportedly greater 
political significance, both because it explicitly expresses the goal to contribute to the 
formation of (virtuous) future citizens, and because it is deemed indispensable (ergo 
compulsory) through the binding policies of democratic states.  As such, for the 
remainder of the discussion, whenever we refer to “education” in general terms, it 
will be with the notion of formal schooling in mind – the latter being defined as the 
educative practice within western democratic states that comprises the common 
categories of pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher education, taking place in 
light of a pre-determined curriculum to be followed and educational standards that 
must be met. 
  
2.1. The rationality of liberal education 
 
With this caveat being made, we may now devote our attention to the 
limitations of an education determined by liberal principles, which – according to 
what was argued above – is largely the case with contemporary western 
democracies’ educational systems. We begin with its most evident limitation 
considering the problem at hand, the one which grounds most of the others and the 
point whence the latter can be logically deduced: a liberal education is 
foundationally grounded upon rationalistic assumptions.  
This aspect, which many would consider a virtue rather than a limitation, is in 
truth perfectly coherent with – and perhaps even, to an extent, necessary for – the 
main aim of liberalism’s educational project. The latter, after all – as we have seen 
above – can be said to have been founded upon the singular demand that individuals 
“think and know for themselves” (Locke, 1979, p. 30). In essence, Locke’s appeal to 
the autonomy of thought in the pursuit of knowledge called upon liberation from the 
commonplace acritical assent given to sources of Scholastic authority, as well as – 
graver still – unexamined prejudices and preconceptions. And at a time like Locke’s, 
this appeal – mildly revolutionary in nature – would have been both justified and 
145 
 
necessary, as a means to evade the intellectual stagnation represented by a yet 
enduring Scholastic education. 
Out of this original concern for the liberation of individuals from the stifling 
effect of heterogeneous and dogmatic gnoses – be this religion, tradition, culture, 
ideology, or whatever other alternative – evolved a conception of education which 
proceeded in the opposite direction. Recognizing both the ability and intent to excite 
irrational passions – and thus elicit blind partisanship – as key factors in the 
successful implantation of many of those gnostic monoliths, liberalism came to 
regard the former as a critical threat to individual liberty.  Hence, instead of 
encouraging unreflective adherence to any pre-existing truth, worldview, or 
anthropological ideal – regardless of how true or virtuous they might appear – liberal 
theorists of education elected for themselves the “‘neutral’ aim of fostering 
rationality and autonomy” (Bridges & Jonathan, 2003, p. 141). Armed with this 
“liberal neutralism”, as Jonathan puts it, liberal philosophers of education were able 
to pursue an “apolitical analysis grounded in a universalistic Kantianism” with which 
to ground their pedagogic prescriptions, comfortable in the assurance that an 
education erected on those grounds would safeguard individuals from being exposed 
to any pernicious influences to their free development (Idem, p. 138). And out of all 
the relatively neutral (politically relevant) principles possible for a liberal education – 
justice, equality, liberty – autonomy and the development of reason are perhaps the 
most neutral of all – therefore meriting their place within liberal education as the 
most commonly accepted key pedagogic aims. 
If the privilege of reason and a critically rational autonomy finds itself thus 
justified within the edifice of liberal education, the question is when such a privilege 
ceases being an advantage to become a limitation or a problem. The answer to this, 
as one might already have surmised from all that has been argued in preceding 
chapters, lies in the moment when the emphasis on reason comes at the expense of 
distinct – and equally significant – dimensions of human existence. In what pertains 
to the dimension that specifically concerns us – emotion – the pedagogic approach 
prescribed in general terms by liberal education either assumes the submission of the 
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latter to rationality38, or simply removes it from the process altogether – on the 
grounds of its concerns with the preservation of individual liberty mentioned above.  
This prevalence of reason – and the resulting tendency towards cognitivism – 
in liberal education bears significant consequences for the problem at hand. First and 
foremost, it is it that promotes and sustains the reductionist view on the requirements 
for civic political competence found at the root of our widespread emotional frailty 
regarding political action. Due to either overly cautious liberal reluctance in 
contemplating emotions explicitly as a serious educative concern or the outright 
refusal of the latter’s pertinence in moral and political terms, formal education in 
western democratic states – informed by a liberal theory of education – has largely 
contributed to the current state of affairs. In fact, its concern with the neutrality of the 
educational process, resulting in the prescription of the development of reason and 
autonomy as key aims and rejecting adherence to any crystallized model of ideal 
individual or citizen, has – despite being arguably successful in achieving its 
proposed liberation from the intellectually oppressive gnoses of the past – created 
problems of its own. 
 
2.2. Emotion and liberal education 
 
These problems can be perceived even regarding the aforementioned socio-
political advantages promised by liberal education. In terms of civic education and 
global politics – and as explained in Chapter I – the model of cosmopolitan 
citizenship, promoted by the concrete application of the precepts of liberal education, 
has often been called into question for deliberately neglecting a broad swathe of 
communitarian and patriotic sentiments – which can be said to constitute 
indispensable motivational aspects for any viable conception of democratic 
citizenship. Indeed, the pertinence of this criticism is patent not only in the ongoing 
debate about it between advocates of cosmopolitanism and those of patriotism, but 
also in the fact that relevant theorists of liberal education – such as Yael Tamir 
(1995), Walter Feinberg (2000) and Eamonn Callan (1997) – have advanced 
                                                           
38
 Namely, via the assumption that the education of emotion, whenever morally relevant, proceeds 
indirectly from the education of reason. This assumption, in turn, is usually grounded on cognitivist 
theories of emotion which liken emotions to judgements – of which Robert Solomon’s (2003), Jerome 
Neu’s (2000) and Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) are good examples. 
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something akin to what the latter terms “liberal patriotism” (Callan, 1997, p. 96), in 
an attempt to reclaim the political value of national and communal commitments 
from insalubrious nationalist ideologies. 
Regarding liberal education’s intent in promoting social justice on the basis 
of equality, something can also be said – particularly when that equality is read in 
light of the concern with neutralizing (and thus render it safe) any sort of political 
content within educational practices. The liberal values of equality and openness (to 
differing views), seen by liberalism as indispensable towards the goal of advancing 
social justice and harmony – and therefore constituting cornerstone aspects of its 
pedagogical project – can actually become political disadvantages. As Allan Bloom 
points out in his cogent analysis of the USA’s educational system, The Closing of the 
American Mind – written from the point of view of an advocate of liberal education 
who is trying to rescue it from its critical mistakes – equality and openness can, and 
often do, degenerate into indifference and relativism. This, as he sees it, is a direct 
consequence of the evolution of liberal thought, in whose earliest beginnings “there 
was a tendency in the direction of indiscriminate freedom”, which was often palliated 
by a concern with natural rights (Bloom, 1987, p. 28). When “openness eventually 
won out over natural rights”, aided by an historicism largely inspired by Marx, 
liberal thought (and education) progressed towards an emptying of socio-political 
values – the latter now viewed as historically contingent, and devoid of the objective 
certainty of scientific facts (Idem, p. 29).  
At the same time, “Liberalism without natural rights […] taught us that the 
only danger confronting us is being closed to the emergent, the new, the 
manifestations of progress (Idem). Any notion of fundamental principles or desirable 
moral virtues found itself removed from the educational process, inasmuch as their 
very nature ran contrary to true openness and equality. No specific moral virtue or 
positive principle can be required by education, for they are products of the 
worldview of a historically circumscribed culture or polity, and therefore rationally 
contingent. The only principles that can satisfy the criterion of universality 
demanded by liberalism are those – like autonomy, equality, and openness – whose 
nature is simultaneously neutral and neutralizing. As such, with its turn from natural 
rights to openness and equality, “liberalism is what prepared us for cultural 
relativism and the fact-value distinction” (Idem, p. 30).  With that, terms like 
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ethnocentrism and moral superiority were imbued with negative connotations, and 
adopted into common parlance as antonyms of the kind of openness required to be a 
citizen of a progressive state. In pedagogic terms, our intention becomes “not so 
much to teach our students about other times and places as to make them aware that 
their preferences are only that – accidents of their time and place” (Idem). 
Indiscriminateness thus becomes, within liberal theory and education, a moral 
imperative in its own right – for “its opposite is discrimination” (Idem). 
 Moving on to the application of market principles to education, it is perhaps 
more immediately understandable here how the same things that were presented as 
advantages can as easily be regarded otherwise. As Levinson states, “[e]ducation has 
long been seen as a means for increasing both society’s and individual’s economic 
competitiveness” (2002, p. 135). Barring some qualification of the term “long”, as 
well as “education”, we can assent to the accuracy of the proposition. And although 
the latter can already suffice to motive the discomfort of many educators, the real 
problem, however, arises when education comes to be regarded solely as a means to 
increase economic competitiveness. This, unfortunately, seems to be the case with 
formal schooling in most contemporary liberal states: the growing effacement of so-
called classical disciplines (ironically, those which comprised late-Medieval liberal 
education) to the detriment of disciplines deemed economically advantageous, the 
growing number of vocational schools and pedagogic pathways, the proliferation of 
the MBA, and – on the part of students as well as parents – the widespread belief that 
the ultimate purpose of education is to ensure gainful employment, all constitute 
symptoms of a view on education which utterly subordinates it to economic 
“imperatives”. 
 Now, one might consider it unfair to blame this situation on liberalism’s 
theory of education. The latter, however, does indeed produce the necessary 
conditions for the former. On the one hand, it does so because of its indirect 
association with economic liberalism and the liberal theory of the market, along with 
its willing assent to allow the principles of the latter to influence educational 
organization and policy-making; on the other, and at a much deeper level of analysis, 
it does so also due to the nature of its foundational principles. Succinctly put, the 
same universal rationalism that sits at the heart of liberal education can, after all, be 
used to justify the shift from a political level of decision-making to an economic one: 
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politics are liable to be imbued with irrational ideology and partisan bias, while 
economic analysis seems to lay upon purely logical principles. Freedom – 
particularly freedom of choice – requires choices to be available, and a liberal market 
economy brings about a proliferation of competing options which consumers may 
choose from. And individual autonomy, in a society such as the one born out of the 
contemporary liberal state, is inextricably connected with financial autonomy: if one 
is not in a position of financial autonomy, then one’s fundamental right to self-
determination finds itself in check. Ergo, education must foster not only intellectual 
autonomy, but also provide the means for that of the financial kind. 
 Finally, a word regarding the limitations of liberal education concerning the 
matter of emotions. As we have stated, the former tends to either disregard the latter 
as something that does not warrant explicit attention – inasmuch as it should occur as 
an indirect consequence of intellectual development – or deny it as an intention that 
entails the illegitimate imposition of some contingent set of moral virtues, deduced 
from an equally arbitrary ideal model of citizen or individual. In both instances, but 
in the latter case in particular, the crux of the argument against an education of 
emotions seems to be that such a thing would represent an untenable offence against 
individual liberty, as well an impediment to the development of true autonomy – and 
therefore be not only illiberal, but ultimately dehumanizing. However, if we accept – 
as I believe there to be good reason to – the truth of what has been argued and 
demonstrated in preceding chapters concerning the legitimate role of emotions in 
decision-making, we must conclude that – contrary to the expectations conveyed by 
much of liberal education theory – any education that disregards emotions does not 
lead to individual liberty and autonomy, but merely to an illusion of liberty and 
autonomy.  
An education able to cope with the challenges posed by such a political 
environment must necessarily embrace the demand to endow citizens with the kind 
of emotional fortitude that stems not only from an awareness of the role played by 
emotions in their decision-making processes, but also from an education of those 
emotions in a direction conducive to virtuous political behaviour. The question we 
now face is whether that problem represents an insoluble aporia – in which case we 
would be left with a work of a tragic nature – or an issue that can be addressed in a 
concrete manner. It is my conviction that the latter is the case. And if that is so, the 
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sort of emotional frailty that we have systematically found at the core of our 
permeability to such political instruments as the exploitation of group dynamics, 
propaganda, emotional appeals, and the state of exception, might feasibly be 
mitigated through education – if not reversed. 
 
 
3. The Problem of Virtue 
 
At this point, one might rightfully inquire whether adopting such a stance 
would not simply amount to the replacement of one aporia by another. After all, by 
inquiring whether it is possible to educate individuals towards political virtue – and 
regardless of such an educational project focussing on emotion or otherwise – we 
will ultimately be asking a question which Plato himself appears to have left 
unanswered: is virtue teachable?  
Tracing the issue back to Platonic ethics, there is a definite ambiguity 
regarding whether the query was satisfied. To summarize the arguments of Meno – 
one of the two key dialogues that Plato devotes to the subject – Socrates begins by 
undertaking an examination of whether virtue is teachable at all and, more 
specifically, whether the Sophists can rightfully be considered its teachers, as many 
of them seemed to claim.  Meeting the latter possibility with reserve, Socrates 
implicitly surmises that if virtue was indeed to be teachable, none would be better 
suited to be its teacher than an individual commonly recognised as being virtuous 
himself (93b). However, upon careful consideration of some of the most notable 
names in Athenian history, such as Pericles, Themistocles and Thucydides, it 
becomes clear that none of them seemed to be able to imbue their progeny with the 
same sort of virtuousness for which they were famed. Furthermore, it is not even 
possible to establish that those virtuous men had themselves been taught to be so in 
the first place. From all this it is concluded that virtue does not appear to be teachable 
but is rather the result of some sort of divine inspiration, and that being virtuous 
comes to be roughly in the same way that we say someone has an “innate talent” for 
any other area of human activity, such as poetry or music.  
 Yet, Plato apparently contradicts himself and this very conclusion in his later 
dialogue, Protagoras. Engaging in debate with a more formidable interlocutor than 
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usual (in the figure of the sophist Protagoras), Socrates is confronted with the claim 
that sophists can indeed teach their students how to be good citizens. Once again, 
Socrates’ rebuttal includes the argument that even those commonly regarded as 
virtuous men were unable to make their own children just as virtuous, but 
Protagoras’s argumentative prowess, skilfully employing both myth and logic, seems 
sufficient to make him concede the point. Following a lengthy discussion in which 
Socrates’ dialectic is often at odds with Protagoras’ stirring rhetoric, the dialog 
ultimately arrives at the conclusion that virtue is in fact teachable (391b). 
This brief summary appears to give us reason to criticise these Platonic 
dialogues for failing to clearly answer the very question that they raise – “Can one 
educate for virtue?”. This assertion, however, may prove premature. And even if it 
was true, Plato’s line of reasoning in both dialogues would still undeniably serve to 
illustrate and emphasise a critical point of the issue: before even considering the 
question of whether – and how – it is possible to educate for [political] virtue, one 
must first answer the question of what virtue is. 
Delving once more into the conclusions of Meno and Protagoras with this 
concern in mind, one can begin unveiling the reasons for their apparent dissonance. 
Towards the end of Meno, Socrates leads us through a dialectical examination of the 
difference between true opinion [or belief] (doxa alêthês) and knowledge (epistêmê), 
stating that these are the only two things able to guide an individual’s action 
correctly (99a). But since it had already been indirectly demonstrated that virtue 
cannot be teachable since there are no teachers of it (98e), the only conclusion left is 
that virtue cannot be knowledge, and must therefore amount to true opinion.  
What makes individuals come into possession of that true opinion in matters 
of virtuous political action, remains nevertheless mysterious, and is likened by 
Socrates to the manner in which oracles and prophets often say true things when 
inspired, but still have no real knowledge of the things they say (99c). This 
ultimately leads to the conclusion that virtue is the result of divine inspiration and 
that it hence cannot be taught. These are not, however, Socrates’ closing words in the 
dialogue. To them, he adds that we will only fully comprehend the issue at hand 
when, “before considering in what way people acquire virtue, we first attempt to 
search for what on earth virtue is, in and of itself” (2010, p. 40 [100b]). 
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It is in the open space created by this final remark that Protagoras becomes 
meaningful. Even though the question of whether virtue is teachable provides the 
overarching theme and teleological bearing of the dialogue, the matter of the true 
nature of virtue is a critical issue within the discussion. After opening the dialogue by 
questioning Protagoras’ presumption to have educated Hippocrates in matters of 
politics and citizenship – on the grounds of the apparent impossibility to teach virtue 
(320b) – and having received the sophist’s rebuttal, Socrates moves immediately into 
the question of whether virtue is essentially a single thing which manifests itself in 
different ways (acting virtuously in a just, temperate, or courageous manner), or 
rather something comprised of many distinct attributes of character (justice, 
temperance, courage, etc.) (329c-d).  
This line of questioning eventually leads to the notion – now familiar within 
Platonic Idealism, albeit not yet as refined in Protagoras as in later works – that all 
those attributes are essentially knowledge, and therefore there is a unity of the 
virtues. One may only properly speak of virtue in the singular, for all virtue is 
knowledge. More specifically, and following a similar logic to the one later echoed 
by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Socrates presents virtue as a knowledge “of 
measurement”, which enables us to gauge excesses and defects, and accurately 
calculate the gains and losses implied by a given action – not only in terms of 
immediate worth, but also in reference to potential future consequences of that action 
(356a-358a).  
Thus, Socrates states, were it not for a lack of knowledge, no one would 
willingly do evil or harmful things, or even pursue a course of action that would lead 
to anything other than a virtuous goal. The immediate consequence of this adoption 
of a “cognitivist” or “intellectualist” ethics, as it is sometimes termed, is that virtue 
must indeed be teachable. Going beyond the indirect reasoning displayed in Meno, 
where it is assumed that virtue cannot be knowledge because there does not seem to 
be anyone able to teach it – which there would if it was – the argument presented in 
Protagoras proceeds conversely: virtue is logically demonstrated to be knowledge, 
therefore it must be teachable. 
At this point, it should be easy to surmise that the answer to the question of 
whether it is possible to educate for virtue invariably hinges on the definition of 
“virtue” being used. As far as Plato is concerned, and especially in light of his theory 
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of anamnesis as it pertains to the attainment of knowledge, virtue and its exercise are 
essentially derived from human intellect. In his conception, he unequivocally 
“wishes to rise above base emotion to the highest realm of rationality” (Lines, 2009, 
p. 41). The political project entailed by his philosophy aims at the establishment of 
“a strong aristocratic state” and his concept of virtue – precisely because the 
cultivation of the latter is understood as tantamount to a dutiful pursuit of knowledge 
– “requires strict discipline among citizens” (Idem).  
The principles laid forth in The Republic regarding the education of 
individuals for citizenship are quite clear regarding the place of emotion in the 
process. Perhaps most notoriously, Plato essentially argues that poetry – “a term that 
encompasses Greek drama, the Homeric epics, music, the plastic arts and all the 
creative works of his day” (Idem, p. 44) – are to be censored. The reason for this is, 
for Plato, almost self-evident: poetry “clouds the understanding, appeals to base 
emotions and overrides reason” (Idem). The fact that Homeric heroes are presented 
as susceptible to fits of uncontrolled emotional outbursts, for instance, is viewed with 
great concern for Plato, who would rather have those “lines of wailing and anguish” 
attributed to “craven men and women – for “no stouthearted child would want to 
imitate such models” (Idem, p. 45). Poetry, with its ability to excite passions and 
imagination, is fundamentally regarded as the antithesis of that intellectual exercise 
of unveiling and progressive retrieval of the realities which only exist unadulterated 
in the Eidetic world. But the fact that Plato’s proposed model of civic education is so 
hostile towards the emotional phenomenon is no accident. Rather, as we have seen, it 
is the necessary and coherent result of his conception of virtue as knowledge, along 
with the conviction that true knowledge cannot be formed in the disruptive presence 
of emotions.  
In summary, then, both the answer to the question of whether it is possible to 
educate for virtue and the method by which that education is to take place are 
determined by one’s conception of virtue. Plato’s original answer to those challenges 
is markedly intellectualist and hostile towards anything other than pure reason being 
established as the focus of any legitimate project of civic education. In light of what 
we have expounded upon in previous chapters, it should be easy to understand how 
Plato’s perspective regarding these issues has more or less remained a significant 
part of the basis of the prevailing paradigm of political education – particularly that 
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advanced by liberal education theory. The very notion of “political literacy” – 
familiar in both common parlance and the contemporary literature regarding 
education for citizenship – reflects an enduring conviction that the essential demand 
of political education is that “citizens must be taught about their civic rights and 
duties, as well as the political world around them, if they are to be ‘good’ citizens” 
(De Brito Serra, 2014, p. 97).  
This knowledge of the political sphere, however, cannot be legitimately 
considered as the equivalent of political virtue. In fact, “considering the ubiquity of 
contemporary media, one could reasonably argue that citizens have access to more 
information on public affairs than ever before” and thus a greater opportunity to 
consolidate knowledge about them (Idem). Nevertheless, the problem remains that 
contemporary civic and political action are often exposed in their shortcomings, be it 
in a lack of interest for the political life and its most basic requirements – such as 
simple participation in acts of suffrage, for instance – or in the aforementioned 
permeability to manipulation by possibly pernicious instruments of persuasion. 
Once again, if what we have previously argued regarding the unavoidable and 
legitimate involvement of emotion in the political process is true, then our concept of 
political virtue – and consequently, of civic education – must be reconsidered. Our 
understanding of political virtue can no longer be equated to a pursuit of knowledge 
accompanied by systematic indexation of facts; it must evolve beyond that to include 
a heightened comprehension of how emotions condition those phenomena and – 
perhaps even more importantly – where we subsequently decide to proceed from 
there in terms of concrete political action. Political virtue, under these terms, must 
include not only an awareness of emotions’ role in the political process, but also an 
ability to manage and eventually even employ those emotions in a virtuous manner. 
As such, instead of simply echoing Plato’s question of whether it is possible to 
educate for virtue, we should now take the query a step further and ask: can emotions 
become a part of political virtue? 
 
 
4. Phronesis and Emotion 
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The Enlightenment’s conception of reason and the pervasiveness of what we 
might dub the rationalistic inclination of liberalism have historically led us to assume 
that a balanced individual – one who, in political terms, is best suited to manifest and 
employ what Aristotle called phronesis – is someone who necessarily keeps his or 
hers emotions in check, maintaining a nearly constant state of apathy and clear-
mindedness.  
But Aristotle, though he postulated phronesis as constituting the hallmark of a 
virtuous political being, had a very different stance concerning emotions than the one 
patent in our contemporary understanding of the demands of political life. On the one 
hand, he understood phronesis (often translated as practical wisdom) to be “an 
intellectual virtue (virtue of thought) that serves the moral virtues; for while the 
moral virtues make ‘the goal correct’, phronesis ‘makes what promotes the goal 
[correct]’” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 17). Phronesis alone – pure intellectual virtue 
standing separate from its moral counterpart – would be insufficient, inasmuch it 
would degenerate “into a mere cunning capacity: what Aristotle calls ‘cleverness’” 
(Idem). Simply possessing the ability to rationally calculate the best means to reach a 
certain goal does not make an individual virtuous, which is why “both the phronimoi 
(persons exhibiting phronesis) and the unscrupulous can be called clever” (Idem). 
On the other hand, Aristotle’s virtue theory operates under “the assumption 
that emotional reactions may also constitute virtue” and that, much like actions, 
emotions and their experience too can have a virtuous median point (Idem). Such a 
conviction is clearly evidenced in the Nicomachean Ethics, when he states that “the 
person who is angry at the right things and toward the right people and also in the 
right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time, is praised" (1999, p. 61 
[1106b21])”. An assessment which is, in fact, shared by a number of contemporary 
researchers in the field of developmental psychology, and who have posited the 
notion of emotion regulation39  as a fundamental aspect of human beings’ socio-
political existence – precisely insofar as “[i]n emotion, a selected response or set of 
responses can be too intense or not intense enough, they can be of the wrong quality 
in a particular context, or they can be in violation of a social norm, again in certain 
contexts” (Campos, Frankel & Camra, 2004, p. 382).  
                                                           
39
 Defined as “the modification of any process in the system that generates emotion or its 
manifestation in behavior” (Campos, Frankel & Camra, 2004, p. 380). 
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Following this contemporary corroboration of Aristotle, political virtue – or 
even phronesis – should not to be understood as the absence of emotion; on the 
contrary, emotional experience is an inextricable part of it, so long as it occurs in a 
proper and balanced fashion. Ergo, emotions must not be suppressed, but rather 
trained to properly coexist with cognition, aiding in the evaluating and providing an 
adequate response to the deliberative challenges posed by our experience of life – 
political and otherwise.  
Any attempt at instruction in this matter should thus consist “not in a stoic 
program of disciplining the mind and strengthening the will to resist the supposedly 
corrupting influence of emotion on judgment” (Kahan, 2008, p. 764), but go beyond 
it into the effort of positively moulding emotional responses – a goal whose 
importance in the political sphere can hardly be exaggerated. As Donald Arnstine 
puts it, “where schools are found in which the education of the emotions is ignored, 
so also will be found adults whose emotions are undisciplined – that is, either 
suppressed or uncontrolled” (1966, p. 45). And the reason behind this “endless 
alternation between emotional suspension and emotional regression” is again none 
other than supposition that “rational thought needs to be taught and that an education 
of the emotions can safely be ignored” (Idem, p. 46). 
The task entailed by this view is a demanding one. For many experienced 
educators, the challenge of educating individuals under exclusively cognitive 
precepts is strenuous enough; to educate the latter’s  emotions, however, would 
probably be regarded by most as an near impossible and absurd task. The largely 
cognitivist approach to education in general – despite the occasionally occurring 
moments of enlightened dissidence from that paradigm, arising from the work of 
thinkers such as John Dewey – is clearly the main reason for the scepticism of 
educators and legislators regarding this point. As it stands, education is still largely 
understood as a matter of transmitting knowledge and fostering technical 
competence, while the extent of the involvement of emotions in pedagogy is 
commonly restricted (at best) to their use as tools to facilitate cognitive learning – 
allowing the teacher to effectively beckon the students’ interest and motivation. 
Emotions, thus, while occasionally acknowledged as relevant to education, are 
commonly regarded as means to achieve certain educative goals, but very seldom as 
goals themselves. 
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 Emotions, one might even object, should rightfully dispense with the need for 
education, inasmuch they are essentially innate, and will hence take place regardless 
(often in spite) of it. This argument is, however, fundamentally flawed. The chief 
concern regarding the education of future citizens, even when focused solely on 
cognitive development, “is not that they will not think, but that they will do it badly” 
– that their reasoning will fail them in the most decisive moment and lead them 
astray from the truth of the matter or the correct choice (Idem). But considering what 
we know about the preponderance of emotion in decision-making, the fact that 
emotions are inevitably experienced should not preclude us from concerning 
ourselves with how they are experienced. As Arnstine succinctly puts it, “[j]ust as 
people left to follow their own devices will think badly or inappropriately, so also 
will they feel – that is, make emotional responses to the world – inappropriately. If 
cognitive experience needs the benefit of education, so does emotional experience” 
(Idem). 
In contemporary western democratic states, the stage at which emotions 
customarily assume a greater relevance in the formal education of individuals is also 
one of the earliest: pre-school. Generally speaking, while the cognitive development 
of children is still a priority of pre-school education, an equally great importance is 
awarded to the development of social abilities. This latter aspect essentially entails 
that educators will be focussing on moderating social interaction and – as a part of it 
– modulating emotional responses to levels deemed appropriate according to 
prevailing social standards. This concern is patent in a number of commonly 
employed pedagogic strategies at this level: conflicts among children are often 
addressed via self-referential questions of clear emotional focus (e.g., “how would 
you feel if someone else did that to you?”); frequent group activities insure that 
children develop the ability to self-regulate their emotions as a means to coexist 
productively within the group; fables and stories imbued with moral lessons are used 
to implicitly foster proper models of behaviour, emphasising emotionally unpleasant 
consequences for certain actions and pleasant ones for others. 
As a further testament of the predominantly cognitive nature of our 
educational system, it is only at the age when an individual’s cognitive ability is 
considered too incipient to constitute the fulcrum of the educative process – and 
when the aforementioned liberal educational principles of autonomy and critical 
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reasoning cannot yet be truly achieved – that emotions assume a greater 
preponderance. As the child’s rational ability develops, however, that preponderance 
is gradually effaced from the process until it simply vanishes altogether, under the 
veiled assumption that the emotional development of individuals is either essentially 
finished by that time or outside the realm of the responsibility of educators. As such, 
in subsequent levels of formal education – even those taking place during 
developmental stages such as adolescence which, being characterized by 
considerable emotional upheaval, would sensibly warrant its presence – the 
education of emotions is completely removed from curricular considerations.  
In light of this fact, the reasons behind the seemingly widespread inability to 
acknowledge and cope with the emotional content of political expedients which – 
like the state of exception – present themselves as necessary responses to emergency 
situations, gradually become clearer. Emotions, after all, play a critical and well-
documented role in risk assessment and the overall framing of decision-making 
processes when perceived risks are involved (Druckman & McDermott, 2008; 
Kahan, 2008; Brader, 2011). Experimental data resulting from studies in this area 
unambiguously points towards the conclusion that “emotion clearly affects risk 
propensity in ways previously unappreciated”, while simultaneously moderating 
“framing effects in particular contexts” (Druckman & McDermott, 2008, p. 317). 
And while cognitive biases can partially explain the way in which individuals make 
decisions pressed by a sense of urgency or emergency, a serious consideration of 
emotions is necessary to fully understand “the intertwined processes by which 
humans make judgments and choices about the world around them” (Idem, p. 318). 
When the emotional education of citizen is left unattended – as we have 
argued is often the case, as a result of the application of liberal education theory – 
this phenomenon translates into the political sphere with significantly amplified 
effects. Even in “normal” circumstances, whenever a political issue is presented 
where considerable risk is present in most or all available choices, the prevalence of 
emotional reasoning over decision-making processes increases exponentially; but 
when the citizens called upon to make those decisions are left lacking in emotional 
resilience and awareness by serious limitations of our educational system, the danger 
that they will incur serious errors in judgement rises in an equally exponential 
fashion. The conclusions drawn from such experimental studies of political 
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behaviour are therefore not only consistent with our own claims in previous chapters, 
but also sustain the importance of directing our attention towards the possibility to 
educate emotions. Exactly how such an education of emotions might be reasonably 
conceived and realized is what now must be answered. 
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Chapter VI – The Political Education of Emotion 
 
 In the history of pedagogic ideas, the concept of an education of emotions is 
something whose predominance has greatly varied, depending on the particular 
zeitgeist of the moment that one chooses to consider. In contemporary educational 
practice, the concern for an education of emotion is most often found associated with 
what we might call “artistic education”: music, poetry, painting and other plastic arts, 
are fields of activity where the education and refinement of the individual’s emotions 
is commonly seen as a crucial pedagogic outcome. Beyond the realm of the 
development of aesthetic sensibility required by artistic endeavours, however, one 
struggles to find a true commitment to the education of emotions in contemporary 
pedagogic research. To find it linked to any sort of political or civic education, on the 
other hand, constitutes an even harder task. 
The notable exception to this state of the art may perhaps be provided by the 
debate around the notion of emotional intelligence, which even the more casual 
follower of current research on education is likely to have come across. Largely 
driven by the promise of a higher degree of happiness and success in interpersonal 
relations of both a personal and a professional nature (Goleman, 1996, 2004), 
emotional intelligence proposes to rehabilitate emotion through a program of 
education specifically tailored to foster a sort of emotional competence. In light of 
this, it is perhaps understandable that much contemporary research on the possibility 
to educate emotion follows the precepts laid down by the theory of emotional 
intelligence. Instead of doing the same, however, what we will try to do in this 
chapter is demonstrate why the latter falls short of the task at hand – a politically 
worthwhile education of emotions – and propose an alternative which is not only 
philosophically richer, but also genuinely able to endow individuals with the sort of 
emotional resilience that our political reality demands. 
 
 
1. The Theory of Emotional Intelligence 
 
As we have just stated, much has been made in recent years of the notion of 
“emotional intelligence”. Widely popularized by Daniel Goleman’s book Emotional 
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Intelligence – why it can matter more than IQ (1996), the concept has come to be a 
part of common-sense parlance regarding emotional development and the importance 
of emotions in our lives. Presented as an alternative conception of intelligence to the 
one purportedly quantifiable through Intelligence Quotient tests – whose legitimacy 
and validity are highly questionable – emotional intelligence has essentially 
spearheaded a contemporary attempt to call into question the establishment of the 
ability for logical reasoning as the sole measure of human intelligence. Proponents of 
emotional intelligence have emphasised different aspects of the latter which 
contribute decisively for the success of individuals in a social medium, most of them 
being fundamentally subsumed into the ability to be aware of one’s (and others’) 
emotions and the capacity to beneficially employ that emotional knowledge as a 
guide for behaviour and action. 
The particular model of emotional intelligence advanced by Goleman – which 
has all but become standard outside academic circles – has experienced a 
considerable rise in popularity as a result of its identification with an ability for 
effective leadership, marketed in books and seminars on emotional intelligence as the 
indispensable tool for the savvy businessperson looking to better manage 
subordinates, and thus maximize profit margins. Understandably, since it is a kind of 
intelligence (or emotional knowledge, as it were), Goleman mirrors Plato’s argument 
of earlier and sustains that emotional intelligence can be taught. Indeed, since the key 
components of emotional intelligence (self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, 
empathy, and social skill) are “ingredients that leaders ‘need to have’”, it “is 
fortunate [...] that emotional intelligence can be learned” – for “the benefits that 
come from having a well-developed emotional intelligence, both for the individual 
and the organization, make it worth the effort” (Goleman, 2004, p. 12).  
 
1.1. Aristotle’s challenge 
 
The reasons for the celebrity of Goleman’s own model of emotional 
intelligence notwithstanding, we must consider here its philosophical value – an 
exercise fully legitimated by the fact that he often cites the Socratic interpretation of 
“Know thyself” as justification for the importance of emotional intelligence’s 
conception of self-awareness, and Aristotle’s considerations in the Nicomachean 
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Ethics as inspiration for his work. Indeed, one might even ask, following Goleman’s 
explanation of the scope and benefits of his proposal, whether emotional intelligence 
can rightly be considered as a direct response of what Goleman terms “Aristotle’s 
challenge” (1996, p. 6) – thus becoming a direct descendant of Aristotle’s unique 
perspective on the place of emotions in our ethical and political lives. 
This premise, albeit generally assumed to be true by Goleman and some 
advocates of his model, does not stand up to scrutiny. Borrowing Kristjánsson’s 
(2007) comprehensive analysis of the key aspects of both emotional intelligence and 
what he dubs “Aristotelian emotional virtue”, one can easily realize the underlying 
differences between the two: the “general aim” of emotional intelligence, for 
instance, is [professional] success, while Aristotle’s is the much more comprehensive 
and conceptually rich eudaimonia. As a consequence of this, the “characteristic mode 
of thought” presiding over emotional intelligence is defined by “cleverness” but 
Aristotle’s perspective is rooted in phronesis – which, as we have seen, he 
purposefully distinguishes from mere cleverness. In terms of “emotional scope”, 
emotional intelligence chooses to focuses almost exclusively on so-called “positive” 
emotions, unlike Aristotle – who asserts that both positive and negative emotions can 
be a part of emotional virtue. Furthermore, emotional intelligence’s approach to 
potential arguments or disagreement is fundamentally focussed on “conflict 
resolution”, while Aristotle’s prescribed attitude before any such situation is 
necessarily one of “truth-seeking”. Finally – and unsurprisingly – the “desired 
emotional end-state” of the two perspectives does not match: emotional intelligence, 
for one, seeks to foster a kind of “emotional tranquillity”, build upon the essential 
skill of emotional self-restraint; Aristotelian emotional virtue, on the other hand, does 
not advocate the apatheia of the stoic sage, but rather a deliberate appropriation and 
education of our own emotions, resulting in what Kristjánsson aptly calls “emotional 
vigour” (2007, p. 93). 
Let us now briefly examine some of the more significant among these 
aspects. Starting with the general aim of both models, there is a clear intention on 
Goleman’s part to portray emotional intelligence as something useful for the 
contemporary individual – particularly, the one who delves in the world of business. 
To build up one’s emotional intelligence is desirable inasmuch it allows one to 
become a more effective leader and more successful overall. Indeed, Goleman 
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claims, when analysing the “ingredients of exceptional performance [such as 
technical skills, IQ and EI], emotional intelligence proved to be twice as important as 
the others for jobs at all levels” (2004, p. 5). Emotional intelligence, therefore, 
presents itself nowadays as a sort of universal instrument for professional success. 
As Kristjánsson puts it, postulating a sort of “slide from success qua happiness to 
success qua profit” has been the hallmark of Goleman’s “gradual shift of focus from 
individual EI to the collective EI of business organizations” (2007, p. 88).  
This focus on instrumental usefulness in service of material benefit, however, 
does not match Aristotle’s view. For the latter, the aim of any endeavour in moral 
development, be it at the level of either intellectual or emotional virtuousness, is 
always to be found in eudaimonia – which we can provisionally translate as 
“happiness” or “good life”. But eudaimonia does not amount, for Aristotle, to a life 
of financial success or even idle contentment; nor is it a simple tangible goal to be 
achieved, in the way that a promotion or a raise in salary is. It is, on the contrary, an 
activity, an ongoing process of striving towards virtuousness in all aspects of life, 
conducted in accordance with human beings' specific ergon. Furthermore, unlike 
emotional intelligence’s notion of “success”, eudaimonia is necessarily a “moralized 
notion”, the hypothetical attainment of which would prove impossible for an 
individual who was not “(morally) good” (Idem). 
Moving on to a second aspect – intimately connected with the first – we find 
emotional intelligence relying on a mode of thought fundamentally determined by 
what we might call “cleverness”, and which can be defined along the same lines of 
Max Horkheimer’s notion of subjective rationality: a mode of thought that concerns 
itself solely with the rationality of the means, while assuming that the ends are “self-
explanatory” – inasmuch as “it takes for granted that they too are reasonable in the 
subjective sense, i.e. that they serve the subject’s interest” (2004, p. 3). This is, 
according to Horkheimer, a mode of thought which ultimately subverts reason by 
declaring it “incapable of determining the ultimate aims of life” and imposes upon it 
the limited usefulness of “reducing everything it encounters to a mere tool” (Idem, p. 
63.), thus founding the worldview inherent in the allegory of the boy “who looked up 
at the sky and asked ‘Daddy, what is the moon supposed to advertise?’” (Idem, p. 
69).  
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Aristotle’s phronesis, on the other hand, rejects the amoral instrumentality of 
cleverness and, as we have argued above, defines itself as an intellectual virtue in 
service of moral virtues. Existing somewhere in between these two dimensions – that 
is, mere rational calculation and moral conscience – phronesis combines within itself 
the ability to reason about both means and ends: the wisdom of the phronimos is that 
of determining the best means to achieve the most virtuous ends, with the nature of 
the latter being as much a source of concern as the former. By contrast with 
subjective rationality, phronesis incorporates what Horkheimer dubs objective 
rationality, which, though it “never precluded subjective reason, [...] regarded the 
latter as only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality from which 
criteria for all things and beings were derived” (Idem, p. 4). As such, it concerns 
itself essentially with ends rather than means, and determines that the “degree of 
reasonableness of a man’s life could be determined according to its harmony with 
this totality” (Idem). 
Thirdly, when one considers the emotional scope of Goleman’s model of 
emotional intelligence it is possible to realize that only emotions deemed “positive” 
are found deserving of valuation as integral components of an emotional intelligence. 
Negative emotions, on the contrary, may more likely constitute a sort of emotional 
imbecility: from introductory stages of his seminal work on the subject, Goleman 
warns us about the danger of “toxic emotions” which “put our physical health at as 
much risk as does chain-smoking” (1996, p. 11), and goes on to subsequently 
reinforce such qualification numerous times; however, he tells us, if “emotional 
distress in its many forms is toxic, the opposite range of emotions can be tonic” 
(Idem, p. 201). This notion comes across even clearer in more recent works, where 
we are “told in no uncertain terms that ‘negative’ emotions ‘powerfully disrupt work’ 
and make people ‘less emotionally intelligent’” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 91). In sum, 
Goleman’s emotional intelligence model succumbs to the fallacious dichotomy of 
good “rational” emotions versus bad “uncontrolled” ones: it is acceptable to “feel” 
some emotions, provided they fall entirely within rational control – in a sort of 
rationally sterilized and mediated experience; but the emotional experience per se, 
unmediated and genuine, finds itself ontologically excised from the “emotionally 
intelligent” individual. 
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As we have previously argued, Aristotle stands in stark contradiction to this 
perspective. His conception of emotional virtue is one which includes both positive 
and negative emotions, the most evident example of the latter being his 
aforementioned exploration of justified anger. Not only positive emotions but also 
negative ones can allow for a virtuous golden mean. In fact, the very distinction 
between “positive” and “negative” emotions constitutes a rather anachronistic notion 
as far as a discussion of Aristotelian philosophy is concerned: Aristotle’s notion of 
emotional virtue “straddles any ready-made distinction between ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ emotions” and, in fact, does not even seem to take any notice of it (Idem, 
p. 90). Aristotle’s point regarding “negative” emotions such as anger is not that we 
should invariably aim to repress or suppress them, but rather experience them in the 
right proportion at the right time. As such, from the educative standpoint which 
concerns us, the implicit aim of the two perspectives is completely divergent: in light 
of Aristotelian emotional virtue, the focus of emotional education should be to 
educate the emotions themselves, not – as emotional intelligence seems to imply – to 
educate our reason in order to maximise its ability to restrict and control them. 
Fourthly, let us consider the differences in what Kristjánsson characterizes as 
“perspective on conflicts”. Goleman’s emotional intelligence model, encouraged by 
perceived successes of the application of a curriculum of “Self Science” at the Nueva 
Learning Center, advocates the inestimable value of an approach to conflict 
resolution based fundamentally on cooperation, negotiation, and compromise. This 
approach, the requirements for which are self-awareness, the ability to manage 
emotions and a capacity for empathy, can be applied to a scope of conflicts ranging 
from the playground to the workplace, and will aid us in becoming “better friends, 
students, sons and daughters – and in the future [...] better husbands and wives, 
workers and bosses, parents and citizens” (1996, p. 312). 
Regarding this view, Goleman ventures, “[w]ere he alive today, Aristotle, so 
concerned with emotional skilfulness, might well approve” of this (Idem, p. 294). 
There is, however, good reason to be sceptical. Aristotle, though he was assuredly 
and unavoidably concerned with the resolution of intellectual and political conflicts, 
was more devoted still to achieving a resolution in accordance with the truth of the 
matter for each case. He would, as Kristjánsson puts it, favour “compromise over 
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conflicts when a compromise could be negotiated based on correspondence with the 
truth”; but if not, “the conflict would have to remain” (2007, p. 92).  
Furthermore, its viability notwithstanding, the benefits of an approach to 
conflict resolution such as the one proposed by Goleman are not always 
straightforward. Conflicts, even moral ones, often arise out of an emotional response 
to what we perceive to be a rationally valid motive; if we promote compromise just 
for the sake of it, and thus a neutralisation of the emotions associated with the 
experience of rightful outrage or indignation, this can amount to a falsification rather 
than an enhancement of human existence. If we consider the example provided by 
Kristjánsson – the moral conflict of a student who experiences jealousy due to a 
belief that the teacher discriminates against her in favour of another pupil – the 
Aristotelian approach to the situation would likely be to “discover if the belief in 
question is warranted and to arrange one’s emotions accordingly, rather than 
encouraging the pupil to resolve the emotional conflict just for the sake of 
compromise” (Idem, p. 93). After all, amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas40. 
Finally, we come to the matter of the desired emotional end-state of the two 
perspectives. As Kristjánsson points out, it would be a mistake to simply equate 
Goleman’s proposal with “a Buddhist call for the annihilation of all emotions, 
painful as well as pleasant, or with their exaltation to an unpassionate state of 
universal benevolence” (Idem). There is, nevertheless, a clearly identifiable 
inclination towards philosophical concepts associated with the Buddhist aspiration 
for nirvana: self-awareness, self-control, harmony and freedom from sweeping 
passions. In a word, then, “tranquillity” is what we may consider constitutes the 
desired end-state of Goleman’s emotional intelligence. This tranquillity, which 
translated essentially into a state of harmony between our rational and emotional 
dimensions, comes about when individuals develop an awareness of their emotions 
(ergo Goleman’s emphasis one “self-science”) and, subsequently, the ability to dial 
down the “emotional chatter” hitherto muffling reasoned internal monologue. This 
goal, however – and despite declarations to the contrary – still very much seems to 
preserve at its core a dichotomy between reason and emotion, wherein the former 
must regulate and constrain the latter from the outside. 
                                                           
40
 Plato is a friend, but a greater friend is truth. 
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In Aristotle’s conception of emotional virtue, one might argue, it is indeed 
possible to perceive a similar concern for fostering harmony between reason and 
emotion, manifested perhaps most clearly in the phronimos' conscious 
acknowledgement of the virtuous mean between extreme [emotional] dispositions. 
The desired end-state of Aristotlelian emotional virtue, however, is not the sort of 
tranquillity or apatheia latter advocated by the stoics, but rather one in which 
“creativity, originality and assertiveness have crucial roles to play, unencumbered by 
the self-imposed policing of ‘pure’ reason”, being best described as a sort of 
“emotional vigour” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 93). It entails a conception of reason and 
emotion which conceives them in constant and unavoidable interplay, inasmuch as 
not only emotions have a rational component, but reason – human reason, that is – 
cannot be genuinely be understood in the absence of emotion. Furthermore, 
Aristotle’s desired emotional end-state is “driven, first and foremost, by moral 
considerations” rather than the “therapeutic or health-related matters” of the kind 
which – as we have previously seen – are often employed by Goleman as key 
justifications for the merits of his emotional intelligence model (Idem). 
 
1.2. A new challenge 
 
Following our examination of the nature of Goleman’s emotional intelligence 
model, as well as the validity of its claim to be virtual inheritor of the philosophical 
interpretation of emotions conducted by Aristotle, we come to a clear conclusion: 
emotional intelligence – perhaps contrary to expectation, considering its 
contemporary ubiquity in certain social and pedagogical circles – does not provide us 
with a suitable model upon which to base an education of emotions, or even to fully 
and genuinely understand the nature of the relationship between reason and emotion. 
In fact, in many respects it seems to represent a clear regression from Aristotle’s 
ideas which, albeit sometimes coloured by an almost incommensurably different 
socio-political context than our own, are still imbued with conceptions of human 
reason and emotional virtue potentially more fertile as far as our present intentions 
go. 
As indicated towards the end of the previous section, Kristjánsson’s chief 
concern regarding the educational implications of emotional intelligence is the fact 
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that the latter seems to be lacking in moral concern. The link between emotional 
intelligence and morality is ostensibly based in the emotion of empathy, but the latter 
– Kristjánsson claims – is not actually an emotion, nor is it necessarily moral: though 
it may be “a precondition for moral concern (such as compassion)”, that same 
capacity to discern or even identify with another’s suffering “is also a necessary 
condition for taking pleasure in, rather than bemoaning, that suffering through pure 
malice or Schadenfreude, for example” (Idem, p. 94). Translated into political terms, 
an emotional education based on emotional intelligence’s tenets may prove equally 
problematic. A focus on empathy and emotional tranquillity, seeking conflict 
resolution simply for the sake of restabilising harmony and disregarding the truth of 
the issues, ideal though it may seem from a diplomatic standpoint, leaves much to be 
desired in terms of concrete political action.  
Anger and fear, for example, are eminently political emotions – that is 
precisely why many of the emotional appeals in the political sphere target those 
emotions specifically. Emotional intelligence’s intent to [partially] neutralize them, 
rendering them “safe” from the perspective of conflict resolution through cognitive 
control, albeit advantageous at first glance, may prove to be catastrophic. First and 
foremost – as we have repeatedly stated – this intent seemingly ignores the fallacious 
dichotomy which surreptitiously grounds it, and thus further promotes the 
schizophrenic conflict between “pure” reason and emotion in the mind of 
individuals, perpetuating the illusion of control that so often leads us to wonderment 
over seemingly inexplicable political phenomena of decision-making.  
But in addition to this problem, and perhaps more decisively, being rightfully 
angry – angry at the right thing, in the right amount and for the right reasons, to 
paraphrase Aristotle – is crucial in politics, with the same being valid for being 
justifiably afraid. The fact that those emotions are often uncontrolled and hence 
easily manipulated by less scrupulous political actors should not lead us towards the 
unattainable goal of repressing them completely – which represents an utter 
falsification of our own human nature – but rather towards the concern of making 
sure that they are experienced in the right measure whenever circumstances warrant 
it. Any program of emotional education that views either anger or fear essentially as 
destructive influences on reasoning, and even on physical or psychological health, is 
yet ill equipped to provide us with an unbiased understanding of emotions’ legitimate 
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– and potentially beneficial – effect on political behaviour. Only the latter will allow 
emotions to find (or perhaps to retrieve) their legitimate political usefulness, and 
cease to be regarded as mere political influences often employed in favour of less 
than virtuous political intentions. 
 
 
2. Emotions: From Theory to Practice 
 
 In order to pursue an alternative model of emotional education to the one 
provided by emotional intelligence, we must first find a different theoretical 
framework which allows us to understand the nature of emotional experience within 
the political sphere – shedding light over the latter’s ability to shape both the origins 
and the subsequent form of that experience. In light of this demand, as well as our 
previous considerations regarding the nature of emotional experience in Chapter II 
and III – namely, Damásio’s somatic marker hypothesis and De Sousa’s theory of 
paradigm scenarios – an approach that seems to be particularly suitable (and 
promising) is the one provided by what is known as practice theory. 
 Although, as Schatzki (2001) states, practice theory can be regarded as the 
product of a more or less accidental collaboration between a number of thinkers 
across different disciplines – such as Wittgenstein, Foucault, Lyotard, and Giddens, 
for instance – its contemporary expression is greatly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu’s 
approach to the subject, simultaneously sociological and philosophical in nature. 
Despite the difficulty in achieving a univocal definition of “practice theory” given 
the multiplicity of its sources and interpretations, we might nonetheless succinctly 
represent it as a theoretical approach that seeks to explain the ontological 
significance of practices for human beings that exist in a social context, 
simultaneously moulding and being moulded by it. Practices, in this context, can be 
loosely defined as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally 
organized around shared practical understanding” (Idem, p. 11). They are “competent 
performances”, “‘doings’ or routines of action [...] that carry specific meanings 
within particular cultural, historical, and material space” (Mattern, 2011, p. 70). In an 
ontological sense, practices are embodied activities which are not merely acted out 
by the agent but that also simultaneously act on the latter: the enacting of the activity 
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itself, the practical understanding required for it, its material conditions and 
constraints, its impact on the world around it, all of these aspects make affect the 
substance of the individual and make practice theory “a theory of how humans ‘do’ 
their very being-in-the-world” (Idem).  
 Understood in concrete terms, practice is essentially action. It can 
“encompass intentional, deliberate action”, but “it also includes, and indeed stresses, 
habituated behaviour executed without much cognitive attention paid” (Scheer, 2012, 
p. 200). As a way to account for (and expound on) this form of habituated behaviour, 
Bourdieu introduces the notion of habitus, derived from Aristotle’s use of ethos 
(habit) and its revival on the part of the Scholastic tradition41 . And much like 
Aristotle’s, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is established as a complex concept 
operating at different levels. In the first-instance, its scope and effect may be 
understood in purely biological terms: the “skilful use of the body in automatic 
movements, impulses, and activations is a learned practice, acquired through 
mimesis, making lasting changes in the body and brain”. Physiologically, habitual 
motions and postures “build up muscle tissue, innervation, and blood vessels in one 
area and not another, shorten some tendons, lengthen others, affect bone density and 
shape, and induce specific development of brain tissue (Idem, p. 202).  
Beyond this first level of effect, however, habitus proves equally able to 
affect our action and behaviour. It does not do so, however – contrary to what might 
be erroneously expected – under the simplistic terms of any kind of operative 
conditioning. Instead, Bourdieu espouses the perspective that individuals “behave 
according to the patterns that their community (class, milieu, subculture) requires, 
but not just in the sense of learning the rules of ‘appropriate’ behaviour [...] and 
obeying them”; in truth, they commonly employ a form of “implicit knowledge” 
imparted precisely by habitus and that which it helps develop – what Bourdieu terms 
practical sense. This practical sense can be defined as kind of “feel for the game” 
(the game analogy being commonly employed by Bourdieu regarding social 
practices and interactions), informed by a practical knowledge which, being “based 
on the continuous decoding of the perceived – but not consciously noticed – indices 
                                                           
41
 It is worth noting that Aristotle’s use of the notion already entailed the argument for the formative 
effect of habit, patent not only in his claims to that effect in the Politics and the Rhetoric, but also in 
the philosophical exploration of the similarity of the Greek words for habit (εθος) and character (ηθος) 
– thus implying that character is formed essentially through habituated action. 
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of the welcome given to actions already accomplished”, constantly carries out the 
necessary checks and corrections to conform the individual’s practices and 
expressions to social expectations (Bourdieu, 1995, p. 10).  
The habitus does not therefore “dictate the exact course of action in practice, 
but rather provides a ‘feel’ for the appropriate movements, gestures, facial 
expressions, pitch of the voice, and so on”. It escapes narrow behaviouristic 
determinism by allowing space for behaviours which are not “entirely and always 
predictable”, and which can actually “instantiate change and resistance” instead of 
predetermined reproduction (Scheer, p. 204). And despite the fact that – as evidenced 
by Bourdieu’s description – it often operates subconsciously, habitus is not irrational 
or unreasonable, but rather the consequence of a type of rationality and knowledge 
that elude conventional parameters. Understood as “body knowledge”, habitus is 
indeed contrasted with “conceptual knowledge” and intended to stand opposed to 
“rationality in rational-choice theory that [Bourdieu] so assiduously combated” 
without, however, being irrational – inasmuch as “it follows a practical logic” (Idem, 
p. 205). 
Bourdieu's approach, on the other hand, proceeds on the grounds of a 
conception of human reason which refuses to be equated with mere logical 
reasoning, but certainly does not reject it; instead, it builds on it and – much like the 
emotional rationality we have been positing – attempts to enlarge our understanding 
of human behaviour and action beyond the scope of possibilities provided by a 
narrow rationalism. As he puts it,   
 
[a]gents may engage in reasonable forms of behaviour without being rational; they may 
engage in behaviours one can explain, as the classical philosophers would say, with the 
hypothesis of rationality, without their behaviour having reason as its principle. They may 
conduct themselves in such a way that, starting with a rational evaluation of their chances 
for success, it seems that they were right in doing what they did, without one being 
justified in saying that a rational calculation of chances was at the origin of the choices 
they made  (1998, p. 76). 
 
 The existence and significance of a practical sense, governed by a practical 
logic, is – as Bourdieu argues – demonstrated by the contemporary attempts at 
developing “expert systems” and artificial intelligence: in practice, social agents – 
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“whether a doctor who makes a diagnosis or a professor who grades an examination” 
– possess “extremely complex classificatory systems” whose translation into practice 
can never be understood on purely cognitive and rational (in the narrow sense) terms, 
and thus can only be logically replicated through extraordinary programming effort – 
if at all. A true understanding of practice requires the realization that the latter is 
defined by “a logic that is not that of logic”, and therefore to apply “practical logic” 
to “logical logic”, or vice-versa – that is, to presume to understand one solely on the 
grounds (and through the means) of the other – is to “run the risk of destroying the 
logic one wants to describe with the instrument used to describe it” (Idem, p. 82). 
 
2.1. Practice theory and political action: emotions as practices 
 
Given the nature of habitus and the implied understanding of human 
rationality that conceptually underpins it, we find ourselves now better able to 
appreciate why Bourdieu practice theory appears to be exceptionally well-suited for 
the task of examining the nature of emotional experience in a socio-political context. 
Indeed, a significant amount of contemporary research in the field of political science 
and international relations argues that it may provide an opportunity to overcome a 
chronic inability to legitimately integrate emotion in the political process. As Mattern 
points out, even though few serious scholars in the political field “would deny the 
importance of emotion to world politics”, until recently “only a few have 
endeavoured to understand the ways in which this is so” (2011, p. 65). And even 
those among the latter group, for lack of adequate theoretical substantiation, often 
“end up belying their own arguments about how emotion matters” – to the point of 
“ironically indicating that emotion per se does not have a distinctive impact on world 
politics” (Idem). In light of this scenario, it has been argued that practice theory – 
which has had a “significant impact in sociology, anthropology, and cultural history 
in recent years” – has also “begun to provide a framework for thinking emotions” 
(Scheer, 2012, pp. 193-4), and one that “embraces, rather than assumes away, the 
ontological complexity of emotion” (Mattern, 2011, p. 63). 
 Practice theory seems to be particularly useful for studying emotion “because 
it elaborates most thoroughly the infusion of the physical body with social structure, 
both of which participate in the production of emotional experience” (Scheer, 2012, 
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p. 199). More to the point, the assumption of practice theory as a framework to 
understand emotion provides us with an understanding of the latter that transcends 
the limitations of the more common perspectives on emotion – such as the ones we 
might dub biological (emotions are simply materially determined phenomena that 
affect the individual) and cognitive (emotions are but different kind of cognitive 
judgement). Instead, practice theory may be used to provide a more fertile account of 
emotions as something which, like habitus, follow a "practical logic embedded in 
social relations” (Idem, p. 205). In this context, emotions would not be viewed as 
“passions” – in the sense of things that render us involuntary patientes (those who 
suffer or endure) – but rather as being both active and passive, inasmuch as they “can 
be a more or less voluntary sentiment, but they can also emerge from the 
receptiveness that [acquired] dispositions create” (Idem, p. 206). 
 That emotions can be expressed by our actions is obvious. The singular 
opportunity provided by practice theory is to go beyond that truism and regard 
emotions themselves as practices; we should not merely consider how “beings 
express emotions through practices”, but rather “how beings acquire the competency 
to ‘do’ a given emotion” and “how the doing of that emotion affects (literally) the 
social orders from which the emotional practice emerged in the first place” (Mattern, 
2011, p. 77). If we are able to provide a satisfactory answer to those two questions on 
the grounds of practice theory, we will find ourselves in the position to appropriately 
meet the problem of whether it is possible to educate emotion – and how. 
 An understanding of emotions as practices faces a number of key challenges. 
The first is precisely to overcome the ingrained view that emotions simply “happen”, 
and replace it with the realization that, more often than not, they are actually done. 
To understand emotions as practices or acts would thus provide “a way of 
counterbalancing the dominant language of emotions as always and essentially 
reactions, or triggered responses” (Scheer, 2012, p. 206). The crux of this challenge, 
I would argue, lies in the willingness to expand our comprehension of what 
constitutes action to include practical action (action through embodied practice) – 
which, as stated earlier, is a competent performance that entails varying levels of 
cognitive control. Current research on emotion would suggest a great deal of 
similarity between practical action and the process through which emotional 
experience takes place: “just as practical action (even that which is cognitively 
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mediated) is ultimately rooted in the unreflective “Background,” so are emotions”; 
emotions, both of the “cognitive and cognitively unmediated sort, ‘happen’ only as a 
result of a series of physiological bodily doings.” (Mattern, 2011, p. 77). 
 Furthermore, one might argue that the ability to experience genuinely and 
fully – or to enact, to do – a given emotion is not innate; in effect, the “the biological 
capacity to create a particular emotional experience” is something that we develop 
“as the open biological system traditionally called ‘the body’ interacts with the 
environments within which the being is positioned” (Idem). In this respect, Mattern 
provides the example of fear: the emotional experience of the latter seems to be 
determined by a number of contingent factors, namely those of a cultural nature 
(what feeling and sensations are acknowledged as amounting to fear), a biological 
nature (the particular collection of physiological and/or cognitive processes involved 
in the formation and expression of fear), and those concerning the environment (what 
kind of stimuli activate the biological processes). In conclusion, “a being learns how 
to experience, understand, and recognize fear”, which essentially demonstrates that 
“emotions are not just doings” but “competent ones” (Idem). 
 The second key challenge in understanding emotions as practices has to do 
with acknowledging the former’s socio-political scope and how it relates to the 
former aspect in terms of the origin, development, and effect of emotional practices. 
According to Bourdieu, practices are essentially defined by the two-way relation they 
establish with their social context. Likewise, emotional practices – although they 
“can be carried out alone” – “are frequently embedded in social settings” (Scheer, 
2012, p. 211).  
The aforementioned constant interplay between emotional practices and 
social context bears decisive consequences going both ways: on the one hand, as 
with “all competent performances, the practical actions that ‘do’ emotion carry social 
meaning and have social effects” (Mattern, 2011, p. 78); since “emotional practices, 
like all practices, express one’s way-of-being human”, they are an integral part “of 
what constitutes human social order” (Idem, p. 79). As such, emotional practices are 
thus one of the key constituting elements of the social context within which they take 
place. More than that, they are equally key constituting elements of the social 
identity of the person responsible for them: to enact and express an appropriate 
emotion in an appropriate context “not only makes one’s individual way-of-being 
175 
 
present but, to the extent that one’s performance is intelligible, emotional practices 
‘surface’ their practitioners as belonging to, or foreign to, a given social space” 
(Idem). 
 On the other hand, there is – to reiterate – a “mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between emotional practices and the structures from which they emerge” (Idem, 
p.78). The very nature of this formulation makes it plain that the effect of social 
context on emotion is at least as great as its contrary; emotional practices – their 
structure, content, and opportunity – are, to a large extent, determined by the social 
context that surrounds individuals. After all, practice theory tells us that “practical 
competence is learned in and through social engagements within a particular social 
structure” – such as habitus (Idem). There is hence an organic process at play, in 
which “physiological systems become integrated with, or entrained to, the rhythm of 
social interactions” – to such an extent that the latter often dispense cognitive 
reflection in provoking “the activation of a particular complex or flow of sensations 
and feelings” (Idem). 
 In light of practice theory, emotional practices – like all other practices – 
appear to be fundamentally learned from the social context in which they are 
integrated – and which they, in turn, affect. The nature of that learning process, 
however, is still to be clarified. To say that they are learned socially still does not 
contribute a great deal to advance our understanding of it; in a sense, one might 
argue, all learning happens “socially” – even the student sitting through an expositive 
lecture does so from within the immediate social structure of his class, and plays a 
commonly acknowledged wider social role (precisely, that of a “student”). What 
matters here is to ascertain the exact extent to which the learning alluded to by 
practice theory is social. Is it a process that simply takes place within social 
structures and dynamics, or rather one that takes place because of them? Following 
what we have said so far, it should be fairly easy to surmise that truth lies in the latter 
option. 
 From very early on in our lives, we are provided with one of the clearest 
corroborations that emotions can indeed be regarded as practices, when individuals – 
faced with the realization that “emotions do things in social contexts” (Scheer, 2012, 
p. 214) – begin using them in communication. We then come to employ them as a 
discourse beyond – or within – the discourse, using their enactment to convey and 
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emphasise certain aspects that would otherwise not be present or clear. The simple 
example of the average political speech and how its persuasiveness varies depending 
on whether it is delivered by an emotionally competent speaker – or the even more 
marked difference between it being delivered in person or simply conveyed in a 
pamphlet, for instance – should be enough to demonstrate the importance of 
emotional practices in a socio-political context. Even in everyday communication, 
we learn that our emotional performance can determine the degree of importance of 
the message, by indicating “how important it is for the recipient to decode the 
expression in the way it is intended” (Idem). 
 In the process of emotional education, the “expectations of the group are 
implicated in learned habits of feeling and stored in the habitus”; as such, “the 
acquisition of the sensibility, or emotional style, of a group proceeds via tacit 
socialization as well as explicit instruction: boys are specifically told not to cry, girls 
to swallow their anger” (Idem, p. 216). If, following recent scientific advances, we 
can indeed perceive the neural correlates of emotions in MRI scans, they “must be 
read as images of a ‘used’ brain, [...] molded by the practices of a specific culture”, 
and the “variations between scans of members of different social groups [as] 
meaningful data” (Idem, p. 220).  
The education of our emotions happens not only through the unmediated 
relationship we establish with our social context, but also – especially in our time – 
in a mediated manner. In this regard, “[l]istening to music, visiting a museum, 
attending a theater performance, watching a film or TV show, playing a video game, 
or reading a novel, for example, can modulate our feeling to a greater or lesser 
degree” (Idem, p. 210). All of those media demand our emotional involvement and, 
in doing so, transform their respective narratives into the very kind of paradigm 
scenarios (De Sousa, 1987) that we mentioned in a previous chapter. They excite our 
imagination and lead us to subconsciously enact the emotional practices being 
portrayed and interiorize their consequences as lessons that later shape our own 
emotional responses. As such, emotional education entails not only a autonomous 
effort – in the sense that “emotional practices are habits, rituals, and everyday 
pastimes that aid us in achieving a certain emotional state”, including “the striving 
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for a desired feeling as well as the modifying of one that is not desirable”42 – but also 
an heteronomous learning that takes place as a result of our integration in a social 
context which challenges the construction of individual identity from the very onset 
of life. Social life “is a constant struggle to construct a life out of the cultural 
resources one’s social experience offers, in the face of formidable social constraints” 
(Peterson, 2010, p. 140). Simply by existing in a society “structured by such 
constraints, and organised by the successful practices of those around you, one 
develops predispositions to act in certain ways” (Idem).   
 This idea that agency and emotional competence (in both the private and 
political spheres) are developed partly on the basis of heteronomous sources is 
something that, while being familiar to philosophical traditions of thought 
descending from Plato or Aristotle – for whom in order to learn how to rule 
[oneself], one must first learn how to obey [heteronomous sources of authority] – 
still causes some discomfort to theories of education and political behaviour which, 
such as the ones that prevail in our case, are marked by cognitivism. In terms of 
emotional education, and specifically regarding the development of virtuous 
emotional practices during the earlier stages of life, it is, however, an aspect of the 
pedagogic process which cannot be disregarded. Whether it is possible to 
purposefully harness and direct the process of social learning that leads to that 
development, is what we will now seek to ascertain. 
 
 
3. Emotional Education and Emulation 
 
 As we have just postulated, a great deal of our education of emotions – or 
emotional practices – is fulfilled via an exposure to the emotional practices of others, 
as well as their subsequent perceived success or failure within the social context. An 
emotional education erected upon the basis provided by practice theory must 
therefore take into account that emotional practices are learned not solely – or even 
primarily, we might argue – on the grounds of explicit instruction regarding how we 
ought or not behave, but rather through our exposure to the exemplary emotional 
                                                           
42
 Being thus part of “what is often referred to as ‘emotional management’ and the ongoing learning 
and maintaining of an emotional repertoire” (Scheer, 2012, p. 209) 
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practices of others. The pedagogic phenomena involved in this latter instance must, 
nevertheless, be qualified before proceeding any further: is emotional education to be 
understood simply as a matter of mindless imitation of heteronomous behaviour? The 
answer is unequivocally “no”. Emotional education should not be viewed as a matter 
of repetitive imitation – for that would inaugurate an even more reductionist model 
than the ones we have previously deemed unsuitable – but as a process involving the 
far richer phenomenon of emulation. 
At the core of the Aristotelian model of emotional education – or, rather, his 
conception of how the latter may come about, since he does not really provide us 
with an explicit educative program – one finds precisely the concept of emulation. 
As far as Aristotle is concerned, emulation (zêlos) is essentially a painful emotion 
which can be explained as a distress caused by perceiving valuable and desirable 
qualities in individuals who are of a similar nature to our own – which therefore 
means that those qualities would be attainable by us. It should therefore not to be 
confused with envy (phtonos), which can more accurately be defined as distress 
caused by the realization that someone has something we do not, and our desire of 
them not having it. 
 The concept of emulation plays a nuanced role in Aristotle’s work. Despite 
being categorized in the Rhetoric as a painful emotion, it is nevertheless presented by 
Aristotle as “a good thing and characteristic of good people”, inasmuch it motivates 
the emulous to strive towards achieving those “good things” that they do not possess, 
but might yet do (2007, p. 146 [1388b1]). Given that only “honoured goods” are the 
object of emulation, Aristotle argues, virtues must necessarily be counted among the 
latter. And if the distress which characterizes emulation serves as a driving force 
towards achieving the good things within our grasp, then it should necessarily drive 
us towards virtue more than anything else. Understood in this fashion, emulation 
may actually be perceived as amounting to a virtue itself, in a twofold sense: a moral 
virtue, for it embodies an aspiration towards (morally) “good things”; and a 
pedagogic virtue – a virtue in the pursuit of virtue, as it were – inasmuch as many of 
those good things are virtues themselves, and achievable only through the purposeful 
betterment of the individual. Thus, Kristjánsson tells us, for Aristotle emulation is 
not a virtue of the “fully virtuous” but “of those on the way to virtue” and hence 
“characteristic of the young” (2007, p. 106). 
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   Adopting a position later echoed by practice theory, Aristotle places a clear 
emphasis on the importance of habit and role-modelling. To recapitulate our previous 
deconstruction of the argument, he starts off from the question of whether the efforts 
of the educator should be focussed on the logical or alogical (alogon) part of the 
soul. Since the latter precedes the former, he concludes that much as “the training of 
the body must precede that of the mind”, so too must the training of appetite (orexis) 
precede that of the intelligence. Reinforcing the analogy, he adds that the education 
of appetite should be undertaken “for the sake of the intellect [nous]”, exactly in the 
same measure that the training of the body is done “for the sake of the soul” (1959, p. 
617 [1334b25-30]).  
An individual’s education at an early age should essentially focus on shaping 
desires and emotions, attempting to foster the sort of dispositions or subconscious 
inclinations towards what educators regard as virtuous modes of emotional 
experience. Recalling Fortenbaugh’s account of this process, we might say that 
“young people are at first habituated to love and hate correctly, so that later when 
they have acquired the ability to deliberate and reflect there will be a symphony 
between habituated preferences and what reasoning shows to be good” (1975, p. 49). 
The issue now, in light of what we have learned from practice theory, is ascertaining 
how the habitus can be directed towards fostering desirable emotional practices, and 
through which means can emulation be operationalized in service of that goal. 
A first answer to the question at hand is provided by the didactic use of 
paradigmatic tales (in the sense of De Sousa’s theory of paradigm scenarios). The 
role of such paradigmatic tales derived from myth and poetry in education was, in 
fact, already widely recognised in the Ancient world – as attested by the foundational 
socio-cultural significance of the epic of Gilgamesh or the works of Homer and 
Hesiod, for instance. Imbued with a performative effect, they make the consequences 
– both positive and negative – of the hero’s actions salient, thus implicitly fostering 
specific models of behaviour. They are responsible for shaping the individual’s 
perceived legitimate expectations regarding the consequences of possessing a given 
character trait or electing a certain course of action, and as such modulate not only 
conscious thought processes, but also subconscious emotional practices.  
In this sense, they provide us with one of the clearest examples of the 
dynamics of emulation employed in the service of education: for all intents and 
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purposes, the story’s hero and secondary characters operate as role-models, and do so 
regardless of the laudatory or cautionary nature of their tale. Even at a young age, the 
child’s mind is at work absorbing the implicit lessons in the hero’s example, in a 
fashion almost cognitively indistinguishable from the lessons he or she derives from 
concrete experience. Through emulation and imagination, both the positive and the 
negative consequences of the hero’s character and behaviour are effectively 
integrated into concrete emotional practices, to such an extent that the confrontation 
with the catastrophic result of the former’s jealousy, for instance, can be endowed 
with a similar educative effect to the concrete punishment imposed on the child 
unwilling to share with a sibling. 
 A brief caveat concerning this matter: it is precisely due to this performative 
effect of myth and poetry – grounded on emulation – that Plato’s aforementioned 
caution against the irrationalism of those media arises. But even though we have 
characterized his view as being hostile to the potential for emotional exaltation that 
they hold, Plato nonetheless acknowledges their undeniable and irreplaceable effect 
in the education of citizens. After all, as Lines explains, “effective learning engages 
the imagination. We pay attention to and remember what excites or disturbs us. 
Myths emerge from uncertain origins and grow more compelling as storytellers hone 
their tales to enthral listeners” (2009, p. 47).  
Rather tellingly, Plato himself considers that, under ideal circumstances, the 
political education of individuals must begin precisely by “supervising the makers of 
tales” and enforcing a careful selection of which stories reach the ears of children. 
Then, one must “persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their 
children and shape their souls with tales more than [they could ever shape] their 
bodies with hands” (Republic, 1991, p. 55 [377b-d]). Despite considering that one 
must purge the old tales – including those of Homer and Hesiod – Plato nevertheless 
acknowledges their power, and thus “invents new ‘myths’”  whose performative 
effects are specifically political, and in line with the overarching purposes of the 
Republic: his myth of the metals “aims to persuade people to accept their place 
within the state”; the story of Er “promises heavenly rewards for good behaviour”; 
and the allegory of the cave “implies that most citizens are in the dark and should 
trust in the decision of the philosopher-ruler” (Lines, 2009, p. 47). 
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3.1. Emulation and role-modelling 
 
Obviously, the educational reach of emulation is not restricted to the fictional 
heroes of mythological and literary sources, nor is its acknowledgement as a 
legitimate and powerful pedagogic instrument limited to Plato or Aristotle. On the 
contrary, there is significant contemporary research on the educational value of 
emulation (or role modelling, as it is often termed), understood primarily as a source 
of moral or character education (Lickona, 1991; Rose, 2004; Cruess, Cruess & 
Steinhert, 2008; Martino & Rezai-Rashti, 2012). This latter perspective focuses 
greatly on employing real-life personages of historic and cultural significance – 
religious and political leaders, civil rights activists, athletes, actors, etc. – as role 
models whose exemplary conduct should be emulated by students as a means of 
character education. Not only that, we are told that teachers themselves should be 
aware that they too are a target of emulation on the part of students and thus act 
accordingly – educating them not only through conventional means, but also through 
mentoring and example. 
Contemporary proposals for education via role-modelling stand in 
contradiction to the prevailing view on education, which widely regards moral or 
character development as a sort of by-product of cognitive development and 
biological maturation. In the eyes of the latter, role-modelling is inherently flawed by 
being grounded on “an emotionally (as opposed to rationally) driven, extrinsically 
(as opposed to intrinsically) motivated and heteronomously (as opposed to 
autonomously) formed morality” – untenable in light of the Kantian heritage that still 
determines much of contemporary pedagogic theory in these matters (Kristjánsson, 
2007, p. 99). Obviously, this criticism ignores both the natural didactic progression 
from habit to reason cited by Aristotle and the plain concrete inability of 
“conventional” education to provide a valid alternative for a morally and politically 
valuable education of emotion. The fact that this objection is questionably biased 
does not mean, however, that role-modelling is without significant conceptual and 
methodological problems; in fact, one could point out at least three issues on whose 
resolution hinges the validity of the approach: an “empirical problem of why this 
method is needed”, a “methodological problem” of how to motivate students to 
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emulate the prescribed role-models, and a “substantive moral problem” regarding 
what exactly should be taught through role-modelling (Idem, p. 100). 
Regarding the first of these issues – the empirical problem of why a 
purposeful attempt at role-model education should be necessary – the question seems 
to be related to the perception that role-modelling is something that occurs regardless 
of any educational efforts in that direction. Children naturally and implicitly seem to 
adopt those adults closer to them in the rearing process – parents, grandparents, older 
siblings, teachers – as de facto role-models for their own character development. 
Why then should we, as a society, waste time and resources in promoting role-
modelling at the level of formal education?  
The answer to this question is perhaps easily predictable: first of all, in 
today’s mediatised society it is impossible to circumscribe the roster of individuals 
eligible by young people as potential role-models to the aforementioned close circle 
of individuals; the sort of control demanded by Plato’s ideal polis over the 
transmission of tales is today made virtually impossible by the sheer amount of 
mediatised stimuli present at any given time. And in light of the impossibility of fully 
isolating children from the latter, there is no guarantee that their role-models will be 
parents and teachers, rather than some less recommendable movie character or reality 
TV personality. 
Secondly, even if it were possible to exert tight control over this kind of 
possible influences on the individual’s character development, limiting them to 
sources like parents and teachers, there would still be no guarantee that the latter 
would necessarily prove to be ideal role-models in light of our pedagogic intentions 
if we do not foment their awareness of the impact that their behaviour and emotional 
practices have upon children and students. One might realize that one teaches by 
example, but still be uncertain as to what kind of example to provide in order to truly 
benefit those learning from it. 
In light of this twofold answer to the empirical problem, it would thus seem 
that there is indeed cause for a greater emphasis on role-modelling from the part of 
educators – which, unlike children, are in a position to apply valid criteria to the 
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selection of individuals, real or fictional, as sources of emulation conducive to proper 
emotional and moral development43.  
 Moving on to the more complicated methodological problem, one finds at its 
core a question which must necessarily be asked following what we have just said: 
given that role-modelling requires students to adopt certain individuals as role-
models –subconsciously at an early age and consciously later on – how can role-
modelling be achieved in concrete terms? In other words, how can an educator insure 
that students are motivated to emulate the example of a given individual?  
This is a problem whose relevance increases proportionally to the cognitive 
development of young people. In the earliest stages of a child’s life, it may actually 
seem irrelevant, inasmuch as children possess a well-documented innate instinct 
towards mimicking the behaviour of their primary caretakers – which accounts, 
among other things, for the development of language and non-verbal communication 
during that period. As the child’s consciousness develops, however, more complex 
processes come into play, and we are faced with something that is no longer mere 
imitation, but a precocious form of emulation: specific individuals are targeted as 
sources of emulation, based not only on their proximity and familiarity to the child, 
but also on the latter’s perception of them as occupying a desirable and achievable 
social role. Same-sex parents and older siblings are especially salient at this stage, as 
are certain individuals in both real-life and fiction which are perceived as socially 
well-regarded (e.g. “popular” playmates, the seemingly omniscient and well-
respected teacher, the acclaimed hero in a favourite cartoon or comic-book, and so 
on).  
With the further maturing of consciousness, a greater involvement of 
cognitive assessment in deciding whom to emulate becomes apparent, and the 
methodological problem hence achieves its full expression. Much of the literature on 
the subject seems to implicitly assume that simply because an individual exhibits 
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 This may perhaps be read by some as amounting to a defence of some sort of quasi-totalitarian 
model of education, advocating control and manipulation over the defenceless minds of children. The 
fact remains, however, that emulation and role-modelling unavoidably take place in a child’s 
development, irrespective of any external action to that effect. The issue then becomes one of 
minimizing risk: is it preferable to allow the process to occur uncontrolled and thus chance entering a 
dynamic of social reproduction of emotional disability and moral shortcomings, or to try and direct it 
towards an arguably more virtuous end-goal, to the detriment of our liberal sensitivities? It is my 
conviction that, despite our frequent reluctance to admit it, any and all education implies a measure of 
control – some might even call it tyranny – of the educator over the educatee; the best we can hope for 
is that such control is employed to the benefit of the latter’s development. 
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qualities that the educators recognise to be good and desirable, the students will share 
that assessment, and thus feel almost unavoidably drawn to emulate the individual in 
question. Outside absolutely ideal circumstances, however – the correct role-model, 
for the right group of students, at the appropriate moment of their lives and 
psychological development – this simply is not the case. In truth, many of the 
subconscious processes that underpin emulation in previous stages of development 
remain equally decisive at this stage, and must therefore be subject to serious 
consideration on the part of educators. 
It would be impossible, within the scope of this work, to undertake a 
comprehensive answer to the methodological problem – an effort of a similar scale, 
solely devoted to the philosophy of education, would likely be required. But 
following what we have said so far, we can nevertheless advance a necessary 
condition for its solution: in order to be an effective complement to the learning of 
emotional practices that ensues from the individual’s interaction with the social 
context, an emotional education based on role-modelling would require the ability to 
present prospective role-models as affectively appealing. In other words, their 
importance or merit cannot simply be presented matter-of-factly but in a manner in 
which it can be emotionally experienced, so as to elicit some sort of affective 
attachment – the latter being indispensable towards the motivation processes 
associated with emulation.  
Taking once again a step back towards Aristotle’s account of emulation – 
which Kristjánsson argues to be able to solve this methodological problem –  we 
realize that it should be comprised by affective (“the kind of pain at the relative lack 
of a desired quality possessed by the role-model”), conative (“the motivation to 
acquire such quality”), cognitive (an understanding of why that quality is of a moral 
value and how to reasonably attain it) and behavioural (“the actual striving for this 
quality”) elements (Idem, p. 108). While contemporary proposals of character-
education through role-modelling commonly emphasise the conative and behavioural 
elements, they often “display an unfortunate lack of concern for the emotional 
prerequisites of (Aristotelian) emulation, and more or less disregard its cognitive 
component” (Idem) – and thus lack the very aspects that underpin the potential of 
role-modelling as an effective pedagogic strategy. 
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 The methods for a prospective education of emotion must be of a 
simultaneously emotional and cognitive nature – in line with our conception of 
human rationality as an emotional rationality. We must not allow emulation and mere 
imitation to be understood as synonymous; if they are, we risk simply replacing 
“copycat vice for copycat virtue”, by grounding our efforts on “an unsophisticated, 
undemanding and uncritical – almost infantilizing – model of emulation, essentially 
devoid of cognitive content” (Idem, p. 102). Unlike imitation, which is an inwardly 
unreflective activity – its subject clay to be moulded to the shape of its object – 
emulation is meant to decisively involve a component of self-reflection. The 
assumed model is not to be merely copied, but rather serve as the spark that ignites a 
moment of self-realization regarding individuals’ aspirations and their potential to 
fulfil them. This cognitively justified demand for self-transformation must, however, 
be emotionally driven: the students’ pain at the lack of a desired (and ultimately 
achievable) quality is a pedagogic tool for the educator, who must therefore 
endeavour to demonstrate to “the learners how such pain could only be alleviated by 
their taking reasonable and realistic steps themselves to acquire the quality in 
question” (Idem, p. 111). 
 Following this, we now arrive at the substantive moral question regarding 
role-modelling, which had already been perceived by Aristotle himself: do we 
emulate someone because they possess qualities which are morally good and hence 
desirable, or are those qualities only deemed to be so precisely because they are 
found in those whom we elected to emulate?  
It seems immediately clear that at a very early age – when emulation is not so 
much a conscious choice as it is the fulfilment of a biological instinct – the latter case 
is true: any salient character traits and behavioural patterns of those closer to the 
child will likely be the object of emulation, and thus decisively shape subsequent 
emotional practices and models of behaviour. The difficulty of the problem becomes 
evident, however, when we realize that “[m]any accounts of role-modelling seem to 
personalize the method beyond good measure”, implicitly sustaining that “[m]oral 
qualities become important because they are displayed by the role models, rather 
than [...] because they are – substantially and independently – important” (Idem, p. 
109). This view not only entails rather obvious and considerable ethical issues, but 
once again stands in contradiction with Aristotle’s own perspective. According to the 
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latter, Kristjánsson argues, the phronimos – who is the “final arbiter of moral 
correctness” – follows the standards for proper action and emotion “because they are 
morally appropriate, and not the other way around”; his knowledge of what is 
morally good is not a consequence of a “divine” or “blessed” nature, as it were, but 
rather from his understanding of “the intrinsic value of the virtues” (Idem). 
Now, there seems to be a paradox at play here: if young people are engaging 
in emulation in order to learn how to be [emotionally] virtuous, it stands to reason 
that, at the onset of the process, they have no way of recognizing what constitutes 
virtue other than deducing it from what is displayed and enacted by the role-model. 
While those qualities should, in principle, be recognizable as such independently of 
the role-model, in concrete terms they are only acknowledged as worthy of emulation 
because of their connection with the latter. How then can we postulate that, in the 
process of emulation, virtues must be regarded independently in light of their own 
moral (and political) importance? 
The answer to this is intimately connected with Aristotle’s implicit solution to 
the aforementioned methodological problem. An emotional education based upon 
emulation understood in Aristotelian terms would seek to emphasise the moral and 
political virtuousness not only of the role-model per se, but also of his or her 
emotional practices and dispositions; it would highlight the reasons why the latter are 
both morally commendable and conducive to overall human well-being, and thus 
regard exemplary role-models “as representative, rather than constitutive” of virtue 
(Idem, p. 111). At this level, the solution of the paradox ensues from the multi-
faceted nature of emulation, which evolves alongside the development of the 
individual’s consciousness and cognitive abilities: initially, following the example of 
a virtuous role-model is the main path that young people may follow towards 
learning emotional virtue; but subsequently, an understanding of why certain 
emotional practices are worthy of emulation is gradually developed, leading to the 
appreciation of emotional virtue independently from role-models. While the latter 
may still be employed as pedagogic tools, they are so only because they exhibit and 
enact virtuous practices, not the other way around – and this is “precisely what is 
meant by taking account of the cognitive element of emulation” (Idem). 
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4. Emotional Virtue in Practice 
 
 We are now in a position to translate the question posed earlier – “is it 
possible to educate for virtue?” – into a more accurate formulation: is it possible to 
educate our emotions to the extent that they become closer to virtues rather than 
vices, in both ethical and political terms? 
 The answer is, as it is often the case, beyond the comfortable certainty of a 
binary calculation. First and foremost, on the grounds of Bourdieu’s practice theory 
and Aristotelian philosophy – as well as developmental psychology – it seems clear 
that, at an early age, it is not only possible to educate emotions, but actually 
unavoidable to do so. Habitus is a strong formative force, and most irresistible at the 
time where critical awareness of its effect is absent. The social context of children 
provides them with innately determined role-models, whose emotional practices will 
inexorably shape their own, and create in them certain dispositions which will later 
be difficult to contradict even under conscious control. 
 The truly challenging nature of the question arises, however, when one begins 
considering the possibility of educating the emotions of individuals at a later stage in 
life, when those very emotions are commonly perceived as being more or less 
permanently stabilized. At this point, one might raise some possible objections to the 
pedagogic model we have examined – legitimized by practice theory and based on 
Aristotelian emulation. Firstly, it may appear to be feasible only at an early age, and 
even then imply significant (and implausible) control over the environment in which 
the child’s education takes place. Secondly, there is the issue of social reproduction, 
and whether it is possible, in educative terms, to contradict the myriad of influences 
that individuals are exposed to within the social context.  
 Without repeating ourselves, and taking into account the aforementioned 
impossibility to present here detailed methodological approaches to the problem, it is 
possible to answer most of these objections by emphasising the multi-faceted nature 
of emulation as a pedagogic instrument. An emotional education based on the latter 
not only seeks to educate emotions, but also employs them as the driving force 
behind the pedagogic process. If educators are able to endow prospective role-
models with sufficient affective pull, they should become salient in the mind of 
learners to a degree that is enough to surpass other sources of influence.  On the other 
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hand, because the educative process ultimately aims at the cognitive 
acknowledgement of the inherent moral and political value of the qualities being 
emulated, it transcends the mere education through habit which is only suitable at the 
earliest developmental stages, and thus becomes applicable throughout an 
individual’s instruction. 
 For the sake of argument, let us however now suppose that the 
aforementioned objections were completely valid and that we, as citizens of a given 
polis, generally reach the end of the educative process as political agents whose 
emotional practices are often more vicious than virtuous. Would there still be any 
hope for a politically beneficial education of emotions at this point?  
The difficulty of the endeavour notwithstanding, I argue that there would – 
and I do so precisely on the grounds of practice theory. Naturally, we cannot simply 
will ourselves into having a different emotional response than the one elicited by a 
given situation, and – despite our misguided best intentions – we are even less able to 
force ourselves to have none at all. But when we understand our emotions as 
practices – which, in light of my earlier examination, I maintain there is good reason 
to do regarding many of the more politically relevant ones – we realize that an 
education of emotions becomes an ultimately feasible practical activity. In the same 
manner in which one learns other embodied practices (e.g. driving a car, sculpting a 
vase, playing a musical instrument, etc.) through observation, reproduction, and 
repetitive enacting, so can one acquire new emotional practices and modify pre-
existing ones. Emulation is obviously a key aspect of this process: one of the most 
effective methods through which we can educate our emotional practices is precisely 
by recognizing the virtuous practices of another, and subsequently striving to 
emulate them. Through successive emulation, habitus is formed; through habitus, 
emotional practices are gradually embodied and thus become our own. 
The importance of aesthetic education, mentioned by Arnstine (1966), is also 
paramount to this process. Friedrich Schiller, one of the great advocates of the 
former, and a critic of the Kantian conception of reason that later informed much of 
liberalism’s theory of education, argued that the key for political freedom lay not in 
the suppression of emotion by reason, but in the education of emotion to the extent 
that the latter becomes harmonious with virtuous action (2004 [1794]). Even when 
such a point is conceded in principle by liberal theorists of education, what the latter 
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often fail to realize – and Schiller did not – is that the education of emotion is not a 
merely cognitive affair. Believing it is, and failing to achieve it on those grounds, is 
what actually underpins our perceived impotence concerning it.  
On the contrary, as made clear by Aristotle’s account of emulation, an 
emotional element is always involved. In a somewhat paradoxical fashion, we need 
emotion to educate emotions – that is, if the pedagogic process is not able to summon 
our emotional involvement, then it will prove unable to effect any significant change 
on our emotional practices. An education of emotion, even that proceeding on the 
basis of emulation and practice theory, must thus be aesthetically engaging. We 
emulate those whose example stirs our emotions and our imagination. If we are 
emotionally neutral regarding a given potential role-model, our cognitive approval of 
their perceived qualities will not be enough to motive our desire to emulate them and 
thus develop their salient emotional practices.  
 In conclusion, what we propose is not an outright rejection of the principles 
of liberal education – for liberty and autonomy should definitely constitute key 
pedagogic goals – but that we acknowledge the necessity to achieve a broader 
understanding of those principles and of how it is possible to include emotions in the 
process while still preserving – and actually enhancing – them. To endow individuals 
with true liberty and autonomy, as we previously argued, are illegitimate – and 
unrealistic – aims for an education that neglects emotional education, for emotional 
virtue and fortitude are inextricable parts of what it means to be (politically) free and 
autonomous. 
The education of our emotions is a possible, if considerably difficult, 
endeavour. At an early age, it depends heavily on the quality of the role-models with 
whom we interact – and towards whom we are emotionally drawn. In subsequent 
stages of development, emotional education becomes something which, in order to 
be successful in, we must not only become emotionally involved in, but also willing 
to undertake as a conscious and constant practical activity. Due to the multilayered 
nature of the process, the kind of emotional vigour that, as we have argued, our 
political existence critically requires is considerably easier to attain if our involuntary 
influences at its earlier stages are already conducive to that result. The eventuality 
that they are not, however, does not excuse us from our political responsibility in this 
regard.  
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Contrary to what we might feel, our early emotional education is not a form 
of determinism; while the latter certainly establishes a strong inclination, it does not 
equate to inescapable determination. One of the consequences of acknowledging an 
emotional rationality, rather than the customary irrational emotionality, is precisely 
the conviction that we are able to educate our emotional practices to the same extent 
that we educate our intellect. As we have said, the difficulty of the task may be 
considerable; but even if that is true, that difficulty is still greatly surpassed by the 
severity of the political consequences of ignoring it. 
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Conclusion 
 
In our efforts to deconstruct the overly rationalistic conception of politics 
characteristic of our times, and thus better comprehend the political role of emotion, 
we often found ourselves challenging the tenets of liberalism. In light of that fact, 
one might assume the existence of a thinly veiled political agenda animating our 
work. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. While our overarching motive is 
definitely political, it is not subordinate to any specific conception or brand of 
partisan politics. In advancing a critical view of liberalism, and particularly of the 
mistaken conception of human rationality that informs much of liberal theory, we 
have not intended to discredit or call for the abandonment of its political project. The 
core values of the latter – autonomy, equality, justice – are values which we too 
regard as indispensable in democratic politics. Our critique is hence not directed 
against liberalism per se, but rather at a crucial error of liberal theory, that hinders the 
former in its pursuit of the concretization of such values in political practice.  
The problem of the political role of emotions, which liberal theory has 
generally been unable or unwilling to address with true philosophical openness, has 
wide ramifications. Some of the latter are, to reiterate, directly connected with the 
possibility to genuinely foster the autonomy of citizens of contemporary democratic 
polities, which provides the sine qua non for equality, justice, and a number of other 
systemic prerequisites of democracy. This results in the critical contradiction of our 
current political reality: our political theory, which we employ not only to understand 
and predict behaviour, but also to direct policy-making and political action at the 
highest instances, is predominantly rationalistic; our political reality, on the contrary, 
is determined by mechanisms – group dynamics, propaganda, expert systems, the 
state of exception – that either presuppose or rely upon the insufficiency of 
individual reason, and the surreptitious pervasiveness of emotion in the processes of 
reasoning and decision-making.  
The “politics of rationality”, which can be found at the heart of that 
contradiction, should not be construed as a synonym of rational politics, but of a 
political conception ensuing from the application of the limited and reductionist 
notion of rationality that we endeavoured to deconstruct. Obviously, politics – and 
especially democratic politics – must be rational. But they must be so in a fuller 
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sense, oriented by a reason that is not artificially monolithic and isolated from other 
dimensions of human experience – “pure” reason – but by phronesis, practical 
wisdom.  
This critical paradigm shift in political thought begins with the 
acknowledgement of human rationality as an essentially emotional rationality, and of 
the latter’s emotional dimension as an inevitable influence upon political behaviour. 
That inevitability is, to reiterate, the result of two seemingly distinct but concurrent 
phenomena: on the one hand, as neurological and experimental evidence 
demonstrates, emotions are inextricably linked to processes of decision-making, 
action, and motivation – all of which are key elements of political behaviour. On the 
other, the demands and constraints of contemporary democratic polities routinely 
place political decisions beyond the scope of logical calculation, thus forcing 
individuals to rely on the very dimension of rationality whose legitimacy in the 
political process they have systematically been led to dismiss – emotion.  
 The fact that our political existence is decisively influenced by emotions 
should not, however, degenerate into fatalism. While that influence can be 
potentially misleading – being no different than an erroneous logical calculation in 
that regard – it remains nonetheless legitimate and potentially beneficial. Emotion 
has a rightful place in the political process, as much as it does in human rationality. 
As long as properly educated, it can constitute political virtue rather than vice. 
Phronesis, the practical wisdom that we have just said to be the proper guide for 
political action, is – in traditional terms – comprised by both logical and emotional 
virtues, acquired through emulation, contemplation, and experience. Read in light of 
this description, the model of emotional education grounded upon emulation, role-
modelling, and practice theory that we have advanced, holds the potential to not only 
educate emotions, but also to prepare and predispose individuals towards an 
autonomous pursuit of phronesis.  
If such a goal is attained, if the political education of citizens comes to 
contemplate more than facts and figures, moving towards a concern with fostering 
practical wisdom and emotional vigour, we will have taken an invaluable step in the 
right direction. Not only will we have guarded ourselves against the danger of the 
political exploitation of a rationalistic prejudice that blinds us to a considerable 
dimension of the political process, but we will also have moved decisively towards 
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ensuring that the key democratic values of autonomy, equality, transparency, justice, 
and truth remain living and breathing components of the political – as opposed to 
mere hollowed-out remnants of what was once a radiant idea of democracy. 
Schmitt’s concern with the effacement of the political, the genuinely political, is 
now, more than ever, a problem that faces us. The barren rationalization of politics 
and its subordination to the logic of the markets, which Schmitt had already 
envisioned, has only increased since the time of his writing – being perhaps even, 
rather ironically, precipitated by the political and philosophical consequences of what 
he inexcusably appears to have perceived as a welcome reaction to such phenomena: 
the advent of Nazism.  
The aforementioned contradiction between the rationalistic character of our 
political thought and the inherent emotionality of our political reality is not just 
misleading for individual citizens – who are increasingly presented with the 
overwhelming rationality of technocratic politics, austerity measures, and various 
other categorical imperatives of the economic kind – but also a serious risk to the 
sustainability of democratic politics, when that purported rationality is consistently 
refuted by the unforgiving reality of concrete results. In a seemingly paradoxical 
manner, the door for irrational politics – the kind that is antithetical to the very 
foundations of democratic politics – is being opened by the [sterile] rationalization of 
the political process, which poses a serious threat to genuinely rational politics. It is a 
phenomenon which, in Europe, has resulted in the rise in popularity of extremist and 
secessionist parties which were, until recently, little more than fringe political 
phenomena. Thus, something becomes evident: if we do not guard ourselves against 
the inevitable failure of the politics of rationality, the alternative forced upon us can 
prove quite pernicious. 
The reprehensible nature of his political affiliations notwithstanding, 
Schmitt’s appreciation was correct in one regard: ideologically, the politics of the 
Nazi party did indeed represent a reaction against the consequences of the 
rationalization of politics, prevalent in a Germany still attempting to cope with the 
impositions of the Treaty of Versailles; legally, on the other hand – as Agamben 
notes – those same politics were legitimized through the expedient that was 
constitutionally available then, and increasingly pervasive in political practice now – 
the state of exception. The parallels should be enough to make us wary regarding our 
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own political situation. The possibility of establishing the exception as political 
paradigm is indirectly provided by the politics of limited rationality, and the first 
steps towards it seem to have already been taken. To counteract that ongoing process, 
the acknowledgement of the political role of emotion and the effort to insure the 
virtuous nature of the latter will be instrumental. Much like the Weimar Republic in 
post-war Germany, contemporary western politics find themselves at a crossroads: 
either we acknowledge the rising winds, and brace our foundations, or we allow 
ourselves to be swept away by the storm. It is unclear when – or whether – we would 
be able to recover from the latter. 
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